


Chalmers H. Roberts
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STATINTL

Helms, the Shah and the CIA

THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only because of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intelligence Agency as well as American foreign policy.

Helms first went to work at the CIA in 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is generally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he personally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or oriented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an action that returned the Shah to his throne. One can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President Nixon was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy.

The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at



1953: Teheran rioting that overthrew the government left the United States Point Four office with gaping holes for windows and doors.

the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian story in their book, "The Invisible Government," and the CIA boys at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the government that the United States had had a hand in what occurred.

IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who confused Westerners with his habits of weeping in public and running government business from his bed, nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refinery. The West boycotted Iranian oil

and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi to replace him. The man who stage-managed the job on the spot was Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washingtonian in private business.

Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roosevelt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zahedi as Premier but Mossadegh arrested the officer who brought the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roosevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In time a new international oil consortium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day, though the Shah has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners.

In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran and Guatemala it "became clear" that a Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, wrote in his book, "The Game of Nations," that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax." He credited Roosevelt with "almost single-handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran" and supervising "their riots so as to oust" Mossadegh.

TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms will go after he leaves the CIA is a stable, well armed and well oil-financed regime under the Shah's command which has mended its fences with Moscow without hurting its close relationship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantage of the changes in East-West relations from the Cold War

While Iran and Guatemala were the high points of covert CIA Cold War ac-

tivity, there were plenty of other successful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale affairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer "secret war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one assumes with the reservation that President Nixon (who was Vice President at the time of Iran) loves surprises.

The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must be taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bissell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activities. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered this as a serious problem."

PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared in Harper's and I had suggested to him some further revelations he might include in the book. He wrote about additions he was making: "This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid."

There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the operation in Iran that he proffered the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have served under you" in such an operation. That remark, Roosevelt is said to have replied, was better than the decoration.

Helms doubtless would be the last to say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that, if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to in

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:

Masters of the U-2

In The Post of Nov. 30 there is an article by your Bernard Nossiter, under an Oslo dateline, about the Russian submarine excursion into the Norwegian fjord. On page A10, column 7, there is this paragraph:

"If an exercise had been scheduled for November in the Sognefjord, the explanation runs, the Soviet military would have been insensitive to the political authorities. In this view, the Soviet military was not trying to sabotage Helsinki, any more than the Pentagon masters of the U-2 were out to undermine the summit 12 years ago. The Soviet military machine, it is suggested, may have simply been pursuing business as usual."

Mr. Nossiter has his facts wrong. Perhaps he should consult your recently retired Chalmers M. Roberts, who could tell him the Pentagon held no "masters of the U-2." In his book, "The Nuclear Years" (Praeger, 1970) Mr. Roberts discusses the matter, starting on page 43. He makes it clear the U-2 flights were ordered by Presi-

dent Eisenhower and were directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. They also were carried out by a contractor (Lockheed) who was paid by CIA.

Another authority who might persuade Mr. Nossiter is Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. In "A Thousand Days" (Houghton Mifflin, 1965). Mr. Schlesinger writes on page 241 of how Richard Bissell, CIA's deputy director for operations, "conceived and fought through the plan of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union."

Clearly, Mr. Nossiter's comment is not based on fact. The Defense Department used some of the information obtained by the U-2 and Defense Secretary Thomas Gates said so. But to declare, as Mr. Nossiter did, that "Pentagon masters of the U-2" instigated or carried out the flights is incorrect.

CLAUDE WITZE.

Washington.

STATINTL

23 OCT 1972

SECRET FLIGHTS ON THE FRINGE OF SPACE

Spy Plane—Faster Than Speed of a Bullet

STATINTL

BY MARVIN MILES

Times Aerospace Writer

BEALE AIR FORCE BASE—America's bullet-fast Blackbirds roost at this heavily guarded nest north of Sacramento, awaiting assignment to secret, fringe-of-space reconnaissance flights anywhere in the world.

Their mission: To provide U.S. military and civilian decision makers with timely information for what the State Department calls "crisis management."

Incredible successors to the U-2 spy plane, their role obviously lies between that of the USAF's hush-hush reconnaissance satellites and the nation's far-flung network of undercover agents and hidden monitoring stations.

If special information is needed quickly for a crucial decision—perhaps days before a surveillance satellite would be on track to check a given area—the Ninth Strategic Reconnaissance Wing here gets the call.

A unit of the Strategic Air Command, the unusual wing commanded by Col. Jerome F. O'Malley has one squadron with an undisclosed

number of the big, delta-wing Blackbirds—SR-71s—the closest plane yet to an intercontinental missile.

But instead of a warhead or bombs or rockets, or any armament whatsoever, the Blackbirds carry a vast array of super-sophisticated reconnaissance systems, exotic electronic sensors and cameras and recording gear to keep a sharp Yankee eye wherever it's needed, night and day.

They also carry elaborate electronic countermeasure (ECM) equip-

An SR-71 from Beale Air Force Base was used in the search for House Majority Leader Hale Boggs. Part 1, Page 5.

ment to jam radar search signals and thwart hostile missiles that might be launched against them from the ground or from fighter interceptors.

Otherwise, pilots say, the superb aircraft designed and produced by Lockheed's famed Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson and his secret "Skunk Works" in Burbank is virtually all fuel tanks and engines.

The Blackbirds, they note with understandable pride, could pace a ri-

fle slug with its sustained speed of Mach 3 plus—better than 2,000 m.p.h. The SR-71 flies so fast, they add, that it requires 180 miles to complete a 180-degree turn and reverse direction.

Strategic operations of the mysterious all-black aircraft have been secret—even from most of the Air Force—since the SR-71 Wing was commissioned here in 1965. And although they remain closely classified today, a Times crew was allowed to visit the base near Marysville.

Security-conscious wing personnel were cautious in talking of their mission, limiting discussion to training, general flight characteristics of the SR-71 and domestic operations, but it can be speculated that:

—The triplesonic Blackbirds based at Beale apparently could fly all required missions out of this California base, if necessary, but probably don't do so because of the special pre-positioning that would be required for a refueling tanker fleet.

—Overseas operations probably are conducted out of various foreign (U.S. or Allied) bases on secret temporary assignment, as required.

An idea of the big plane's capability can be seen in a recent record set by a Blackbird that won the Mackay Trophy for Lt. Cols. Thomas B. Estes and Dewain C. Vick.

They flew 15,000 miles nonstop over the United States in 10½ hours—equivalent to the distance from San Francisco to Paris and return—averaging about 1,430 m.p.h., faster than twice the speed of sound.

And this included descending from above 80,000 feet to 25,000 feet and slowing from triplesonic speed to 400 m.p.h. for an unspecified number of 15 to 18-minute refuelings from a KC-135 jet tanker.

The record points up the great advantage of the SR-71 over all planes flying today, despite the fact that Kelly Johnson laid out the basic design of the aircraft in 1953, more than a dozen years ago.

That advantage is sustained speed, the ability to cruise at more than three times the speed of sound for thousands of miles while late-model fighters reach much above Mach 2 temporary all-out speed.

Sustained Speed Cited

Sustained triplesonic speed is the great advance achieved in the Blackbird over the U-2 spy plane in which Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Russia on May 1, 1960.

While the single-engine U-2, also developed in secrecy by Johnson and the Skunk Works, was ahead of its time, it was essentially a jet-powered glider, a 46-foot fuselage soaring on an 80-foot wing.

True, it could climb to 90,000 feet and remain aloft 9½ hours without refueling, but the fact that it was slow, a 17,000-pound kite that depended on altitude for protection, eventually made it vulnerable to Soviet missile development.

The fate of the U-2 evoked a question at Beale about improved Russian surface-to-air (SAM) missiles such as the SA-5 Griffon, credited by the trade magazine, Aviation

Week, with a 95,000-foot intercept capability. Would such a weapon menace the Blackbird?

And how would the SR-71 fare in skies defended by such aircraft as the triplesonic Soviet Mig 23 Foxbat interceptor armed with air-to-air missiles?

Guarded Answers

The answers were guarded and it was quickly obvious that no one at Beale, from Col. O'Malley down, would undertake specific comparisons with Soviet capability.

They discussed surface-to-air missiles, in general, however, their speed, their reach and the phenomenal tracking problem that would be imposed on them by the SR-71's extreme speed and altitude and its sophisticated electronic counter measures, particularly signal jamming techniques.

Col. O'Malley, a veteran of many fighter missions in Vietnam, pointed out that F-4 Phantoms sur-

continued

19 OCT 1972

Book World

The Ike Years All Over Again

EISENHOWER: And the American Crusades.

By Herbert S. Parmet.
(Macmillan, 660 pp., \$12.95)Reviewed by
Karl Hess

The reviewer, who served briefly on special assignment at the White House during the Eisenhower administration, is a visiting fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies.

If you want to relive the Eisenhower years, this is the book for you. It has what seems to be 40 million useful references to Eisenhower sources, piled up as the foundation for what is almost a daily log of the General-President's years in the White House, and the several immediately before, as he backed-and-filled about heading what eventually he came to see as his bounden duty to lead the nation.

It cites dozens of interviews. It obviously is written by a man who has read himself bleary in his subject but who, at the end of it all, simply says that to call Eisenhower "a great or good or even a weak President" misses the point. He was merely necessary."

Necessary, for what? By contenting himself with observing Eisenhower rather than with trying to understand him, his friends, his particular role in the society, Herbert Parmet does not provide even a hint of answer. But because he is such a voracious reader and studious observer, the clues are all there.

First, there is Eisenhower the anti-Communist. Like Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon, Eisenhower saw the confrontation with communism both apoplectically and apocalyptically. Eisenhower's New Look defense policy, diplomatically extended through John Foster Dulles's leadership, meant to deter the Soviets and the Chinese, at least, from big moves in the

of nuclear retaliation. As Parmet meticulously recounts—without seeming to be impressed—Eisenhower's rhetoric about the New Look was seriously compromised by the old look of some of his crucial actions: when he landed Marines in Lebanon, for instance.

Also, when Eisenhower supported the covert U.S. operation that overthrew the Guatemalan government, he was well into a world of old-fashioned, even if newly-equipped, coup and counter-coup, terror and covert warfare. That, as a matter of fact, is just the way Eisenhower wanted to fight the war in Indochina—secretly and discreetly. But he did want to fight it. On that he was as dedicated

a hawk as Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon. (If there was a difference in style it would probably be mostly in contrast to Johnson. Eisenhower was dead set against a big land involvement. The Nixon policy of ordering bombing while talking peace probably would have appealed to him more, and the early Kennedy policy of secret raids most of all—except that Eisenhower always seemed skeptical of how well such secrets could be kept. His explicit skepticism about the U-2 overflights was, of course, brilliantly justified.)

Beyond his fervent anti-communism, there is another aspect to Eisenhower that might mark a very special (and necessary) place for him in our country's development: his total visceral and intellectual commitment to the rectitude of American corporate enterprise—as he understood it from his closest friends, all big businessmen. He believed that the expansion of capitalist enterprise around the globe would ultimately

menace by putting it to shame.

Although Eisenhower is justly famous for having said that we must hold onto Indochina because of its raw materials, he should be equally famous for the much more sophisticated notion, emphatically ascribed to him in this book, of wanting to assure the freedom of American corporations to export capital abroad, to buy as much of the world as possible, as a basic extension of U.S. foreign policy and cold-war strategy. Frustrated by the failure to elect Wendell Wilkie to head the expansion of American corporate enterprise into the ownership of One World, the great financiers and industrialists who supported Eisenhower (while middling entrepreneurs and old-time conservatives denounced him) may have thought him quite necessary to safeguard the expansionism which has now flowered, under three other presidents, into the age of the multi-national corporation.

This brings up that most perplexing of all Eisenhower riddles: Eisenhower's farewell speech in which he warned against the excesses of a military-industrial complex which he saw as threatening to become the dominant force in American policy-making.

Why was the man who was prepared to oust governments, dispatch Marines, talk of massive retaliation, overfly the U.S.S.R., and angrily rebut anyone tried to tell him how to run an Army—why was such a man so concerned at the end about the military he had faithfully served and the industry he had painstakingly supported? Parmet isn't even curious.

Again the clues, if not the conclusions, are scattered throughout this storhouse collection of facts. One is the context of the speech. Eisenhower spelled out the menace to be that of a "scientific-technological elite" and not just the MIC abstractly. To him, real business meant the big banks, the big owners, the vastly rich folks whom he enjoyed so much as personal friends. The gunslinger conglomerate under Kennedy, apparently appalled him. He was an old-fashioned capitalist. He

troubled by the fantastic support given, say, the banking system by federal policy.

But he was troubled by the thought that the new, scientifically-based weapons companies would muscle their way into policy-influencing positions. Also, he seems to have been disturbed by the possibilities of a garrison state, totally dominated by a defense budget. He was never disturbed by the company-store domination of the lives of most ordinary Americans by the financial elite which already does own control of most the capital and industry, as well as control of those who make policy. Maybe that just seemed traditional to the General-President.

At any rate, deep concern along these lines may be merely academic after all. Thanks to Eisenhower's foremost bequest to a grateful nation, Richard Nixon, it looks like we are going to have both a garrison state and a company store anyway.

Associated Press Writer

U.S. intelligence reported work on the Cuban bases now was proceeding at top speed, suggesting the Russians were trying to make them operational. The tension rose. The American government applied pressure by halting a Soviet-American board-

Spies in sky keep two big powers in balance

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

All that has kept the world from self-destructing this last quarter of a century has been the precarious nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

For a few short years America had an overwhelming preponderance of power. We were certain we would never resort to it, but our mere possession of such nightmarish power drove the Russians to distraction. Then they in their turn achieved an edge—and regained a measure of stability—and it was our turn to taste the fear in the phrase "missile gap."

A decade ago the balance was regained and has since been maintained. The number of missiles, their megatonnage and their guidance systems are largely irrelevant; what counts is that neither power can launch a preemptive strike with any hope of survival, and on this balance hangs the peace of the world.

Tiger by the tail

The balance, however, is far from static. Both powers hold a fearsome tiger by the tail. Research and development must continue lest one side or the other achieve a breakthrough in delivery or defense, which might destroy the balance. The expense of such a breakthrough—indeed the expense of maintaining the current balance—is so hideous that both powers would like to avoid it. They are committed to a continuing arms race not by the need to achieve a breakthrough but only by the imperative of not permitting the other to do so.

Both sides recognize the need for a mutual effort to scale down their arsenals. In the past, negotiations over disarmament foundered on a single element—trust. The issues at stake were so overriding that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could afford to accept the other's word that an agreement would be adhered to.

The recent SALT talks, however, have achieved initial and encouraging successes, and the key to the progress can be found in an innocuous euphemism the treaties employ: "National technical means of verification". The phrase refers to a program which supplies an acceptable substitute for the missing ingredient of trust, and on that program rests all hope of reversing the arms race.

The "national technical means of verification" are the photo reconnaissance satellites employed by both America and

referred to as SAMOS (for "satellite and missile-observation system"); the Soviet satellites are referred to as COSMOS, and while neither country will discuss their details, they do, as the re-

sult of a 1962 agreement, report each launch and its orbital characteristic to the UN.

The programs give both countries a positive check on the nuclear activities of the other. Neither nation can test or deploy a major new weapons system without timely—and highly detailed—warning accruing to the other.

The United States launches four or five "search-and-find" SAMOS missiles annually from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. They remain in orbit about a month, covering the entire surface of the globe twice a day, once at night (when infra-red photography, sensitive to heat emissions, gives almost as much information as daytime passes) and once during the day.

The photographic results are radioed back, and despite the loss in resolution, construction work of any description is at once apparent when photos taken a few days apart are superimposed.

Each search-and-find satellite is followed a month or two later by a "close-look" satellite, which photographs the specific areas of interest its predecessor has spotted. These photographs are not transmitted electronically. Instead the satellite ejects the film capsule itself, which is recovered in mid-air by specially equipped planes based in Hawaii.

What photos show

The pictures are analyzed at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (known as "En-pick" to the intelligence community), a little-known joint project located in Washington under the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The sophisticated interpretation of these photographs provides the vast bulk of what America knows about the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc countries and the People's Republic of China.

The photos reveal not only major construction — from transportation nets through shipyard activity to all manner of missile facilities — but an astonishing wealth of technical detail as well.

While the U.S. will not talk about the SAMOS program any more than the Soviet Union will discuss the details of COSMOS, the general details of both programs are more or less open secrets.

America's most closely guarded secret, however, is the resolution of its photographic systems employed by SAMOS. (N.P.I.C., in fact, maintains its own security classification system, and a

organization won't get you past the front door.)

The first generation of satellite cameras a decade ago were lucky to pick up objects six feet across. The third generation in current use will pick up objects less than two feet across, and the resolu-

tion may some day be measured in inches. In terms of analysis, this means that not only can new missile sites, or changes in old ones, be recorded, but the precise technical construction of the missile can be reconstructed in fair detail as well.

The Soviets launch perhaps four times as many satellites as America does, partially because theirs do not last as long, and also because the Soviets are given to "tactical" missions — sending a satellite for a special "look-see" when something of interest is going on.

The U.S. prefers to wait for its regularly scheduled shots, and has sent only one tactical satellite aloft — to check Israeli claims that the Soviets were violating the truce by installing missile sites on the banks of the Suez Canal. Soviet photography is good enough to allay their fears that the U.S. is installing new weapons systems, although the resolution of their cameras is not nearly as good as ours.

High-altitude coverage of the Soviet Union started in the early 1950s when balloon-mounted cameras were launched in Europe to drift across Eurasia before being recovered in the Pacific.

From such crude beginnings we advanced to the U-2 aircraft, which worked like a charm until the Soviets finally developed a missile that could bring it down — with disastrous results for American diplomacy. President Eisenhower had approved the U-2 program only after Premier Nikita Khrushchev had rejected his suggestion of "open skies" inspections. The gap between the U-2 flights and the inception of the SAMOS program was fortunately a short one.

continued

7 AUG 1972

Moscow's Smile

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

MOSCOW—"We don't have to like each other to do business and cooperate. I am for improved Soviet-American relations because I am a Soviet patriot and I know improved relations would be good for my country. I think the same thing applies to you Americans." Yuri Arbatov, the Kremlin's chief Americanologist, was speaking for himself when he made these remarks, but there is mounting evidence that similar ideas form the backbone of Leonid I. Brezhnev's policy toward the United States.

Certainly Mr. Brezhnev has made some impressive moves recently to demonstrate his commitment to better relations with the United States. He received President Nixon here last May despite the political difficulties caused him by the President's earlier decision to mine North Vietnamese ports. He accepted the setback represented by Egypt's decision to oust Soviet military personnel rather than give the Egyptians the offensive weapons they demanded. Diplomats here believe he faced significant opposition from a "hard line" Politburo faction on both issues, a faction that could become a majority and oust Mr. Brezhnev if his policy fails.

There are other, less cosmic, signs pointing in the same direction. The Peterson trade delegation here was received with outstanding hospitality and friendship even while very hard bargaining went on behind the scenes.

A major and prestigious Soviet research institute here is now engaged in a high-priority effort to figure out ways of improving Moscow's image in the United States. The goal of the effort was expressed the other day by a Soviet editor, who said, "We don't want you Americans to think of us as barbarians." That some lessons have been learned was evident recently when a Soviet court gave Gavriel Shapiro, who married an American girl in a Jewish religious ceremony, an astonishingly lenient sentence on a charge of draft dodging.

Even that old bugaboo, the unavailability of matzos to religious Soviet Jews for Passover, has been taken care of to some extent. On a recent Saturday morning a group of Americans from the Peterson mission visiting Kiev asked to see the synagogue in that city. They were taken there promptly and found a congregation of over 200 elderly Soviet Jews engaged in the traditional Orthodox Sabbath service. Before the Americans left they were shown an album of pictures depicting the Kiev congregation's facilities for baking its own matzos.

There is another side to the picture, of course. The Soviet press hammers away on Vietnam day in and day out, and Soviet sources say proudly they intend to continue helping the North Vietnamese. The message about eschewing barbaric tactics has not yet caused any softening toward star ballet dancer Valery Panov or toward various Soviet scientists who fell into disfavor after they asked permission to emigrate to Israel.

There is no mystery about the two chief reasons for the main thrust of the Brezhnev line, which is so reminiscent of the drive Nikita S. Khrushchev mounted for a similar rapprochement during the Eisenhower Administration at the end of the nineteen-fifties. Soviet sources here freely admit that Mr. Khrushchev made a major blunder by blowing up over the U-2 incident in May, 1960, and they seem rather proud that Mr. Brezhnev made no similar error over the mining of North Vietnam's ports. "We are trying to repair the thread that was snapped by Gary Powers," one Soviet editor said.

Very little is said here about the Chinese, but the fear and worry over future relations with Peking is unmistakable. Soviet officials know from their own life experiences that a large country can go from weakness to power in one or two generations.

But it is economics that is the main motive. Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev are now far richer than they were when this correspondent first visited them in 1955. Food of all kinds seems abundant, with the strange exception of lemons. Most people seem well-dressed, and mini-skirts and pants suits are all the rage among the more elegant women here this summer. There are now traffic jams in Moscow, a phenomenon that was unthinkable three or four years ago.

But Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev are the main tourist cities. Except for them and a few others, living conditions—though better than earlier—are still hard. One need only look at the bedraggled dress of the peasant women in the street to sense the gulf between the urban living standards and the conditions in the countryside.

It is for massive American economic and technical aid, above all, that Moscow now wants to improve relations with Washington. Despite the emphasis in the Soviet press on U.S. unemployment and the poverty of Negroes and Mexican Americans, even sophisticated and well-informed Soviet sources speak of America as though it were a

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new Eldorado with limitless resources to pump into Siberia and start its oil, gas and metals flowing whenever Mr. Nixon gives the signal.

One can only conclude that influential Muscovites believe the Vietnam war will be over in the not-too-distant future and that in the improved international atmosphere resulting therefrom both Washington and Moscow will be able to reduce their arms budget and end the futile and extremely expensive strategic weapons race. Only on that hypothesis does the Soviet hope for major American investment make sense, since the Russians are realists accustomed to calculate. Secretary of Commerce Peterson has said Vietnam was never mentioned in his economic negotiations here, but it must have been very much in his own mind and in the mind of Mr. Brezhnev when the two men met. It would seem a reasonable bet that when Henry Kissinger flies to Paris these days to negotiate with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho, he has Mr. Brezhnev's best wishes and perhaps—but only perhaps—more tangible Kremlin help behind the scenes.

Harry Schwartz is a member of the editorial board of *The Times*.

4 AUG 1972

None Care If It Is Treason

Ramparts published the article. The *New York Times* reported it in full, page one, carry-over of four columns on page three. It was a revelation by a former U.S. code analyst that the United States has broken all super-secret Soviet communications codes. (This, incidentally, say the experts, is not so.) The article tells how many planes, ships and satellites the United States has monitoring foreign air waves. Where many of them are; how they operate; what they have discovered, things calculated to win friends and influence enemies all over the world, and also at home.

It was written by Perry Fellwock, 26, of San Diego, California, a war protester. At twenty, he enlisted in the Air Force. While serving, he was recruited by a United States security agent into the National Security Agency, which is charged with the collection of security information, most of it through advanced technological means—the U-2s, spy satellites etc. When Fellwock left the Agency three and a half years later, he—like all other intelligence people—swore an oath never to reveal what he had done while in the employ of NSA. But now Fellwock feels that oath no longer “is binding to me.” He feels that by telling all he will “make sure that there are no more Vietnams.” He feels that “the American military [is] the most dangerous threat to me, my family and to world peace itself.” He has taken this step “neither for money nor glory, but to bring to the American people knowledge which they have a ‘need to know.’”

And also, and not so incidentally, to the enemies of the American people knowledge which they have a paramount need to know.

And yet, if Fellwock is so dead set on preserving the peace by this attack on NSA, how does he explain away one incident he describes in detail in his article. It was during the Six Day War. According to Fellwock, the U.S. electronic intelligence ship *Liberty* (a *Pueblo*) was sent along the Israeli coast to intercept Israeli battle orders. It was attacked by the Israeli air force and 34 Americans were killed. But, still according to Fellwock, the *Liberty* already had transmitted the fact that General Dayan intended to order his forces to attack both Cairo

and Damascus. President Johnson brought tremendous pressure on Israel to halt further troop movements and also got on the hot line to warn Premier Kosygin against what appeared to be an imminent Soviet airborne operation against Israel from Bulgarian bases.

Did this not, in effect, not only prevent further Vietnams, but stop the outbreak of World War III? Isn't the tight surveillance that Fellwock insists the NSA is keeping over the Soviet bomber fleet and Soviet nuclear subs designed to avert war rather than to touch it off? Isn't the NSA, whose mission is to gather information, but never to act on it, a weapon for peace rather than a weapon of war? The answer is, of course, that Fellwock and Ellsberg and the others are first and foremost anti-Establishment and very possibly anti-American. And they have managed to talk themselves around to saying that when they decide unilaterally to abrogate an oath, steal a Top Secret document, traffic with the enemy, which this amounts to, that they are doing it because they are right. Theirs is the higher morality.

It was a simpler world when the betrayers of national trust, the Philbys, the Burgesses and Macleans, the Martinsons and Mitchells (two earlier NSA defectors), did their dirty work and cut and ran. And a better world.

How Business Bolsters Our Intelligence Defenses

From building eyes in the sky to advising Presidents, businessmen are deeply involved in an essential but hush-hush national activity

High over the Eurasian land mass, two Project 647 satellites (Made in U.S.A.) patrol unusual "dwelling" orbits, their delicate sensors watching for a missile launching in the Soviet Union or a nuclear explosion in China.

A propulsion engineer in a secure, windowless California office calculates the range of an Egyptian anti-shiping missile from data gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency. A computer analyst in Boston, his advice needed by the code-breaking National Security Agency, hops a plane to Washington. And a corporate executive answers the President's personal plea for some unpublicized counsel on how to reorganize the Defense Intelligence Agency.

American industry, a world leader in advanced technology, is deep into the complexities of modern intelligence work—and much quieter about it than a swinging James Bond.

The U.S. intelligence establishment, once comparatively simple, is now huge as well as highly sophisticated, costing the government some \$6 billion a year and directly employing 200,000 men and women.

One expert has estimated that 70 per cent of this money and manpower is inextricably involved with the science and technology that, in less than two decades, have revolutionized an essential national activity—essential despite the thaw in the Cold War.

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The revolution began one December afternoon in 1954 when Trevor Gardner, a former California businessman who was the Air Force's research and development chief, picked up his Pentagon telephone to make a call at the CIA's request. The man he called was Clarence (Kelly) Johnson, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.'s chief designer, in Burbank, Calif. Nineteen months later, Mr. Johnson's ubiquitous U-2—designed, built and tested in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy—made its first spy flight for the CIA over the Soviet Union.

Today, the U-2 still flies reconnaissance missions over Cuba, potential Latin American trouble spots and the troubled deserts of the Middle East. Its intelligence "cover" was blown in 1960 when a Soviet missile knocked Francis Gary Powers from the sky over Sverdlovsk. But its cameras still rank among the world's best, it can slip over a target more easily than a satellite—and it remains an undisputed symbol of modern, technological espionage.

Ironically, Lockheed did almost as much to push the U-2 into the open—by creating superior spycraft, and therefore reducing the need for secrecy about it—as the Sverdlovsk marksmen did. By 1960, work was well along on a supersonic successor aircraft, the Lockheed SR-71, and on increasingly sophisticated spacecraft that keep an entire planet under observation.

Under the peculiar rules of the intelligence game, Lockheed can admit what everyone already knows—that the U-2 was and is a spy plane. However, it can only concede that the Air Force SR-71 has "strategic reconnaissance" as its mission. And the company cannot even discuss the fact that its Agena rockets have carried almost every American spy satellite launched in the past dozen years.

The rocket's role

While the U-2 clearly marked the beginning of the new espionage, the rocket quickly proved a far more dramatic instrument of change.

Sputnik I, launched on Oct. 4, 1957, left no doubt that rocketry had altered man's destiny.

And the prying eye of the intelligence camera soon peered down from 100 miles in space, rather than from 10,000 feet. By names in the high technology industries were quietly recruited—General Electric Co., CBS

Laboratories, Bell Telephone Laboratories, RCA and Philco-Ford, Itek Corp., Eastman Kodak Co., Perkin-Elmer Co., Aerojet-General Corp., TRW Inc.—as well as thousands of smaller suppliers.

Only when first cousins of clandestine devices developed for intelligence work show up in civilian life—in the camera system of the Lunar Orbiter, for example—can companies take oblique credit for remarkable technical achievements.

Industrialist John A. McCone, who succeeded aging spymaster Allen W. Dulles as Central Intelligence Agency director in 1961, and is now back in industry, is given much of the credit for harnessing industry and technology to the intelligence community's needs.

"Dulles had no background for this kind of thing," a top intelligence executive recalls. "McCone had headed the Atomic Energy Commission and been Under Secretary of the Air Force, and he fancied himself something of an engineer."

"He wasn't afraid of the technological game."

The simple communication link that Mr. Gardner used to order the U-2 from Mr. Johnson still operates.

"We can pick up the phone to a West Coast contractor and say, 'Go ahead,'" an intelligence official reports. "Research and development is different in this field than in the military services. We are just plain less bureaucratic."

"Contractors say it is a pleasure to deal with us because they can get decisions quickly. The security rules are hard to live with, but they are more than counterbalanced by the lack of complications."

The leading consumer of new intelligence technology, the CIA, initiates more than 50 per cent of the R&D projects it sponsors but depends on industry for many new ideas. Surprisingly, it and the other intelligence agencies also depend heavily on companies for analytical help. "We don't contract out 'current business' [the hottest new intelligence data] but we might ask someone to do a six-month exhaustive study, say, on the accuracy of an ICBM," one government intelligence official explains.

AUG 1972

STATINTL

U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear iridescent I.D. badges — green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"—980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting

the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies—it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

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A lack of intelligence

By Donald R. Morris
Post News Analyst

The August issue of Ramparts magazine — a periodical much given to attacks on the intelligence community — features an article entitled "U.S. Espionage: A Memoir," attributed to "Winslow Peck."

The article claims that the National Security Agency (NSA) has broken every Soviet code, and can pinpoint the location and type of each Soviet jet and missile submarine. It also claims the United States is still making routine U-2-type surveillance flights over the Soviet Union and China.

For lagniappe, the author describes how in 1967 the NSA monitored a live TV contact between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov, who had just been informed his braking chutes were malfunctioning and who was facing certain death.

"Peck" also claims that the electronic surveillance ship Liberty, on which 74 crewmen died in an Israeli attack during the Six-Day War in 1967, overheard Gen. Moshe Dayan order his troops on to Cairo and Damascus, as a result of which then President Lyndon B. Johnson brought intense pressure on Israel to halt further troop movements, and on Premier Kosygin to call off a threatened Soviet airborne operation against Israel.

"Peck" turns out to be one Perry Fellwock, who enlisted in the Air Force in 1966 at the age of 20, was assigned to NSA for duty, served in NSA stations in Turkey and Indochina, and was discharged in November, 1969 — age 23. Ramparts claims he was a "senior analyst" with NSA.

Fellwock claims he then turned down a \$10,000-a-year job with the CIA, because he wanted to "work to end the Vietnam war." In April, 1972, he was arrested and fined \$50 for disturbing the peace in San Diego before the Republican party headquarters and the 11th Naval District headquarters.

In an interview with the New York Times, Fellwock said, "I know the FBI knows who I am. I'd like to avoid publicity but I'm willing to go through trial, and if I have to, to jail."

Fellwock and the Ramparts editorial board can sleep quietly. Neither the FBI nor anyone else is liable to bother him.

NSA's "no comment" to the story does not conceal official agitation but only yawning boredom.

To begin with, while NSA does employ multitudes of Air Force enlisted men in a variety of clerical and technical capacities, it does not use such youthful detailees with high school educations as "analysts," senior or otherwise.

Ramparts could have acquired a far more detailed and accurate account of the structure and activities of NSA from an overtly published book, David Kahn's superb "The Codebreakers," than they got from their ego-tripping source. His corridor gossip is flattering, but ludicrously inaccurate.

Items: NSA is the seat of the major cryptanalytic effort of the U.S. government. It regularly reads flat portions of the traffic of foreign nations which is sent in a wide variety of low-level crypto systems, designed only to provide protection for a short period of time. It does not, alas, read the key internal traffic of major powers, which these days is sent in crypto systems using computer-generated keys, which are impervious to attack.

There have been no U-2-type overflights since the early 60s, when the satellite reconnaissance programs were developed. The unmanned SAMOS capsule houses equipment so sophisticated that the photographic and electronic take is infinitely superior to that which a conventional overflight could produce. (The United States does send planes and ships along Soviet and Chinese borders to sniff out electronic developments and defensive techniques and reaction times, but these do not deliberately violate foreign air or sea space. When it happens by accident, the results can be disastrous.)

And youthful military enlisted men on detail to NSA simply do not have access to intelligence slated for the executive level — and they certainly aren't conversant with presidential actions based on such intelligence.

In short, Ramparts — which has scored palpable hits in the past — is attacking with an empty water pistol. And Fellwock, having secured ample amounts of the publicity he is so ardently avoiding, can sink back into the obscurity from which he emerged.

BRIDGEPORT, CONN.

TELEGRAM

JUL 24 1972

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Code Breaking

A former Air Force sergeant, who was discharged from the service in 1969, claims that the United States has refined its electronic intelligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet or plane or missile-carrying submarine around the world.

The press quickly discovered the identity of the analyst, who signed his article with the pseudonym of Winslow Peck. Peck corroborated many of his revelations, but found some experts strongly denying that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers.

This whole matter strikes at the fundamental security of the United States as well as of the Soviet Union. In the sixties, the U-2 intelligence flights were known to the Soviet but Premier Khrushchev used it as an excuse to call off his summit talks with President Eisenhower. Government intelligence

experts now say there has been no authorized violation of Soviet or Chinese air space since.

Peck was employed by the little known National Security Agency. Headquartered at Fort Mead, near Baltimore, it has about 90,000 employees, mostly military. Its annual budget is about \$1 billion. Primarily, it collects world information, mostly through advanced technology, for distribution through the Government, including the Central Intelligence Agency. Peck claims that it has encircled the Communist world with some 2,000 electronic listening posts on land or on naval vessels or aircraft.

It is reassuring to know how widespread our intelligence apparatus is. But, no matter how comforting, it is not information to broadcast to our foes. Its value is in its secrecy. Its original revelation can only be distressing to American relations with the Communist powers with whom we are trying to set up new relations of co-existence leading to peace.

Spy in the Sky?

It was just announced that the government is going to send a U-2 plane up over Chesapeake Bay in the next few days to map the damage caused by tropical storm Agnes.

Without wishing to seem unnecessarily suspicious, we should just like to point out that, by the freakiest of coincidences, the Soviet Embassy has recently purchased a summer residence for its ambassador and the embassy staff at Pioneer Point on the Chesapeake's Eastern Shore. The embassy, according to latest reports, is in the process of renovating the tennis courts and building a basketball court on the grounds of the waterfront estate.

If you remember, President Eisen-

hower was first impressed by the potential of the original U-2 over a decade ago when the spy masters showed him detailed photographs of his favorite green at Burning Tree, snapped from 60,000 feet up.

If you also remember, Premier Khrushchev used the shooting down of an operational U-2 as the pretext for scuttling summit talks with Ike in 1960.

We just hope every precaution will be taken with the flood-mapping spy plane, so that the new era of sweetness and light between the United States and the Soviet Union will not come crashing down in flames just because somebody at the CIA wants an aerial closeup of the Russians' new basketball court.

Inspector Satellite to Police SALT Weighed by Air Force

STATINTL

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. Air Force is taking a new look at satellites that could rocket into space and inspect foreign spacecraft looking down on the United States.

The arms control agreement with the Soviet Union has given impetus to proposals for such inspector satellites. President Nixon has assured Congress that the United States will keep track of the Soviet missile buildup, a promise hinged on the ability to keep counting missiles with observation satellites.

Right now, both the United States and the Soviet Union spy on each other from space by satellite. Neither side has interfered with the other, in contrast to Russia's desperate effort to knock down U-2 spy planes which used to fly over her territory—an effort that was ultimately successful in downing Francis Gary Powers.

Nevertheless, the Soviet

Union over the last few years has conducted several sets of exercises which many Western space specialists see as designed to perfect satellites that could inspect, and possibly destroy, U.S. satellites.

The United States is behind Russia in this field. The Air Force has sponsored a number of studies but has yet to fly the first inspector satellite. One argument against doing it has been the fear of looking provocative and extending the arms race to outer space.

In the environment of the recent Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), aerospace companies see their chances improved for getting beyond paper studies and individual pieces of hardware.

Several of the companies are preparing proposals for submission this week to the Pentagon in hopes of obtaining one of two Air Force study contracts for the satellite inspector.

The off-and-on satellite

inspector effort has been heavily classified by the Pentagon through the years. But the basic idea has not changed much since former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara told Congress in secret testimony in 1968 that "we are exploring the development of a non-nuclear surveillance or destruction capability against hostile satellites . . ."

McNamara said any one of a number of rockets could carry the satellite inspector into space—the Spartan, Polaris, Thor or Minuteman. One way for the satellite to home in on another would be by the heat it would give off in space—so-called infra-red sensors.

LTV Aerospace worked with the Air Force on a sensor for a satellite inspector under a secret project called 922. The sensor was launched into space successfully from Cape Kennedy but the doors on the sensing unit failed to open, dooming the test.

ARE BUREAUCRACIES IMPORTANT? (OR ALLISON WONDERLAND)

by Stephen D. Krasner

Who and what shapes foreign policy? In recent years, analyses have increasingly emphasized not rational calculations of the national interest or the political goals of national leaders but rather bureaucratic procedures and bureaucratic politics. Starting with Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*, a judicious study of leadership published in 1960, this approach has come to portray the American President as trapped by a permanent government more enemy than ally. Bureaucratic theorists imply that it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible for political leaders to control the organizational web which surrounds them. Important decisions result from numerous smaller actions taken by individuals at different levels in the bureaucracy who have partially incompatible national, bureaucratic, political, and personal objectives. They are not necessarily a reflection of the aims and values of high officials.

Presidential Power was well received by John Kennedy, who read it with interest, recommended it to his associates, and commissioned Neustadt to do a private study of the 1962 Skybolt incident. The approach has been developed and used by a number of scholars—Roger Hilsman, Morton Halperin, Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Barnett, and Graham Allison—some of whom held sub-Cabinet positions during the 1960's. It was the subject of a special conference at the RAND Corporation, a main theme of a course at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton and the subject of a faculty seminar at Harvard. It is the intellectual paradigm which guides the new public policy program in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Analyses of bureaucratic politics have been used to explain alliance behaviour during the 1956 Suez crisis and the Skybolt incident, Truman's relations with MacArthur, American policy in Vietnam, and now most thoroughly the Cuban missile crisis in Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, published in 1971 (Little Brown & Company). Allison's volume

article on this subject. With the publication of his book this approach to foreign policy now receives its definitive statement. The bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom.

My argument here is that this vision is misleading, dangerous, and compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the President; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility; and compelling because it offers leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for innumerable reinterpretations and publications.

The contention that the Chief Executive is trammelled by the permanent government has disturbing implications for any effort to impute responsibility to public officials. A democratic political philosophy assumes that responsibility for the acts of governments can be attributed to elected officials. The charges of these men are embodied in legal statutes. The electorate punishes an erring official by rejecting him at the polls. Punishment is senseless unless high officials are responsible for the acts of government. Elections have some impact only if government, that most complex of modern organizations, can be controlled. If the bureaucratic machine escapes manipulation and direction even by the highest officials, then punishment is illogical. Elections are a farce not because the people suffer from false consciousness, but because public officials are impotent, enmeshed in a bureaucracy so large that the actions of government are not responsive to their will. What sense to vote a man out of office when his successor, regardless of his values, will be trapped in the same web of only incrementally mutable standard operating procedures?

The Rational Actor Model

Conventional analyses that focus on the values and objectives of foreign policy, what Allison calls the Rational Actor Model, are perfectly coincident with the ethical assumptions of democratic politics. The state is viewed as a rational unified actor. The behaviour of states is the outcome of a rational decision-making process. This process has three steps. The options for a given situation are spelled out. The consequences of each option are projected. A choice is made which maximizes the values held by decision-makers. The analyst knows what the state did. His objective is to explain why he

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HOW U.S. KEEPS TABS ON THE RED WORLD

STATINTL

Thanks to aerial surveillance and space-borne cameras, the world is now virtually an open book to U. S. They've become vital tools of American policy.

President Nixon, directing war moves in Southeast Asia and peace moves with Russia, has at his fingertips a major weapon brought to a peak of reliability during his Administration.

The weapon is this: a constant flow of aerial photographs providing, in minute detail, the kind of intelligence information that no previous President was able to count on.

Over North Vietnam, reconnaissance pilots flying at altitudes of 10 miles or more are able to take pictures that can distinguish between tank models, show the types of trucks and artillery pieces, expose troops in camouflaged bunkers—and even count rifles.

Over Russia, reconnaissance satellites orbiting at 100 miles up—or more than 300 miles—can detect the construction of rocket sites and the firing of missiles. From their pictures, aircraft at landing strips can be identified. The most effective cameras, from 100 miles, can depict objects two feet in diameter and show the writing on billboards.

"Silent army." Such surveillance intelligence—when properly interpreted—is seen as a major key both to the fighting in Vietnam and the possibility of an arms-control pact with Russia. Behind the information fed to the President is a silent army of intelligence specialists using new advances in photography, aeronautics and space technology.

In Southeast Asia, these technicians depend heavily on reconnaissance planes and pilotless drones for the pictures they need. Space satellites are used for back-up material.

Worldwide, however, the important business of keeping tabs on the Russian and Communist Chinese nuclear-missile build-up rests primarily with the space satellites. Aircraft give better pictures at lower cost. But, since the incident in which a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia, aircraft reconnaissance of the Soviet Union has been ruled out.


How they work. Reconnaissance planes and drones have been flown routinely over Southeast Asia since the Unit-

ed States first began bombing North Vietnam in 1965.

The drones have their cameras turned on to take wide-angle pictures continuously while in flight. Reconnaissance pilots, after studying earlier drone photography, can pinpoint their cameras on suspected military activity for closer, more detailed pictures.

The photos are analyzed within minutes at U. S. bases in Southeast Asia. In some cases, the photos are also sent to Washington—either by air or by radio beam, depending on whether the priority is secrecy or speed.

Over the past decade, the U. S. has kept watch on the Soviet Union and Red China with a series of "search and find" satellites whose very names are classified. They are equipped to photograph and radio back to



"Sky spy" model is readied for testing. Satellite cameras can photograph most of the world.

ground stations prints that can be put together to depict the entire country.


Ground stations for receiving these pictures are located at New Boston, N. H.; Vandenberg Air Force Base in California; Oahu, Hawaii; Kodiak Island, Alaska; on Guam; on the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, and in Ethiopia. In addition, six ship-board stations, each with a 30-foot antenna, can be deployed around the world to fill blank spots in the network.

The photos are radioed from the satellites and wind up at Sunnyvale, Calif., or in Washington for interpretation.

Another series of "close look" satellites is used to focus on known or suspected subjects of military significance. These photos, of a much higher quality, are dropped by parachute to be retrieved and sent on to the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, D. C.

What's ahead. New and improved reconnaissance satellites, officials say, are in the offing. One, dubbed the "Big Bird," is expected to have an orbital life of several months and to carry a quantity of film packs that can be returned at frequent intervals.

Success of the sky spies has been credited with removing an important hurdle to a U. S.-Russian agreement on limiting arms. Without the satellites, it



Gemini V photo shows African airfield from 100 miles up. Sky spies give much more detail.

is argued, no significant agreement could be possible because of the Kremlin's steadfast opposition to on-site inspection teams to enforce a treaty.

Even before arms-control talks started, U. S. officials say the satellites have helped to stabilize relations between the U. S. and Russia—through increased knowledge—and at the same time have significantly reduced U. S. defense spending to protect against the unknown. [END]

28 MAY 1972

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Pact Unveiled Under Bizarre Circumstances

Kissinger's Nightclub Act

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

MOSCOW, May 27—It is a press tradition that journalists brace themselves doubly against the winds of political hyperbole at summit conferences, where there is abnormal temptation to create a public impression of extraordinary happenings. But even the most imaginative news manager would have been taxed to preplan the bizarre staging that unveiled the world's first nuclear arms limitation here.

Nothing approaching the manner in which this major international news reached the press has occurred since the aborted 1960 summit conference in Paris. There, former Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev blew down the pillars of the temple with a temper tantrum using unprintable language.

because the United States had sent a U-2 spy plane across his country. That was stagecraft for disaster. What happened here last night and in the early morning hours of Saturday was improvised stagecraft to display success.

None who experienced it will quickly forget the climatic act of an improbable diplomatic presentation that had leaped between the Kremlin Palace of the czars; a well-worn diplomatic bargaining room in Helsinki, Finland; the U.S. embassy here, and ultimately the night club of Moscow's Intourist Hotel. No one fully orchestrated this production.

In the seductively dim lighted "Sky-light Sky Room," which happens to be on the hotel's ground floor, between a bandstand and a circular

raised dance floor, against a background of champagne buckets. President Nixon's inexhaustible security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, gave the American version of what Mr. Nixon described as the "enormously important" strategic arms agreement signed two hours earlier in the Kremlin.

On Tuesday, Kissinger said, the President and Brezhnev spent the afternoon and evening on four unresolved SALT disagreements, resolving all but two of them. One group of remaining problems concerned the terms for interchanging land missiles with submarines and another obstacle was how to deal with older Soviet submarines.

Kissinger and other American and Soviet experts worked most of the night on these issues; they were briefly discussed again by the President and Brezhnev the next day followed by another prolonged session by experts, who worked into the morning hours of Friday.

Airborne Negotiations

By noon Friday, the stalemates were broken, and the Russians were anxious to announce the result Friday night to avoid disrupting the summit schedule. Joint instructions were flashed to the U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki, and the final agreement was literally pieced together by American Ambassador Gerard C. Smith and chief Soviet negotiator V. S. Semyenov on an American plane that brought them to Moscow at 9 p.m. yesterday.

The task of publishing the agreement and explaining it to the world was barely beginning at that point, with a signing ceremony set for 11 p.m. in the Kremlin.

At 10:02 p.m. American newsmen traveling with the President were assembled in the U.S. embassy for an on-the-record briefing by Ambassador Smith and Kissin-

ger, both operating under heavy strain.

Smith called it "the freshest treaty that I have ever talked about." In fact it was so fresh that no one in the room had a copy to show to newsmen. That produced tumult. The "landmark" treaty that the President and his associates hailed was not available to quote from because a frantic operation was under way to produce a formal version for the Kremlin signing ceremony.

Criticism already was being raised in Congress about the still-unseen treaty, especially charges that it gave lopsided submarine advantages to the Soviet Union. Smith and Kissinger firmly denied that, and then—in an unusual sequence—began revealing, in Moscow, intelligence information to sustain the American assurances. This session, and the one afterward in the Intourist Hotel, produced on-the-record exchanges between American newsmen and officials never before heard in Moscow.

Basic Story

Reporter: "The basic story (about the treaty) is going to go out of this session. I think we have to get figures on submarines and other estimates, otherwise the story will go out in a garbled way . . . is this figure of 42 Y class submarines an accurate one that they will be allowed to complete, and we with 41?"

Smith: "I don't know about this figure of 42 submarines. I have seen all sorts of speculations about Soviet submarines, but it is perfectly clear that under this agreement if the Soviets want to pay the price of scrapping a substantial number of other important strategic weapons systems they can build additional submarines.

Reporter: "... I think you are evading the point."

Smith: "I am purposely evading the point because that is an intelligence estimate that I am not in a position to give out."

Ambassador Smith, who has been negotiating with the Russians under mutually agreed stringent security precautions, in addition to usual sensitivities on weapons data, reached an impasse with newsmen in the brief time allotted for questioning.

Then Kissinger stepped in.

'Not Constrained'

Kissinger: "Since I am not quite as constrained or don't feel as constrained as Ambassador Smith, lest we build up a profound atmosphere of mystery about the submarine issue, I will straighten it out as best I can."

"The base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute. It has been in dispute in our intelligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the range that was suggested."

Kissinger: "I am not going to go beyond what I have said. It is in that general range. The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage that they know what it is precisely. (Laughter)"

This discussion then proceeded into complex detail but with little time for additional questioning because of the impending 11 p.m. signing ceremony. At 10:55 p.m., the briefing was cut off with a pledge to resume it across town at the Intourist Hotel that serves as press headquarters for the summit meeting.

There, an attempt was made to hold a joint American-Soviet press briefing, but that was frustrated because no one had a copy of any of the three official documents that newsmen had seen being signed on television.

At 1 a.m. today, secretaries were still rushing to copy and mimeograph the texts of the antiballistic missile treaty, the interim agreement limiting offensive nuclear weapons and an accompanying protocol from the only authorized version

MOSCOW MUSINGS

Despite Soviet Rigidity, Life Relaxing

By a Star Staff Writer

MOSCOW — All the poetry of modern Russia seemed to be summed up in that little dining room across from the Kremlin.

There we sat, connoisseurs of past Nixon travels to Russia, reminiscing about the 1959 visit of the then vice president which produced so much verbal fireworks with Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Superficially not much has changed in the heart of this metropolis. There in that Victorian-like dining room were the same tatty lace curtains, the same struggle for service, the same blaring music from a combo still living in the 1930s.

Outside, despite the intrusion of several new glass skyscraper hotels, the splendor of the flood-lighted spires of the Kremlin remains supreme.

But as the evening wore on, the real changes in Moscow shone through. It is basically a change in mood. It is relaxation. It is an unashamed search for the "good life," as determined — in best Ameri-

can style — by more cars, better clothes, larger apartments.

This poetry of change penetrated the dining room. Suddenly, in an interval between blaring jazz tunes, came the haunting strains of the Lara theme from the movie Dr. Zhivago.

The movie — and the book by Boris Pasternak — have not been allowed here. This great among modern Soviet poet-novelists was ignored to his death by the guardians of Socialist orthodoxy.

Yet in came the Zhivago music, and the foreign and Russian patrons around the room, many of them affluent Russians still dressed in clothes of harder times, ate on with noisy nonchalance.

Later, in the doorway of the hotel, a group of Swedish lads — on a school graduating trip to a Russia which they confessed they didn't like — also personified the changing Moscow.

They were a little drunk a

little raucous, dressed in the hairstyles and ragged clothes of the young West. Guitar in hand, they strolled through the balmy night to the Lenin tomb on Red Square, mingling with Russian passersby who seemed not the least bit surprised by this youthful parade.

It all seemed so normal — therein lay the difference from 1959. Time and relaxation have worked their way. Thirteen years ago, for instance, the rage of Soviet puritanism would have been visited on a young Russian couple who walked over the cobble stones of Red Square hand-in-hand, sneaking an occasional kiss.

These are only little things. They form the first impressions of a returning traveler to Russia.

The bitter Nixon visit here in 1959 produced the first real but brief thaw in Soviet-American relations. Those later months when Khrushchev visited the United States and he and President Eisenhower distilled the "spirit of Camp

David" were a time of new hope. Today the same optimism is abroad in this capital.

"Everyone here is expecting so much, yearning for so much," said an intelligent In-tourist guide of the President's visit. "Last evening on the metro home, everyone was reading about his arrival and talking about what can happen."

Nixon has said that he does not want a new "spirit" which will later die in disillusionment. The "spirit of Camp David" crashed with the U2 plane incident over Russia in May 1960 and Khrushchev's later sabotage of the Big Four summit conference in Paris.

For President Nixon today, his summit with Communist party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is painted as a summit of substance. But already a "spirit of Moscow" is building in popular expectations of dramatic achievement.

Whether the substance the President wants matches this expectation is still an unanswered question.

10 MAY 1972

STATINTL

Tass Criticizes President; 2 Ships Hit, China Says

No Mention Made of Trip

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 9—Tass, the Soviet press agency, today criticized President Nixon's decision to mine North Vietnamese ports as a violation of international law, but gave no indication whether the move would force the cancellation of Mr. Nixon's scheduled trip to Moscow in two weeks.

The initial Soviet reaction came in the form of a dispatch from Washington summarizing Mr. Nixon's speech last night on new measures against North Vietnam.

Pravda, the authoritative Communist party newspaper, carried the Tass dispatch without any other commentary to signal Moscow's intentions.

American embassy officials said late tonight that a 20-man White House team, which arrived Sunday evening to begin final preparations for the Nixon visit, was still planning to hold its first meeting with Soviet officials tomorrow morning—probably the first real test of the Kremlin's attitude since the new measures were announced.

The Tass report branded the port-mining and other measures announced by Mr. Nixon as "overt acts of aggression" in violation of "norms of international law." It was taken as a preliminary response while the Kremlin weighed alternatives.

The President's announcement came as the Soviet Union and its leadership marked a two-day holiday celebrating the 27th Anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. The holiday perhaps added to the traditional Soviet reluctance to respond quickly in public to major new foreign policy developments.

Diplomatic circles were mindful that the first Soviet reaction might not necessarily indicate how the Kremlin would finally deal with Washington's challenge. They recalled that in May, 1960, Premier Nikita Khrushchev delayed for nearly two weeks before cancelling President Eisenhower's planned visit to Moscow after the

American U-2 spy plane was brought down.

They noted that the Kremlin might want to confer with Hanoi before taking any major course of action and also might want to wait until the vote in Bonn on ratification of non-aggression treaties with Moscow and Poland.

The Tass dispatch from Washington, presumed to have been carefully screened at a high level before its release, reported Mr. Nixon's speech matter-of-factly, citing not only the military measures but also his statement that "these actions are not directed against any other nation."

It related his offer for a complete halt to "all acts of force throughout Indochina" and American withdrawal from Vietnam within four months of an internationally supervised cease-fire and release of American war prisoners. It cited his assurances that he wanted to end the war but said his latest actions "point to the contrary," an unusually mild Soviet comment.

10 MAY 1972

STATINTL



Victor Zorza

Viet War Puts Brezhnev on Spot

THE SOVIET LEADERS have made a great effort in recent days to help President Nixon settle the war on terms acceptable to him, but in doing so they have become vulnerable to the hardliners in the Kremlin.

Just how far the Soviet leaders went is evident from Mr. Nixon's statement that they had lately shown an interest in bringing the war to an end on a basis that would be "just to both sides." For him to say this is to acknowledge that the Soviet leaders were working for a settlement which, in Mr. Nixon's own judgment, was "just" and therefore favorable to the United States.

In spite of his continuing anger at the Kremlin for supplying arms to Hanoi, he was admitting, in effect, that Moscow and Washington had gone a long way toward a settlement on Vietnam. His failure even to complain about China suggests that Peking was even more cooperative.

The Soviet leaders who favored the summit had staked their political careers, as Khrushchev once did, on the expectation that a mutually acceptable deal with the United States was possible. The hardliners were arguing that such an expectation was an illusion. They are bound to claim now that Mr. Nixon has proved them right.

The Kremlin hardliners, especially the military, were concerned about the concessions that Mr. Nixon might exact from their politicians, much as some of the military and conservatives in the United States were concerned about the concessions that Mr. Nixon might make to the Russians.

Leonid Brezhnev, the Communist Party secretary, as is clear from the Soviet press, sought to justify the summit with the argument

that Mr. Nixon might be genuinely anxious to secure a "generation of peace." But Marshal Grechko, the defense minister, countered by publicly drawing attention to the "growing aggressiveness of imperialism, and primarily American imperialism."

SOVIET MILITARY leaders obviously were not mollified by what Brezhnev told them during a meeting held midway through Henry Kissinger's visit to Moscow last month. The army paper Red Star, commenting on the meeting, pointedly stressed again the threat of an American attack on the Soviet Union. The military leaders have allies in the Soviet security police apparatus, whose chief, Yuri Andropov, is the only Soviet leader to have uttered a public warning about the "illusions" implicit in trusting Mr. Nixon too far.

Brezhnev was able to overcome the objections from both these quarters while the preparations for the summit were going well, but his position has obviously been weakened by Mr. Nixon's latest actions.

The parallel with the Paris summit of 1960, which Khrushchev was forced to abandon under pressure from his own hardliners in response to the U-2 overflight, is an obvious one.

EVEN IF Brezhnev had been tempted by Mr. Nixon's renewed offer of "major agreements" on trade and nuclear arms, he must now be in a much weaker position to persuade his opponents in the Kremlin that the summit ought to go on. Indeed, he may well be under pressure to resign himself to the fact that Nixon himself has acted.

The Soviet Union cannot afford to make trouble on the routes to Berlin because this would damage its search for an understanding with West Germany. But it can send minesweepers to Vietnamese waters, thus putting the onus of challenging them on the U.S. Navy.

Soon after Kissinger left Moscow, where he had certainly warned his hosts of Mr. Nixon's determination to be tough, a Soviet missile submarine arrived in Cuba in apparent violation of the Soviet-American understanding.

At any other time, there would have been howls of protest from Washington. So far, the administration has chosen to play it down. But the arrival of the submarine shows that those Soviet leaders who also want to play it tough are not without resources.

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STATINTL STATINTL

Joe Alsop

The Voice of
Power
GloryGod
Gloom
and Doom

By Tom Kelly

In Joe Alsop's pleasant garden room four plump caged doves are cooing. Joe says when asked that he does not like doves—that out of their cages they are dirty, mean, and hard to manage.

Joe sits under the skylight sipping a tisane from a huge blue and white china cup and the doves in two large, elaborate cages pay him no mind.

They're in and Joe's out but nobody's free.

Joe is a blue blooded falcon, a rare and endangered species. He is a falcon by inheritance, a member of the establishment, a natural born leader, a cousin of leaders, a classmate of leaders, a former roommate of leaders, and the chosen voice of the pedigreed "first-rate men" for thirty years.

For generations we've all been run by the East Coast cousins. The first cousins went to Groton and the second cousins to St. Paul's. The Irish Catholic fifth cousins were named Kennedy—but that was later. First they were coachmen and named Pat and Mike. They went to Choate.

It is difficult to tell the cousins without an alumni bulletin. Cousins are not measured by blood alone, but establishment cousins do tend to marry establishment cousins and produce genealogical cousins.

There are several (de facto) Jewish cousins named Lehmann, Ochs, and Morgenthau, but there are no Italian or Polish or Bulgarian cousins. Black people are not ready to be cousins though some can be classmates. It is customary to speak well of the late Frederick Douglass.

Some cousins chuckle a lot and Joe's blood cousin Teddy Roosevelt grinned and shouted "Bully" but most were serious faced and did not laugh out loud. This was partly because many were from New England but also because they were born to assume the awful responsibility of running the world.

Running the world is not easy. Joe took up the burden in 1932. He was a strange youth—fat, an honor graduate of Groton and Harvard, son of a roar-

ing Connecticut reactionary father and a mother who was as well connected as the Connecticut Light & Power Co. He was cousins to everyone important south of Portland and north of Philadelphia. He was literally a cousin to all the Roosevelts—Teddy, Franklin, Eleanor, and Alice Blue Gown.

When Joe was ready for the professional world his grandmother (a cousin of God's) decided that he was not to be a businessman, diplomat, banker, Episcopal bishop, or president of Harvard. It was suggested that he get a job on a newspaper, a startling idea. Cousins and classmates owned newspapers, of course, but they didn't work on them. Joe had a few precedents. Alexander Woollcott, who if not a cousin was at least invited to cousins' homes, was cutting a choleric swath through New York culture, and Bob Benchley, a blithe spirit but a Harvard boy, was working for magazines.

Ogden Reid hired Joe at Joe's grandmother's suggestion and sent him to report to the *Herald Tribune's* city editor, a disenchanted man named Stanley Walker. City editors are all low-born. Stanley had difficulty believing his own eyes since Joe, though only twenty-two, was 245 pounds, dressed in well-cut vest and watch chain, and possessed of an extraordinarily arch accent that suggested simultaneously the Queen Mother, Cardinal Newman, and the fatigue of a gentleman who'd just swum the English Channel backwards.

He also couldn't type.

Still, no one is perfect. Joe was broadly read and he could write a clear, ominous sentence. Alex Woollcott decided that Joe was the only educated youth he'd met since his own college days. Alex was given to extraordinary judgments—he was against sex and he believed Louisa May Alcott was a great writer.

Joe was soon a featured byline writer at the *Herald Tribune* and in less time than it takes to add up the Vietnam election returns he was the co-proprietor of a Washington column—his partner being a gentleman named Robert Kintner, a non-cousin, who would in time become head of NBC and an advisor to



Enough Of Covert Action

While the Administration has obtained a temporary order against publication of a book on the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L. Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful to the author. He has already provided outside of book covers some valuable insights and comments on an agency that deliberately hides from the public and Congress.

Without revealing any really hidden secrets, the author uses published reports to note that the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dollars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency has 18,000 employees, and that 6000 of these are working in clandestine services, as opposed to intelligence collection.

As it is, however, the CIA is the President's baby. Congress has proposed various control measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget, or requirements for clearer information about it, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Congress as well as the White House. Congress, after all, foots the bill, but it does not know for what.

CIA officials occasionally surface from secrecy to complain that critics concentrate on CIA failures. If so, that is because the public only hears about the failures, and they have to be big ones at that. They always seem to involve those covert or "paramilitary" operations, which range from a most qualified success in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I don't think we've had a successful paramilitary operation yet."

The clandestine operations are worth review. There was the U-2 spy plane incident that torpedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. There was the CIA's proud armed intervention to "save" Guatemala from leftists, leaving the country to oppression and terrorism. There was

the financing of Radio Free Europe which, when disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige of freedom or credibility. And there was the Bay of Pigs.

Then there was the CIA military operation to save the Dominican Republic from a rebellion to return a democratically-elected president. There was armed support for the overturn of a government in The Congo. Of course, there was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening the way for another dictatorship more satisfactory to Washington. And there is presently war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered without any visible success for the American position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace and order.

Aside from the fact that so many of these clandestine activities were inefficient and ineffective, even aside from the fact that they were bound to be failures for America's long-range prospects and reputation even if they did succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in paramilitary functions represents a continuing ability to start hostilities without the knowledge of the people or Congress, and certainly without any declaration of war.

Author Marchetti is fair enough to say that so far various presidents have kept a measure of control over such activities. That is no guarantee for the future, however, and it is Congress, not the President, that is supposed to make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Marchetti recommends confining intelligence activities to a small and highly professional group, and eliminating the covert actions entirely.

Intelligence simply cannot work well when governed by an agency equally interested in activities ranging from propaganda to military action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation does need successful intelligence. It does not need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable power to make war.

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RICHARD WILSON

Moscow Trip Looks Beyond Present Tensions

It's a fair question why and how plans for President Nixon's visit to Moscow can go forward in the present state of tension and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

President Eisenhower's projected trip to Russia was called off in May, 1960 under essentially less provocation than the direct risk to Soviet shipping in Haiphong harbor at the present time.

Although the Russians knew of reconnaissance overflights of Soviet territory, its leadership exploded in fury when Red gunners succeeded in shooting down a U2 spy plane and accused Ike of treachery. Premier Nikita Khrushchev withdrew his invitation to Eisenhower to visit Russia in June 1960 and U.S.-Soviet relations fell back into a deep freeze.

The difference between then and now, if Nixon's analysis is correct, is profound. We have done more than fly over Soviet territory (in fact, American

spy satellites now do so every day.)

We have damaged Russian shipping by aerial bombardment. It is surmised we may have killed Russians at surface-to-air missile sites in North Vietnam.

It is commonly recognized that the war in Vietnam, particularly in its present stage, is a proxy conflict between Soviet and American arms, with the prestige of both countries at stake.

How, then, can we continue to talk to the Russians with great expectations of new trade arrangements, cultural exchanges and nuclear arms agreements?

On Nixon's side, the answer is to be found in his underlying concept of his discussions with the Chinese and Russian leaderships.

He sees those discussions as transcending present conflicts. He deems them to be of an historic nature meaning more to the next generation than this one.

Small token advances may be made with both Russia and China as a result of his visits to Peking and Moscow. Certainly the most will be made of any partial agreement on nuclear arms.

But this is only the beginning of what must be a continuing process extending over many years so that the very strong China of the future, and the very strong Russia and America of now and the future, will not plunge the world into a horrendous conflict from which it might never recover.

Something of the same attitude must be shared in Peking and Moscow, it is reasoned, or Nixon never would have been invited to Peking, nor have been received there as he was, and his projected trip to Russia would most certainly be called off.

Compared to what might happen in the future involving Russia, China and the United States in nuclear war, the

present conflicts between these powers seem minor and, in any case, can eventually be overcome.

One would like to think that this largeness of mind is as universal as Nixon evidently hopes it is. He adverted to this theme indirectly in China, particularly at the Great Wall, and it now appears to be a permanent part of his political psychology which he likes to believe originates in the idealism of Woodrow Wilson.

Therefore, the President, knowing that only Soviet arms make the present offensive in Vietnam possible, is willing to go ahead with the Moscow part of his general scheme regardless. And the leaders in the Kremlin, with who knows what on their minds, are willing to set to one side the threats to their shipping and confrontation in the Mediterranean, and the conflict over Israel.

They are willing to suppress their suspicions of Nixon's going to Peking and quit harping on some unknown secret deal between Chou En-lai and a perfidious American President.

Their receiving American advance delegations and going ahead with Nixon's planned visit displays a mood quite different from their bristling anger over Eisenhower's relatively innocent venture in 1960.

The United States desires an improvement in relationships in certain areas and so does the Soviet Union. Those areas are limited. The outstanding big differences remain. In theory, at least, those differences might prove less menacing in the future if some preliminary agreements can be reached now.

STATINTL



Stanley Karnow

Nettling the Kremlin

AMERICAN OFFICIALS are currently stressing that the administration's "contingency plan" to mine Haiphong harbor is only an "option" that may never be exercised. But the possibility of such a move is nettling the Kremlin, and the risks are real that some miscalculation could jeopardize not only President Nixon's Moscow trip but also endanger U.S.-Soviet relations in other ways.

Proposals to mine or blockade the Haiphong harbor in order to discourage Russian weapons shipments to North Vietnam were repeatedly rejected by former President Johnson on the grounds that the tactic might wreck Soviet-American ties.

But on Tuesday, in response to questions from Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird declined to "rule out" a decision to drop high-explosive devices into the sea near the North Vietnamese port.

LAIRD'S REMARK was more than mere talk. A massive U.S. naval buildup has been underway in the Tonkin Gulf to provide the vessels for the prospect of a blockade. Moreover, as Washington Post reporter Michael Getler disclosed, a U.S. Navy ammunition ship laden with aerial mines has left its Philippines base to join the American armada off the Vietnam coast.

If the administration's statements and deployments were designed to worry the Russians, they had their effect. Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatoliy Dobrynin delayed his scheduled departure for Moscow this week, reportedly to discuss the deteriorating Vietnam situation with Henry Kissinger, the President's foreign policy adviser.

The details of their conversation are of course unknown. Yet it is fair speculation that Dobrynin made it plain to Kissinger that mining or blockading the Haiphong harbor might lead to something like a combination of the 1960 U-2 incident and the 1962 Cuba confrontation in reverse.

Besides prompting the Kremlin to cancel the President's invitation to visit Moscow next month, Dobrynin presumably said, a threat to Soviet ships might also torpedo the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the prospects of increased U.S. trade with the Russians.

At worst, the Soviet diplomat may have warned, the destruction or damage of Russian ships in the Haiphong area might even touch off a more serious clash between the United States and the Kremlin.

But the Russians have little to offer in exchange for their demands that the President refrain from escalating his actions in North Vietnam.

They cannot or will not attempt to dissuade the North Vietnamese from pursuing their present offensive in South Vietnam, partly because their influence in Hanoi is limited and partly because they fear being overtaken by the Chinese. Nor can they, for the same reasons, curb their military supplies to North Vietnam.

In addition, they apparently believe, they have every right to provide North Vietnam with weapons as long as the United States continues to arm the Saigon regime and fortify it with air support.

JUDGING by both its rhetoric and conduct, however, the administration is plainly persuaded that the Russians do indeed have the

leverage to restrain the North Vietnamese—if not through advice then by cutting back their military shipments to Hanoi.

Administration spokesmen further hold that the contention of the Russians that their aid to Hanoi is the equivalent of U.S. aid to Saigon is specious since, they say, the South Vietnamese are defending their territory against a North Vietnamese invasion.

But underlying these administration arguments are other considerations that are rightly or wrongly spurring the President's decision to challenge the Russians.

One of these, consistent with his strategy since 1969, is that he must intensify his employment of air power to cover the reduction of U.S. troop strength in Vietnam. The other, particularly important at this time, is that he must escalate even more forcefully to placate the hawks at home if he intends to keep withdrawing American boys. In addition, he simply refuses to be "bullied" by Moscow.

Whatever the validity of this approach, it is carrying the United States dangerously close to a collision with the Soviet Union. Such a collision, if it happens, would be one of Vietnam's most costly casualties.

CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

VICTOR MARCHETTI

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel *The Rope-Dancer* has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

After the Bay of Pigs, the agency had its first major setback because it failed in its attempt to overthrow Castro. At the top of the agency's hierarchy was the committee, which included the director, the administration, the agency's legal counsel, and the agency's public relations. Throughout the 1960s, the agency's operations against Cuba continued at the same time, and the agency was deeply involved in operations against regimes in Laos and

When the Nation exposed the CIA in 1967, the agency's labor and cultural funding conduits, not tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's control over the CIA. He was simply told by the CIA and get on with its business. He was informed to look into the Secretary of State, the CIA. Some of the CIA. Some because they had been longer thought worth

continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

From Bratsk to Novosibirsk, U.S. Rock Beat Is Big, President Isn't

STATINTL

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

BRATSK, U.S.S.R., March 23—Across the vast expanses of Siberia, the prospect of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union this spring stirs little excitement. People are more interested in knowing about American cars, books, rock groups and fashions.

"I'd like to see New York—what are they wearing there?" asked a 23-year-old factory worker and amateur guitarist, decked out in a loose-sleeved yellow and green paisley sportshirt and a purple vest for a jam session of the Padun, a local group.

When a visitor suggested that the young combo from Bratsk would be pretty much in vogue in New York and inquired where they had found costumes so far from the usual Soviet garb, a teenage flutist with long red hair replied with a laugh, "From you—Americans." He explained that while the style was American, the clothes were home-made or custom-made here.

Questions About Cars

In Irkutsk, a taxi driver wanted to know whether it was true that "Americans all have cars and they are bigger and better than our." He was immediately hushed up by two technicians who insisted, "As you can see, we have everything here."

At a Russian Orthodox Church, a grandmotherly worshiper strolled up to two American visitors and, amid recollections of the suffering of World War II, suddenly asked: "How is life with you?" Then looking the visitor up and down, she answered herself: "I can see that it's good."

In far off Yakutsk, south of the Arctic Circle, an accordionist in a hotel dance band stopped at an American's table to ask whether American accordions had five rows of buttons or just four. (Generally, there are six.)

In Novosibirsk, a college senior wanted to know about the latest recordings of Ar-

tha Franklin and the rock group Blood, Sweat and Tears.

The questions and comments of Siberians in random conversations reveal astonishing pockets of specialized knowledge about aspects of American life in the midst of ignorance about American society in general.

Capitalist Social Security

Two industrial workers riding the Trans-Siberian Railroad were at first skeptical then sincerely surprised to learn that unemployed or disabled American workers receive social security benefits and that many American college students receive scholarships. A 26-year-old welder was incredulous that a husband alone could support a middle-class family of four. In most Soviet families the wife must work, too.

A young professional woman in Novosibirsk, said that some Soviet women were so stirred by the Angela Davis case that they were naming babies after her, then asked why Miss Davis was being so persecuted. The woman later acknowledged that she had been unaware that Miss Davis had been charged with complicity in a murder.

Many Soviet youths listen to the Voice of America regularly and are up-to-date on the lives of movie stars and rock musicians in America.

In Siberia one encounters four university graduates whose favorite tune is the depression-era tune, "Brother, Can You Spare a Dime," and

In Siberia, much as in middle America, the tendency seems to be to regard international politics as the distant affair of officials in the capital. Publications in Moscow may be gradually mellowing in preparation for the Nixon visit, but thousands of miles away the people were

either uninterested or wary about having Mr. Nixon visit.

Some, remembering how President Eisenhower's planned trip to the Soviet Union in 1960 was canceled at the last minute because of the downing of the American U-2 plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers, are skeptical that Mr. Nixon will actually make the trip.

"We built a special guest house for President Eisenhower," a Bratsk executive recalled over dinner. "Then he sent Powers and that finished it. We still have the house. Maybe Nixon will use it. But we'll have to see if he actually gets here."

A teacher in Novosibirsk voiced a thought echoed by many others: "It would have been better if Kennedy could have come instead of Nixon."

Memories of Old Days

Some of the wariness is attributable to Soviet memories of Mr. Nixon's vigorously anti-Communist political past and some to the tremor of uneasiness sent through the Soviet Union by his recent trip to Peking.

Again and again, American travelers are urged to explain why Washington has suddenly decided to be close to Peking after two decades of estrangement.

More than one Soviet citizen suggested that a secret deal had been struck in Peking to Moscow's disadvantage. "In a year or so it will come out," said a political lecturer in Bratsk.

Two Soviet journalists in Yakutsk disagreed on whether the time was ripe for an American-Soviet agreement on arms limitations or space cooperation.

One, reflecting the present approach in Moscow, forecast a "useful" visit. The other, more in line with the old position, suggested that important agreements were unlikely so long as there was



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in Yakutsk a university lecturer who knows not only such Soviet-translated staples as Dreiser, Jack London and Hemingway, but also Faulkner, J. D. Salinger, and Saul Bellow.

15 MAR 1972

Stalinists Snipe at Brezhnev

By Sidney I. Ploss

Mr. Ploss, a research fellow at Harvard University's Russian Research Center, wrote this article for Perspective.

The manual used in a special new course in Soviet universities regrets that under the late Nikita Khrushchev Joseph Stalin's version of politics-as-warfare fell into disfavor.

Devoted to the ruling Communist Party's "strategy and tactics," the new course brings back the military definition of politics for which Stalin was notorious.

Prof. V. S. Aleksandrov, author of the course manual, examines the history of the U. S. S. R. in terms of "strategic stages." At each stage, he writes, party leaders confronted "the main enemy" and targeted it for "the main blow." Invariably this meant a fight to the finish with "class-hostile forces" inside the country and abroad.

Main Enemy: U. S. Business

Now, U. S. big business is seen as the Soviet's "main enemy." American corporate interests are pictured as disposing of huge power which they use to subvert the Eastern bloc of nations and to launch armed attacks on it. Aleksandrov instructs that in turn Soviet energies must be applied toward isolating and eliminating this mortal foe.

The rivalries between America and its democratic partners in the world community are to be exploited as a "strategic reserve" of Communism. And allowance is made for "trials of strength" to promote the cause of global revolution.

All this seems inconsistent with the foreign policy stand of today's Politburo headed by Leonid Brezhnev. His actions would make it appear that Communist China is the Kremlin's "main enemy" on the international scene. Over 30 Soviet divisions, after all, are massed on the Russo-Chinese frontier, where bloody clashes occurred in 1969. Brezhnev soon afterward gave his belated approval to President Nixon's call for a new era of negotiations between Washington and Moscow.

Why then is an effort being made to induce cold-war moods at Soviet institutes?

While secret police operations are more limited, the U. S. S. R. is still a totalitarian state. Unusual effort is made to control the media and to have it service a narrow group of supreme

top level is shared and policy disputes exist there, all of the regime's propagandists do not say the same thing. Instead, they tend to voice the diverse opinions of mighty patrons at the seat of power.

The case of Aleksandrov and his friends at the Ministry of Education looks like a classic example of Soviet factionalism.

A Basic Clue

A basic clue for solving the riddle of Aleksandrov's eccentric manual is its discussion of policy compromises. Unlike Brezhnev's spokesmen, who have gone to great lengths to justify such East-West deals as the Berlin accords, the manual warns that some compromises may express "opportunism and betrayal of the workers' interests."

Good Communists are urged to "pitilessly expose" and wage "irreconcilable struggle" against "top leaders" of Communism who strike that kind of bargain with outsiders.

The super orthodox textbook also restricts the differences between Western politicians to starkly economic ones. In contrast, those Soviet writers defending Brezhnev's policy of resolving Soviet-American differences insist that "a considerable number of capitalist figures" now oppose a line of military pressure and advocate "mutually advantageous cooperation with Socialist countries."

Brezhnev's group includes President Nixon among the Western moderates, to judge from the hopes for improving U. S.-Soviet relations during his upcoming visit to Moscow that are raised in the quoted source, an editorial in the party magazine, Kommunist. It takes issue with diehards like Aleksandrov, who are told that long-term trends in world politics must never be treated as "a rigid scheme." Each international situation is said to be "unique and unrepeatable," requiring "a creative approach and solution on every occasion." This dynamic attitude is a far cry from the party educator's static teaching about need for ironbound continuity of conflict with class enemies, foreign or domestic.

The high-level infighting over foreign policy that is indicated by disarray in

Soviet propaganda is likely to sharpen as a result of Nixon's trip to China. Kremlin hardliners may be expected to stress Peking's anti-Soviet behavior and to offer the Nixon voyage as proof that it is America's unchanging policy to encourage a weakening of Russian influence wherever possible.

Wields Less Power

Others will argue that foreign entanglements have cost Washington too much in recent years and compelled Nixon to assess more soberly the situation in the world.

One is thus reminded of Khrushchev's advance to the summit meeting with President Eisenhower in 1960. At that time it was Mao Tse-tung who most prominently raged against the Soviet chief's search for recognition of the European status quo. The Paris summit conference abruptly collapsed in the wake of the U-2 incident and amidst signs that Khrushchev was not complete master in his own house.

In 1972, Brezhnev wields less personal power than Khrushchev. The internal critics of his policy of cooperation with the West are more conspicuous. Clearly worried about the prestige of the Communist philosophy, these neo-Stalinists are strong enough to preach their militant gospel in Moscow lecture halls. They may yet cause a major surprise in the uncertain field of U. S.-Soviet relations.

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One of the most unique developments in the history of aerial reconnaissance was the Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance airplane. Design work on the U-2 was initiated in the summer of 1953 at the request and with the funding of the Central Intelligence Agency. By the summer of 1954 construction of the prototype airplane had begun and by 1955 this first airplane had made its first flight. The airplane was given a "U" category designation to maintain its veil of secrecy relative to its real purpose (U being a designation given to Utility class airplanes).

The C.I.A. had requested the U-2 for the express purpose of espionage reconnaissance. They wanted an airplane capable of flying over forbidden territory at an altitude so high it would be immune to conventional anti-aircraft defenses. This airplane would, of necessity, also be capable of carrying a highly sophisticated lightweight reconnaissance package over very long ranges.

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was chosen as main contractor in the U-2 program for several reasons. In the main, they had Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson (one of the true greats in the world of aeronautical engineering) and his design team, as head of their experimental and advanced projects division, and they had a super secret facility known as the "skunk works" in which an airplane such as the U-2 could be produced without fear of discovery.

Johnson had done some outstanding work during his years with Lockheed. Some of his more famous products included the P-38, the P-80, and the F-104. After the U-2, came the world's fastest jet-propelled aircraft, the YF-12A and the SR-71. The U-2 began its design development program at the same time as the F-104. As a result, the two aircraft mutually influenced each other, as a comparison of the two airplanes will bear out. Several crucial factors dictated the U-2's many unique features. First and foremost in importance was the airplane's weight which needed to be kept at a bare minimum. With very few exceptions every conceivable short cut was taken to keep the U-2 within certain weight restrictions. The landing gear was compromised down to a bicycle arrangement of a single main bogie with a smaller bogie in the rear. Outrigger wheels under the wings, used during taxiing and take-off, were jettisoned as soon as the airplane became airborne. The wing structure consisted of a single main spar with turned-down tips serving mainly as skids during landing and secondarily as end plates which cut down on tip drag. Over-all, the wings had the amazing aspect ratio (chord to span) of 14.3 to 1 (compared to a more conventional 6 to 1). Full span flaps filled up some 6 percent of the trailing edge span and wing loading was 25 pounds per square foot. The U-2 was virtually a powered sailplane. And like a

sailplane it was a highly sophisticated, very efficient, and aesthetically appealing flying machine.

The U-2, in its initial production U-2A variant, entered service with the U.S.A.F. during the summer of 1956. All U-2's were hand-made and as a result, production lots were relatively small, only 10 airplanes per lot being built. During its first two years of service a total of some 20 airplanes became operational. About 10 of these entered service with the C.I.A. under the cover of N.A.S.A. Initial releases concerning the airplane and its duties declared it to be for weather reconnaissance only. Observers in Britain, Germany, and Japan noted otherwise.

For two years U-2 reconnaissance missions were flown over Soviet Russia beginning in the fall of 1958. The missions did not go unnoticed inside the Soviet Union but acknowledgement by U.S. authorities that the flights were being made was nonexistent. The Soviet government demanded a halt to the overflights (this being kept from the U.S. press) but the demands were ignored. It was of utmost importance for the U.S. security system to know of Russia's internal workings.

With very few exceptions, the U-2 overflights remained one of the best kept secrets of the U.S. intelligence system. The U-2 was a seemingly impregnable reconnaissance machine and as long as it remained so, it would be used.

A total of 55 U-2's were built in at least three different models. Five of these were two-place U-2D's (for missile monitoring), approximately 30 were U-2B's, and approximately 20 were U-2A's. The U-2A was the initial

production variant powered by a Pratt and Whitney J-57-P-37A jet-engine developing 11,200 pounds thrust. This version was capable of maximum altitudes in the vicinity of 70,000 feet. When the overflights began in the fall of 1958, a newer, more powerful version of the U-2, the U-2B, was introduced. This version was powered by a Pratt and Whitney J-75-P13 jet-engine of 17,000 pounds thrust. This engine gave the U-2 a maximum operational ceiling of 90,000 feet.

The engines used in the various U-2 models were special modifications of standard production engines. The main difference was in the compressor section. The U-2's engines had special broad chord blades in this section to make better use of the low air density at high altitudes. These engines also burned special low-volatility fuel (MIL-F-25524A). This prevented evaporation losses at high altitude and added an additional 5 per cent to the airplane's maximum range over standard JP-4.

With the phenomenal 90,000 foot altitude capability of the U-2B, it was well known that nothing the Soviet Union could put into the air could possibly come close to knocking the airplane down during an overflight. This was of course, barring the possibility of an engine failure or other malfunction. The original U-2A at 70,000 feet was in its own right, within this realm of immunity. The U-2B was, for all practical purposes, an impregnable fortress.

On May 1, 1960, Francis Gary Powers and his U-2B were shot down near Sverdlovsk well inside the Soviet Union. Exact details as to how the airplane was destroyed remain covered to this day. Information available indicates that for some reason the airplane was

A Finger in Every Dike

RISE TO GLOBALISM: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. By Stephen E. Ambrose. Penguin Books. 352 pp. Paper \$2.45.

COLD WAR AND COUNTERREVOLUTION: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy. By Richard J. Walton. The Viking Press. 250 pp. \$7.95.

RONALD RADOSH

Mr. Radosh is author of *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (Random House) and editor, with Murray N. Rothbard, of the forthcoming *A New History of Leviathan* (Dutton). He teaches history at Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York.

During the past ten years, it has become much more widely accepted that the cold war was not a Russian invention. Cold-war "revisionism" has made its impact. The shock of the Pentagon Papers has been eased for many by acquaintance with the historical analysis of such scholars as William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, David Horowitz and Walter LaFeber. Yet until now, there has been no overall synthetic account that tells what each postwar administration did and also provides a critical analysis of its policies.

This task has been realized by Stephen E. Ambrose's *Rise to Globalism*. As the title suggests, Ambrose is concerned with the developing globalist conception of America's role abroad. He realizes that this posture developed from the need to avoid a postwar depression by achieving new foreign markets—a problem, since "much of the proposed market place was closed." Ambrose sees postwar foreign policy as formulated particularly to prevent nationalization of American-owned property abroad, which meant an effort to create "an open door everywhere." The globalist shift was not mindless. "Politicians looked for areas in which American influence could dominate; the businessmen looked for profitable markets and new sources of raw materials; the military looked for overseas bases," and America began a "program of expansion that had no inherent limits." This basic stance was developed by the administration of Harry S. Truman; it is in its account of these years that Mr. Ambrose's book makes its most significant contribution.

By 1947, Truman and his advisers "saw communist involvement in every attack on the status quo anywhere and convinced themselves that the Kremlin was at the controls of the world's conquer the world." To deal with what was regarded as a worldwide threat, they

undertook to arm Europe. The program had to surmount an initial obstacle: the American populace was not yet ready for a new holy crusade, and Truman needed large economic and military largesse from Congress to meet the supposed threat.

The issue Truman found to get this funding was Greece, as the United States prepared to move into the areas from which Britain was forced to withdraw. But to mask their real purpose, Truman had to present his intervention as a step on behalf of worldwide freedom. Hence the Truman Doctrine was devised, and it "defined American policy for the next twenty years. Whenever and wherever an anti-communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even diplomatic pressure . . . the United States would supply political, economic, and most of all military aid." For Truman the terms "free peoples" and "anti-communist" were assumed to be synonymous." Once the premise was accepted, the enormous interventions of future administrations were but a step away.

It was Korea, however, that allowed the Truman administration to finally achieve the enormous defense budget called for in the secret and influential National Security Council resolution 68. The drafters of NSC 68 asked for a \$35 billion budget. This task Truman considered hopeless, calculating that a reluctant Congress would grant at most \$17 billion. At least, until Korea. The crisis allowed Truman to put the recommendations of NSC 68 into effect. Ambrose is emphatic on one point: the Korean War, whichever side started it, was a boon—politically, economically and socially—to American imperialism.

As for the war itself, Ambrose corrects major errors in our understanding of it. First, he points out that the U.S. authorities knew that North Korea was planning to invade across the 38th Parallel. In fact, the State Department had prepared a resolution condemning North Korean aggression days before the attack. But unlike I. F. Stone, who argued in his book that Syngman Rhee started the war with covert American support, Ambrose writes that the North Korean action was "too strong, too well coordinated, and too successful to be a counter-attack." He believes that the North Koreans simply calculated that they could overrun the peninsula before the United States could reinforce South Korea. Moreover, American officials had already defined South Korea as outside the U.S. defense perimeter, and the North Koreans

may very well have doubted that America would move in.

Second, Ambrose presents a major revision of standard accounts of the MacArthur-Truman dispute. Truman's assumption that American bombers alone would force the North Koreans back was quickly shattered. American troops were then brought in, supposedly only to restore the border at the 38th Parallel. But by August, the policy was to reunify Korea under the aegis of the South.

Now, the policy of crossing the 38th Parallel and unifying Korea was not MacArthur's. Rather, it was the new policy of the Truman administration. The President's advisers argued that China would not intervene on Korea's behalf. Quoting from instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Ambrose writes that stepping beyond containment "came after full discussion and consideration in the highest levels of the American government. Truman later implied, and millions believed, that MacArthur had gone ahead on his own, that it was the general in the field, not the government at home, that had changed the political objective of the war in the middle of the conflict. Such was never the case. Truman, with the full concurrence of the State and Defense Departments and the Joint Chiefs, made the decision to liberate North Korea." Much later, after MacArthur's February 1951 offensive, Truman moved away from the objective of a military victory. But that policy had itself arisen from the decision to favor containment, which actually meant war mobilization, a high defense budget, and a permanent cold-war footing for the nation. That is the significance of Truman's flat rejection of Clement Attlee's plea for peace in Asia.

In contrast to Truman and the policy of permanent intervention, Dwight D. Eisenhower appears in Ambrose's book as a President struggling nobly to minimize the effects of the cold war. While his administration engaged in the rhetoric of liberation, the reality was more often a restrained version of Truman's containment. Despite John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower was more flexible than his predecessor. The Republicans may have rattled the saber, but "they also shut down the Korean War, cut corporate taxes, and reduced the size of the armed forces. Despite intense pressure and great temptation, they entered no wars. They were willing to supply material, on a limited scale, to others . . . but they would not commit American boys to the struggle."

By 1955, the decision to go to the summit had undercut the failure of Re-

COLORADO TO KOKO NOR

**The amazing true story
of the CIA's secret war
against Red China**

• The author, L. Fletcher Prouty, is a retired Air Force colonel who is now with the Center of Political Research in Washington, D.C.

By L. FLETCHER PROUTY

STATINTL

NIGHT HAD obscured the mountains when the Air Force cargo plane finally approached the Pikes Peak country from the west. Wearily, it seemed, the aircraft crossed the south shoulder of the peak, turned left, dropped flaps and began the long, gradual descent to Peterson Field which serves both as an Air Force base and the municipal airport of Colorado Springs.

The landing was uneventful. But from that point some strange things happened.

The aircraft, a heavy-bodied C130 powered by four turbo-prop engines, taxied to a remote end of the field rather than to the regular ramp. A military bus quickly pulled up alongside.

If any outsider had been there to witness some 20 men disembark, he would have been told they were soldiers from India scheduled for training at nearby Ft. Carson under a military aid program.

But the troops weren't Indians and they never got to Ft. Carson.

The loaded bus headed westward out of Colorado Springs, up the Ute Pass highway, and disappeared into the night.

During the months that followed, other men like those in the first group disappeared mysteriously in Colorado Springs in

the same mysterious manner and vanished into the mountains.

The identity of these men and the nature of their mission makes a fascinating story — and, in some respects, a frightening one — with vast international implications. Recent developments in relations between the United States and Communist China, which portend so much for an era of peace, give that story a special timeliness. The details of this operation are reported here for the first time.

To understand what this hush-hush operation was all about, it is necessary to set the time, which was August 1959, and to recall the ominous twilight zone — neither peace nor war — into which relations between East and West had drifted in that period. With an eye toward the successful culmination of his two-term administration, President Eisenhower announced a series of international events leading to a super-Summit Conference in Paris during May 1960.

The Korean War had settled into an uneasy truce six years earlier, in 1953. The Berlin Wall was still two years in the future, 1961. At the moment the point of East-West friction was at a most unlikely place, Tibet, an almost mythical land to most Americans

who connected it vaguely with a Ronald Coleman movie about Shangri-la.

There is nothing mythical about Tibet. It is an ancient country with an area four times that of Colorado, separated from India to the south by the Himalayan Range, many of whose peaks are twice as tall as Colorado's highest mountains. The country's average elevation is about 15,000 feet. Soon after the Communist government took over control of China in 1949, Peking announced its intentions of "liberating" Tibet. In October 1950 Chinese Communist troops invaded it.

Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader, the Dalai Lama, then only 15 years old, urged his people not to resist. The Chinese in turn left the Dalai Lama alone. But by February of 1959 it became evident the Chinese intended to seize him to gain undisputed control over that country.

Forewarned, the Dalai Lama and about 80 of his followers fled Lhasa, the capital city on March 17, 1959, heading for the safety of India. The Chinese were not aware of the Dalai Lama's departure for several days. They had been lulled by the fact that there were only two good routes out of Lhasa, both under Chinese control. The only route to the west, toward the Chinese border, was a narrow, treacherous trail. The only route to the east, toward the Indian border, was a narrow, treacherous trail. The only route to the south, toward the Indian border, was a narrow, treacherous trail. The only route to the north, toward the Chinese border, was a narrow, treacherous trail. The only route to the west, toward the Chinese border, was a narrow, treacherous trail. The only route to the east, toward the Indian border, was a narrow, treacherous trail. The only route to the south, toward the Indian border, was a narrow, treacherous trail. The only route to the north, toward the Chinese border, was a narrow, treacherous trail.

When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the CIA worked to ferret out details of the sanction-busting. In the popular traditions of spying, secret documents disappeared were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock when one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was not until the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were unactive in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his story and looks at the Director, Richard Helms

DEAD LETTERS

IN SALISBURY

MANY of the bright young men Allen Dulles had recruited to CIA from law offices and universities had gained their spurs in London, where they were sent to glean some of the methods of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks about the Victorian and Indian Army traditions still surviving in the British secret service, but he had a healthy respect for its unrivalled experience and great professionalism. He knew that CIA could learn a lot from the British about operations in the Middle East and Africa, where its stations were rapidly expanding.

After Archibald Roosevelt, one of CIA's foremost "Arabists", had restored cordial relations with SIS when station head in London, a plan of co-operation was devised for Africa, where most of the former British colonies had gained independence, and were becoming subject to strong Soviet and Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia made her momentous "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI), which led to the conflict with the British Government.

There is no better instance of the strengthening of CIA-SIS collaboration than the hitherto undisclosed story of the services CIA rendered the British authorities in Rhodesia, particularly since about 1968.

Indeed, in assisting the British SIS in its thankless task of implementing the policy of economic sanctions against the Smith regime, CIA put its relations with the Portuguese in jeopardy. It has an enduring understanding with the Portuguese Government and its PIDE secret service on many aspects: NATO security, anti-communist operations, the use of radio stations in Portugal and her colonies, and of bases for the U.S. Navy and Special Forces in Angola, Mozambique and Macao. However thin the

British sanction policy became, British consular offices and SIS men were supposed to watch the steady flow of Rhodesian pig-iron, tobacco, and other products through the Portuguese ports of Lorenzo Marques and Beira in East Africa to Europe and the Far East. Merchants and shippers there had made fortunes out of the traffic which the Portuguese were bound, by United Nations resolutions and agreements with Britain, to regard as illegal.

After the closure of British missions in Salisbury all information about Rhodesian exports dried up at source. At this juncture CIA stepped in to assist the British. It was not merely a labour of love. American tobacco syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky greatly increased their production and sales to Europe when Rhodesian tobacco growers lost most of their trade through sanctions. Traditionally, Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. When these supplies dried up, European manufacturers turned to American growers. But by and by Rhodesian exports began to flow again, by the use of false certificates of origin and smuggling through the Portuguese ports and through Durban in South Africa, much to the displeasure of the Americans.

Thus, obliging the British and helping American business, CIA ordered its agents to ferret out the secrets of the sanction-busting schemes devised by Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA station in Salisbury was bustling with activity. Since 1962 it had been headed by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA official, who had joined it in 1952 from the State Department and had come to Africa in the guise of an official of the U.S. Development Aid Agency.

Other CIA men were Caplan, a former A. Francis M. who had a cloak-and-dagger background in Cuba and Congo and several other places. Edward Salisbury.

From 1957 from the State Department; from 1959 he headed the East and South African section and, at the time of his new appointment, was Station Head in Pretoria. Among his various exploits he was reputed to have initiated the first contacts between the South African government and Dr Banda of Malawi.

The CIA agents were perpetually journeying between Salisbury and the Mozambique ports, and Murray was temporarily posted to Lusaka to maintain personal contact with British officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign affairs as well as security and the secret service of the Rhodesian regime, were not unaware of the unwelcome operations of the Americans. They suffered them for the sake of avoiding an open clash with Washington. Their patience, however, became frayed when it was discovered that secret documents had disappeared from the headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian National Front Party. Subsequently,

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A Naive Test of Soviet Sensitivities

HARRY TRIMBORN

MOSCOW

What constitutes proper behavior for an official representative of the United States government in visiting the Soviet Union?

Does he have the right to engage in any activity not specifically prohibited by Soviet law, even if he knows—or should know—that certain of such activities are sure to anger his hosts? Or must he follow the ground rules—explicit or implied—laid down by his hosts, whether he likes them or not?

Is it acceptable for him to come to the Soviet Union ostensibly for one purpose at the invitation of the Soviet government, then engage in side activities that the government considers "subversive" and "anti-Soviet"?

And what would the answers to these questions be if they were applied to an official Soviet visitor to the United States?

These and similar questions, are at the root of the controversial activities of three U.S. congressmen who visited the Soviet Union recently as part of a seven-man House subcommittee delegation ostensibly for a two-week look at Soviet educational facilities.

The three congressmen were Reps. James H. Scheuer (D-N.Y.), Earl F. Landgrebe (R-Ind.) and Alphonzo Bell (R-Calif.). Among them they contacted Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel as well as a Soviet civil rights leader, and distributed religious material to Soviet citizens.

Their activities, however laudable and well-meaning they might have been, placed the U.S. Embassy here in an impossible situation. The embassy, according to reliable sources, was deeply angered over the behavior of the three visitors. The State Department even complained to the congressmen's Washington offices about it, according to the sources.

While maintaining an official stance of "no comment," one top diplomat called the distribution of religious material here "stupid."

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Yet at the same time the embassy was trying desperately to hush up the activities, even to the extent of misleading reports.

And it didn't help much when the congressmen later insisted that they had done nothing wrong, had not meant to anger the Soviet government or break any laws.

Their remarks showed a lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union and extreme naivete over what would or would not be permissible for a visitor, official or otherwise, to the country.

The embassy felt the visitors should have done nothing to anger their hosts, whether or not there were any specific regulations covering their actions.

The embassy's sensitivity to diplomatic disruptions is at a peak now in anticipation of President Nixon's scheduled visit to the Soviet Union in May. U.S. diplomats reportedly are concerned over supplying the Russians with ammunition for what one source called the "U-2 gambit." This is a reference to the planned 1960 summit meeting between Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower which the Russians angrily called off following the downing of the U-2 spy plane over Russia.

In the view of some sources, the Russians appear to be attempting to stockpile "anti-Soviet" incidents involving Americans in the event they need an excuse to call off the Nixon visit. And visiting congressmen and other Americans should do nothing to help the Russians build their inventory.

The "U-2 gambit" may have been behind the beating of U.S. Air Force attache, Captain Elmer L. Alderfer at the Riga airport Jan. 5, ostensibly for taking pictures there.

The embassy's efforts to keep a lid on the three congressmen's activities

The author heads The Times bureau in Moscow.

ties were doomed because Scheuer—taking advantage of a seeming Soviet blunder—wanted anything but silence.

Scheuer was detained briefly by Soviet police Jan. 12 after he had gone to the home of a Jew who is seeking to emigrate to Israel. Two days later Scheuer was ordered expelled from Russia for engaging in

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Scheuer sought out newsmen to relate with relish his encounters with Soviet authorities and also to tell of his meetings with a number of other Jews seeking to leave, and with dissident civil rights leader Valery Chalidze.

Bell allegedly accompanied Scheuer to some of the meetings and supposedly was collecting material for the World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem. Bell went to Israel after leaving the Soviet Union.

While readily admitting his contacts with the Russians, Scheuer denied a Soviet allegation that he had distributed anti-Soviet material. The reference apparently was to documents Scheuer displayed disclosing the formation of a group in the United States to press for greater immigration of Soviet Jews.

Scheuer was detained on the pretext that police were searching for a "foreign-looking" criminal in the neighborhood and, since the congressman was a foreigner, he might just be their man.

To some observers, the Scheuer detention represented a Soviet blunder. The resultant worldwide publicity could only help Scheuer politically and embarrass the Kremlin.

Thanks to his own efforts and the apparent Soviet mistake Scheuer found himself in a dream position for any politician. He had struck a blow on behalf of a serious and deeply felt cause that gave him worldwide publicity and went over big with the voters back home.

Here was a Jewish congressman from the heavily Jewish constituency of the Bronx tangling with the Soviet police over the status of Soviet Jews. As Scheuer himself reportedly put it to a U.S. diplomat following his detention:

"I've just insured my reelection. It's too bad there wasn't a little blood on my face and an American photographer around."

The incident, and Scheuer's subsequent expulsion, along with the embassy's futile efforts to minimize the three lawmakers' activities makes sense if the Russians are indeed stockpiling material for possible future use against the planned presidential visit.

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continued



Joseph Kraft

The Anderson Papers

JACK ANDERSON achieved a journalistic coup in publishing the minutes of the secret White House meetings on the India-Pakistan crisis. But how much of a hero is the man who leaked the information?

My strong impression is that he accomplished very little public good, if any. On the contrary, his actions are almost certain to drive the Nixon administration deeper than ever into secret dealings on a restricted basis.

On the good side of the ledger, the leak has now provided unmistakable information that the President deliberately tilted American policy in favor of Pakistan and against India. But that much was known to everybody in touch with the State Department and White House at the time of the crisis.

Sens. Edmund Muskie, Edward Kennedy and Frank Church, among others, said so. Hundreds of us wrote it. Indeed, one reason Henry Kissinger held his background briefing of Dec. 7 was to take the edge off the charges the White House was biased in favor of Pakistan.

A second and more important gain from the revelation has to do with information about the way the government works. The secret minutes provide detailed, irrefutable evidence that day-to-day foreign policy is made in the White House as never before.

They equally show that top officials allowed themselves to be treated as mere lackeys by the White House. Some of them—including such supposed heavyweights as the chief of naval operations—said, and apparently regularly say, things silly enough to issue from the mouth of Bertie Wooster.

Then there is the matter of truth-telling. According to the minutes released by Anderson, Henry Kissinger told a meeting of officials on Dec.

3 that "he (the President) wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan."

On Dec. 7, in a background session with reporters subsequently released by Sen. Barry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger said: "There have been some

comments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate."

Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kissinger told a flat lie. My impression is that, taken in the larger context, his remarks at the secret conference were not in such flagrant contradiction with his remarks at the background briefing. Still, he was plainly trying to manipulate public opinion.

BUT SO WHAT? Does the new evidence do more than confirm a universal judgment? After the U-2 and the Bay of Pigs and the credibility gap, is there anybody not impossibly naive or ill-informed who doesn't know that the government lies? Is one more bit of evidence a noble act? Or is it just a pebble added to the Alps?

Set against these gains, there is the way the administration is apt to react. Maybe the President and Dr. Kissinger are going to say to themselves: "Golly, we sure erred in not telling the truth and nothing but the truth. Jack Anderson has taught us that honesty is the best policy."

But much more likely, they are going to feel that the minutes of the meeting were legitimately classified internal working papers of the government. Probably they are going to feel that the stuff was leaked not for any large purpose, but out of opposition to the policy. And almost certainly—and I say this as an opponent of the policy—they will be right in this surmise.

In these circumstances, the limited trust they have in the outside world is going to be even more sharply limited. They will have of the bureaucracy—a

suspicion that the departments and agencies are full of crypto-Democrats out to get the administration—is only going to be intensified. And that deep suspicion is going to yield two sets of adverse reactions.

For one thing, security will be tightened. There is apt to be an end to the kind of minutes that were taken at Dr. Kissinger's meetings. They will certainly not be spread through the bureaucracy anymore.

Secondly, the limited access which experienced officials now have to White House decision-making is going to be even further curbed. The President and Dr. Kissinger are going to keep things to themselves more than ever. Important decisions which are even now made with too little consultation and with too small an input from the outside are going to be made by an even more narrowly circumscribed group of men.

No doubt Anderson gets high marks for his acumen and industry and courage as a journalist. But his source, the man who leaked the stuff, is something else. Whatever his motives, he has done this country a disservice.

He Was Sky Spy Prior to U-2 Days

(When American U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers was shot down 1990 miles inside Russia on May 1, 1960, it caused a crisis between the U.S. and Russia and Premier Khrushchev cancelled a summit meeting with President Eisenhower. But CIA-sponsored overflights of Iron Curtain countries had been taking place for at least 10 years, according to a Southern California resident who began his career as an airman with the Polish Air Force in 1937).

By DEL SCHRAMER
Herald Examiner Staff Writer

Ten years before Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was blasted from the skies over Russia in 1960, Polish airman Janecz S. Barcz was making the first of his 90 spy flights over Communist-held Albania, Romania and Bulgaria for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Barcz, 52, now a patriotic American citizen living in San Pedro, recalls his four years of frantic hedge-hopping through the Balkans from a base in Athens, Greece, with a shudder.

"We flew so low around and up over those mountains and hills that my heart still flutters when I think of those exciting, but danger-filled missions. We started out in the old C-47 which had a top speed of 140 m.p.h. and later switched to C-54s with a top cruising speed of 185," he said.

Powers flew a sophisticated high-winged, specially-built Lockheed Aircraft jet which

could fly five miles high at a speed of 500 m.p.h. and had a range of at least 2500 miles.

Barcz grins. "Both Powers and I were spies with a lot of cloak-and-dagger stuff, but there the similarity ends. He was probably taking pictures of Red guided missile bases hundreds of miles inside Russia, while we were parachuting secret agents, supplies and leaflets into satellite countries. He made \$30,000 a year and I made \$5260. Oh, there was one more similarity—we both carried 'poison kits' to be used if we were about to be captured. Powers obviously never used his and I was never forced to seriously consider using mine."

But this is not to say Barcz and his four-man crew didn't have some close calls. He recalls, "An Albanian agent we called 'The Old Man' almost succeeded in doing us in. It was in 1953 and we had parachuted this old man four times into the wilds of Albania and his companions were always picked up and executed but he always got back."

"I went to the CIA man and said, 'there's something funny about this. The old man always comes back, doesn't he? Another thing, he's the funniest dressed spy I ever saw. He wears expensive Italian silk suits, silk shirts, diamond rings and parachute boots. And here we're dropping him in among simple Albanian peasants. I think the old man is a counter-spy.'"

"But the CIA, successor to the wartime OSS, was smart. It knew a man hammering a radio key establishes a personality as obvious as a finger print. When they asked him, the old man said his right arm has been injured and he was hitting the key with his left hand. I guess they believed him because we flew into almost a fatal trap set by him. We were scheduled to drop our stuff in a boxed-in valley and the only way in was up a river."

"When we were a half mile from drop-down, the Albanian

Communists opened up with all the artillery and machine guns they could muster. We took scores of hits and one of our two engines was knocked out. It was a miracle we got out alive. My radio was dead so I threw the radio code books into the Adriatic along with the stuff we had to drop. Two Russian Mig's circled above us as we hugged the water and made for Brindisi, Italy.

"I did a foolish thing which no spy should ever do. I found the radio was working again so I sent an uncoded message describing our circumstances. The Mig's gave up the chase at Brindisi, but the Italians put us in jail. Two hours later a U.S. Air Force plane arrived and we were released. Three days later we had returned to Athens via Rome and we never saw the old man again, thank God."

The reason Barcz and his crew made only 90 overflights in four years is because they flew only when there was a full moon. "You might say," he quipped, "we were the original moonlighters. We were sight-flying and you needed all the moonlight you could get to be able to distinguish the mountains from their shadows."

Today American satellites whirl high above Russia and the Iron Curtain countries taking pictures, but in the days following World War II the spy planes did the job. Barcz says he never flew over Russia, but he did know former Police Air Force airman who flew over Hungary, the Black Sea and the Baltic States. Presumably, some of them flew over Russia.

"During my four-year tour in the Balkans," Barcz recalls, "a western airliner was shot down over Bulgaria with 48 deaths. The Communists apparently mistook the airliner for one of our spy planes. The so-called Bucharest Uprising possibly could be traced to our activities, but nobody in the CIA confided in us aside from assigning our missions."

STATINTL

Books

A traffic of spies

SPY TRADE

By E. H. Cookridge.
*Hodder and Stoughton. 288 pages.
 £2.50.*

GEHLEN: SPY OF THE CENTURY

By E. H. Cookridge.
*Hodder and Stoughton. 424 pages.
 £3.75.*

The beauty of spies is in the eye of the beholder. Mine are fine, until they get caught. Yours are blackguards; or so, at least, governments and spy trial judges conventionally pretend. In the eyes of most of us spies are remote outsiders, though worth a second glance should you ever surely recognise one. And Mr Cookridge observes in the opening chapter of "Spy Trade" that it is not only the richly ornamental spy of fiction who excites pleasurable curiosity.

How it happens that many a "real life" spy has been able to turn profitable publicist instead of having to languish in jail for as long as his captors had originally intended he should, is amply explained in "Spy Trade." The author discusses over a score of postwar cases of governments bartering captive foreign agents against their own incarcerated men. For in the end, it seems, no government is quite so beastly as to disown altogether a man who has supplied it with valuable intelligence, however disreputable he may have been made to look subsequently.

A delicate matter in these exchanges is the comparative worth of the hostages available. When equally big fish are not at hand several small fry have the good luck to be thrown in to balance the scales. Mr Cookridge devotes seven of his 21 chapters to the intricate circumstances in which Moscow exploited the windfall of Mr Gary Powers and the U-2 shot down over Siberia to effect the release in February, 1962, of Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, the highly competent Soviet spy in the United States, who had been sent to prison for 30 years. Among other comparable cases considered by the author are those of Messrs Greville Wynne and Gordon



Gehlen (left) in Nazi days

Lonsdale, the Krogers and Mr Gerald Brooke, and Mr Alfred Frenzel, (a meatime-minded Bundestag deputy who had sold defence secrets to the Warsaw Pact countries) and the comparatively insignificant west German archaeologist, Frau Martina Kischke. The book is aptly illustrated with 40 photographs.

Like the rest of us, spies are mostly weird birds, variously impelled by the exigencies not only of mating, feeding and drinking (preferably the hard stuff) but also by patriotism, religious or political belief, some personal grievance against society, or, above all, by the desire to be somebody different and important. Even the fabulously competent and studiously aloof General Gehlen displays in his recently published autobiography an undignified itch to play to the gallery, not merely for the lolly that a knowledgeable agent (literary) can rake from the international market but also for personal vindication in the face of latter-day disparagement.

Mr Cookridge, perhaps in deference to his publishers, calls his other book "Gehlen: Spy of the Century." But in fact Reinhard Gehlen himself never crossed a frontier to spy out the nakedness of the land of military apparel. General Gehlen controlled a far-reaching network of agents and shrewdly fitted their bits and pieces of information into a coherent picture. In the years between the two world wars, he was the organiser and

co-ordinator of intelligence for the Wehrmacht on the eastern front. (It was not his fault that Hitler disregarded unpleasant news.) In Bavaria, after the war, Gehlen put his experience and knowledge at the disposal of the west, first the United States, and then the Federal German Republic. As head of the Federal Intelligence Service he tapped sources of invaluable information from the rival east German Democratic Republic, especially in the days when it was expanding much of its "People's Police" into a "People's Army" tutored by Soviet officers. In March, 1968, Gehlen was the first to predict, on the strength of contacts in the Soviet Union, that Moscow would displace the Dubcek regime in Prague by force. Eventually he came in for heavy public criticism for high-handed ways and indiscriminating choice of staff, including some former SS officers and such costly double agents as Heinz Felfel.

It is in all a fascinating story and Mr Cookridge tells it well. The text is adequately documented. But there are a few mildly irritating mistakes. Herr Brandt, for instance, spells his first name Willy not Willi. And there cannot have been a rendezvous at Milestone 107 on the autobahn; there are only kilometre posts.

STATINTL

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ROE CONSILDINE

Rudolf Abel, 'Master Spy'

What did "master spy" Rudolf Abel, who died last week in Moscow, spy upon during his nine years in America? He drew a whopping 30-year sentence, twice the penalty imposed on David Greenglass for betraying (for \$300) the innermost secret of the A-Bomb, the lens-trigger.

But Abel's harvest was never detailed during his trial, except that it had to do with snooping around "military secrets." When the FBI marched in on him he was living in a cheap New York 28th Street hotel with a lot of radio receiving equipment. It did not seem quite elaborate enough for a "master spy." Yet the CIA director, Allen Dulles, said at the time of Abel's conviction, "I wish we had three or four like him in Moscow."

The FBI was pretty certain that he was a full colonel in the KGB, the Soviet Union's secret police, and that during World War II he might have infiltrated circles close to Hitler. Abel was a superior linguist. He could even speak Brooklynese by the time he was nailed.

AT THE TIME of his apprehension and trial the Russians announced that they had never heard of the man. But three years after Abel returned to Moscow — having been swapped for our airborne spy, Francis Gary Powers — he was lauded in Pravda by none other than the KGB director. And in 1936 the popular Soviet magazine "Young Communist" had a big spread on him. It praised his "courage, valor and boundless devotion," and even quoted him on his perilous profession:

"Intelligence work is not a series of rip-roaring adventures, a string of tricks or an entertaining trip abroad. It is, above all, arduous, painstaking work that calls for an intense effort, perseverance, stamina, fortitude, will power, serious knowledge, and great mastery."

He may have been building himself up. Spying against the U. S. is something like spying on Times Square. As the last citadel of the free press we relieve a spy of most of traditional chores. We print or televise or expose in scientific journals just about everything any foreign power wants to know about us. We give it away before a spy can steal it, generally.

WHETHER ABEL was all that he was cracked up to be will never be known nor will he have the

satisfaction now that he is dead, of reading his memoirs and learning from him just what it was that he spied on. He personally couldn't have seen much from that frowzy hotel room, though, of course, it might have been the KGB's hot-line terminal in this country.

When we gave him up in 1962 to get back Gary Powers it was said in Washington that it was a bad deal as trading a 20-game winner for a bat-boy. Abel, by that time, was labeled "master spy," credentials not quite clear. Powers was a plane jockey, albeit an unusual one. He worked for the CIA and his job was to get into a U-2 in a friendly country, fly it very high over the restricted airspace of the Soviet Union and, working from a pre-set plan, take pictures, record military messages, and sniff out radioactive particles and positions of heat-producing installations, such as steel plants. One camera alone cost \$1 million.

He was shot down at 63,000 feet over Sverdlovsk by what must have been one of the earlier versions of the SAM, the air-to-ground missile that was launched extensively from North Vietnam bases during the U.S. bombing of the North.

ABEL WAS GIVEN a medal for whatever it was he did for his bosses. Powers was given the boot out of the CIA flying job, returned to test-fly for Lockheed, which built the high-flying plane in a restricted plant known to the employees as the "Skunk Works," and finally drifted off to write a book. He wouldn't urge that you think of it as your life's work.

The actual swap of the "master spy" and the pathetic pilot — who had served two years of his 10-year sentence by a military tribunal — was something right out of "The Spy Who Came In From The Cold." Under guard, they walked to the middle of a bridge linking East Berlin with West Berlin. It was a fog-shrouded day. Dialogue was unnecessary. Curiously, the mechanics of the deal had been arranged by Abel's trial lawyer, Jim Donovan, and he was present at the exchange.

Now Abel is gone, without telling us what he stole. It must have bemused him, as he died, to realize that despite all that talk, you CAN take it with you.

STATINTL

17 NOV 1971

Col. Rudolf Abel, Russian Spy, Dies

By Jean R. Hailey
Washington Post Staff Writer

Col. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, at one time the Soviet Union's master spy in this country, reportedly has died of lung cancer in Russia. He was 68.

Col. Abel, who posed as a struggling artist in a small studio in Brooklyn in the 1950s, was exchanged in 1962 for American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.

The Soviet spy, who headed his country's espionage network in the United States for nine years before his arrest in a New York hotel room in 1957, had been sentenced to 30 years in prison.

Sentencing of the nondescript, bald and slightly built Russian followed a dramatic trial in the Brooklyn Federal District court house just across the street from his cluttered \$35-a-month photographic and art studio.

While he turned out a few paintings, his time was spent mostly in finding out national defense data of this country and microfilming it. The microfilm was then hidden in hollowed out coins, bolts, pencils and blocks of wood. His studio also contained short-wave receivers capable of picking up radio messages from Moscow.

Col. Abel, who slipped into the United States illegally from Canada in 1948, used the name of Emil R. Goldfus during his years in this country. He was exposed when an assistant, Reino Hayhanen, defected and told American authorities about him after being ordered back to Moscow.

The principal charges against Col. Abel included conspiracy to transmit atomic and military information to his country, which he gathered through a system of codes, secret drops and couriers.

But even during his trial, few specifics were given on the information he was alleged to have transmitted. He listened without emotion to the proceedings, sometimes with a cryptic smile. He admitted under one charge—that he had entered this country illegally.



Associated Press

COL. RUDOLF IVANOVICH ABEL

He was finally convicted on the testimony of Hayhanen and the evidence of the equipment found in his studio.

Col. Abel had served four years and eight months of his 30-year sentence, when he was exchanged for Powers, who had been shot down in the American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union in 1960.

The secret and heavily guarded exchange took place at the Glienicke Bridge between East Germany and West Berlin. Powers had served 18 months of the 10-year sentence imposed on him by the Russians. He reportedly now is a traffic reporter observing freeway congestion from a plane in Los Angeles.

For many years after Col. Abel's arrest, the Soviet Union denied any knowledge of him. It admitted four years after his return

to Russia, he was awarded the Order of Lenin, that country's highest civilian award, for his "outstanding service" as an intelligence agent for 30 years.

And in 1969, he appeared in East Berlin for a ceremony renaming a street for Richard Sorge, considered Russia's most valuable wartime spy, who was executed by the Japanese in 1943.

Born in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), Col. Abel was the son of a factory worker. His father eventually was arrested for his revolutionary activities and exiled to the Far North.

After serving in the Army, Col. Abel was discharged in 1926, when he was given job offers from a radio research institute and also from Soviet intelligence. He professed a love

of foreign languages and had a knowledge of radio communications.

"My comrades argued that I should employ my knowledge of foreign languages to serve the country," he once said. "Finally, I made up my mind and started working for the Soviet intelligence service on May 2, 1927."

"Clean hands, a cool head, and a warm heart," was his description of a good intelligence agent.

CIA 4.02 U-2



GEN. PHILIP STRONG

P. G. Strong, 70, General In Marines

Retired Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Philip G. Strong, 70, a career intelligence officer, died of cancer yesterday at Metropolitan Hospital after an illness of several months.

Gen. Strong served in naval intelligence during World War II, and after the war in senior positions with the Central Intelligence Agency for almost 15 years.

During World War II, he served for more than two years as chief intelligence officer to the admiral who commanded the battleships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Following the war, he held an executive post in intelligence with the State Department where he developed an interest in scientific intelligence, which he later expanded on during his career in the CIA.

According to information provided by his family Gen. Strong was early involved in work that led to development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

On retirement, he was awarded CIA's intelligence medal of merit. He afterwards served as a consultant for the General Electric Corp.

In 1946, he married the former Margot Berglund of Gothenburg, Sweden. They moved to Hartland, Vt., following his retirement in 1957 but her long illness made it necessary for them to return here. She died in 1970.

Gen. Strong is survived by two daughters, Margot Semler, of Washington, and Harriet Barlow, of Chevy Chase; a brother, Benjamin, former head of the United States Trust Co. in New York; two sisters, Katherine Osborne and Elizabeth Watters, and five grandchildren.

Gen. Philip Strong Dies; Helped Develop U2 Idea

Brig. Gen. Philip G. Strong, 71, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, retired, a career intelligence officer who was involved in the development of U2 reconnaissance aircraft, died of cancer yesterday at Metropolitan Hospital. He lived at 2500 Q St. NW.

Gen. Strong was an intelligence specialist for the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

During World War II, he was chief intelligence officer for the commander of U.S. battleships in the Pacific for two years.

Gen. Strong was commissioned in 1926, after attending Princeton University and spent a year on active duty as a captain.

During the war, he returned to active duty, serving in the office of naval intelligence. His duties included supplying intelligence for the battleships in 10 major campaigns in the Pacific, 27 air-sea actions and two major fleet battles.

Headed Unit

Later he was assistant chief of staff in the intelligence section at the San Diego Marine base. In 1946, Gen. Strong went on inactive duty and became head of the intelligence acquisition and distribution division in the office of special assistant for intelligence to the Secretary of State.

At the State Department in 1950, Gen. Strong helped to write a report, "Science and Foreign Relations," which recommended creation of posts for scientists as overseas attaches to spur international scientific inquiry and exchange of scientific data.

In 1950, Gen. Strong was transferred to the CIA, where he held senior positions until he retired in 1964.

While at the CIA, he was involved in the innovative concepts of revolutionary recon-



BRIG. GEN. PHILIP STRONG

naissance vehicles, which led to the development of the U2 spy planes.

Gen. Strong was married to the former Margot Berglund of Sweden, who died a year ago.

In his career Gen. Strong collected books and articles on intelligence, which he gave to Princeton University. Another collection went to George Washington University.

Gen. Strong received many decorations and awards, including the Legion of Merit and the CIA's Intelligence Medal of Merit.

He leaves two daughters, Mrs. Margot Semler of Washington and Mrs. Harriet Barlow of Chevy Chase; a brother, Benjamin, of New York; two sisters, Mrs. Katherine Osborne of Sarasota, Fla., and Mrs. Elizabeth Watters of Scottsdale, Ariz., and five grandchildren.

Services will be held Tuesday at 1 p.m. at the Ft. Myer Chapel, with burial in Arlington Cemetery.

7 NOV 1971

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William Anderson

One Can't Trust Spies Anymore



WASHINGTON, Nov. 6—Some of my best friends are spies.

I was talking to one the other day who was complaining that most Americans seem to think that we don't need any undercover agents, altho it is all right for the other side [sides] to have plenty of them.

There is a little bit of truth in what the spy says. Everybody knows that we have the Central Intelligence Agency because it gets blamed for everything that goes wrong in the spy business.

The spy-in-the-sky case in which Gary Powers got shot down in his high-flying U-2 airplane is perhaps the best known case, but the CIA also took the rap for the ill-fated invasion of Cuba which was to unseat Fidel Castro.

But the CIA is not really all that big and its job gets compounded because many, if not most, of the other government bureaus which do business overseas like to take individual shots at spying. This includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation with agents planted everywhere—from among revolutionary groups to Barth Day rallies.

At the last demonstration against the White House policies on Viet Nam, a rather small affair as demonstrations go, it was noticed by this reporter that an awful lot of the people mingling with the demonstrators didn't really look the part. Investigation disclosed they were from the Customs Office, Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, United States Marshal's Office, or the Bureau of Narcotics, to name a few.

Not too many years ago, we learned of a diplomatic trip to Russia by an American [who shall not be named] who took along a group loaded with more gadgets to detect radiation than they could carry at one time. One of the gadgets was shaped like a slightly oversize fountain pen.

After we gave up the U-2 flights over Russia [but not China] the military developed cameras for space satellites that today are launched in secrecy from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cal., to circle far above foreign nations. The detail from these pictures is amazing—and helpful.

But this sort of thing is never talked about in more conventional places of American government, especially not at the State Department. There is a certain disdain shown toward spies and spying at state, a trait shared by diplomats of many Western nations.

So it was with interest that I listened when another spy told me how William Rogers, secretary of state, had played a key role in helping Egypt purge its nation of Communist spies.

The story the spy told us was that Rogers had been equipped with a wrist watch that could detect electronic eavesdropping equipment. This makes sense because there are any number of minute electronic devices that could be detected by a watch of this kind.

It is also on public record that East Europeans had indeed been expelled from Egypt for planting listening devices in a variety of official meeting places.

In any event, Rogers' watch was supposed to have sounded a signal during a private meeting with President Anwar Sadat that they were under electronic surveillance. Sadat, of course, heard the buzzing. I asked Rogers the other night if the story was true.

The secretary grinned and said he had heard the same story.

"But," he insisted, "it just isn't true." It's getting so you can't even trust spies any more.

STATINTL

C.I.A. — A SECRET ARMY FOR SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

STATINTL

They even speculates on life of world figure !

(PIERRE NORD, an internationally known expert on espionage, describes subversive war — the ultimate weapon — in his book "L'intoxication" (Editions Fayard). It is a document, a first-hand memoir. In it, he traces the development of the great contemporary affairs and evokes little-known facets of the 1939-1945 world conflict and the subversive, revolutionary, ideological cold war that has changed the face of the world since 1945... Here are passages from his chapter on the United States Central Intelligence Agency — C.I.A.).

The C.I.A.'s headquarters is sheltered from the curious in a 125-acre park at Langley, Virginia, twenty minutes by car from the White House. Information has assumed that the President of the United States runs the secret services himself (!) and is as close to the other user of its services, the Pentagon, joint headquarters of the American General Staff and the U.S. Department of Defence.

The C.I.A. director, head of American secret warfare, espionage activity and subversion in foreign countries, is assisted by two other men: the chiefs of the Intelligence Division and Plans Division, and he knows what combination of electronic brains and robots!

SPYING IN LUXURY OF ELECTRONICS

The C.I.A. directors — surrounded by luxury and calm in their Langley office, dressed in shirt-sleeves and slippers if they like their ease — can exploit the labours of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its satellites carrying out patrols for them in the stratosphere at 40,000 miles an hour; the Midas II detecting missiles, the Samos series and other systems taking photographs. Tomorrow, the orbiting space stations will be

The results of these space eyes, translated into film and tape recordings, graphs and summaries, allows the directors to count Soviet missiles stockpiled at Sverdlovsk, or to determine the advanced state of the next Chinese nuclear experiment, or to hear Moscow's orders to its submarines cruising along Florida's coast, or to follow the countdown of Soyuz rocket "Number X" at Baikonour in the farthest reaches of the Soviet Union as easily as they can check the progress of their own Apollo "Number Y" at Cape Kennedy. All instantly.

A SECRET "ARMY"

It is openly reported that the American secret service is an army of hundreds of thousands of men. That is plainly an exaggeration; but it would be less so if the venal foreign agents on the monthly payroll and freelance spies were counted.

WHO CAN say how many are at work in Indochina alone? It would be well below the mark if scientific and industrial workers who conceive and build the espionage machinery were counted.

Spying and counterespionage have become vital industries and electronic values are the workhorses of Wall Street, the New York Stock Exchange.

evaluated in terms of numbers: the C.I.A.'s WORKING STAFF.

The C.I.A. declares some 20,000 permanent employees and some writers have put the total at 60,000 — divided more or less equally between the "blacks" who operate under cover and the "whites" who check in at Langley and its branches every day and cannot conceal themselves.

"BLACK" agents get data at its source overseas under cover as tourists, journalists, businessmen or diplomats. These are the real secret agents. The "WHITES" include a technological elite of researchers, scientists, chemists, metallurgists, mathematicians, biologists, electricians, electronics experts, photographers, doctors, foresters, dietiticians and even magicians.

And this is no joke... Going even farther: The Americans and the Soviets moreover have been experimenting in thought transmission, and what has filtered through of the first results could shake the most rational mind.

HOW CLOSE TO DEATH?

But it is certainly the medical service which is the Agency's avant garde. Among its other duties, it precisely cal-

culates the length of the remaining life-span of foreign personalities who interest the United States. Its doctors say they do not bother with leading American figures; that is false on the face of it because it is the latter who determine everybody's future.

As for the private lives and financial affairs of these personalities, the C.I.A.'s leading legal experts, accountants and police officers often know more than their colleagues in the subject's homeland.

A very select company of sociologists, economists, historians, geographers, financiers, political experts and emigres interpret an enormous mass of information collected on each antagonistic, neutral or allied state.



Richard Helms —
the new C.I.A. boss.

Being the most expensively paid in the world, they appear qualified enough to conclude "Here is what this country will do in such circumstances".

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5 OCT 1971

This is the man who leaked the Pentagon papers that tell the

ELLSBERG TALKS

Top Secret history of decision-making in the Vietnam war. Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, a

veteran of Vietnam and Pentagon combat, is lean, intense, athletic, attractive to women and brilliant. Why did this 40-year-old Harvard-Cambridge-MIT intellectual, enthusiastic Marine Corps officer, Rand Corp. analyst and Defense Department planner expose these

classified documents to the world? Since he did, their publication has become the most sensational story of the year. The Nixon Administration tried to halt publication, starting a battle in which the Supreme Court refused to stop the nation's press from making the papers public. In this self-revealing interview with Look's Foreign Editor J. Robert Moskin, Dr. Ellsberg explains why he risked prison to try to end the war.

When you turned yourself in, you said you had made the Pentagon papers public as a responsible American citizen. Really, the essential question we want to talk about is: What is the moral responsibility of the citizen who thinks he sees his government doing evil?

I was in a dual position. Like every American, I had a feeling of obligation to the Constitution and to my fellow citizens. At the same time, I was a researcher through most of this period, doing consulting for the Government, and someone whose reflexes in terms of loyalty had been set by 12 to 15 years of service to the Executive Branch—15 years would include the three years with the Marine Corps.

I question the identification of the state or the Government with the Executive Branch or with the President. All the members of the Executive Branch are the creatures of one elected representative of the people, the President. When you look at the entire Executive Branch, you confront this enormous structure of somewhat conflicting institutions in which only one man has been elected by the people. The effects of this are very great.

In the early sixties, before I ever got on the subject of Vietnam, I was granted interagency access at a very high level to study the decision-making process in crises like the Cuban missile crisis, Suez, Skybolt, U-2 and so forth. In fact, the arrangements for that study were set up by Walt Rostow, who was then head of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department.

I was at Rand and was brought to Washington as the sole researcher for what was to be a year's study. That study exposed to me the importance of the President in every one of these crises, the peculiar, very powerful influence of the President's personal judgment and personal preconceptions.

This conflicts with another view of the decision process in Government, which says that the President, although he may look powerful, is given surprisingly little leeway by the bureaucratic agencies under him, in which to influence policy, that he has to fight for influence, to connive, to maneuver, in order to have any impact whatever.

It's a position that's very plausible from within the system. The bureaucrat gets a sense that presidential policy reflects the success of one or another agency in tying his hands. He doesn't have a sense of presidential initiative and power.

The most startling thing to me was to discover how critical the President's role had been, that if his hands were tied at all, it was because he chose to cooperate in having his position forced by one pressure or another.

Was this the experience of just one President, say, Kennedy?

Oh, no. This related very much to Eisenhower and others. Remember the clear-cut lies by the Executive relating to the shooting down of the U-2 flight over Russia in 1960? Remember that first they described the plane as having been a weather plane off course. Then Khrushchev revealed that they not only had parts of the plane but they had the pilot alive. After which the President himself took responsibility for the U-2 plane and admitted that it had been a spy reconnaissance flight. He was very much criticized for having admitted this, which demolished the summit conference scheduled right afterward.

Most Americans assumed that Eisenhower had not known of the flight, certainly in detail. I think most people believed this on two grounds: that there's a lot that goes on that no President knows about in detail and that Eisenhower knew even less than most Presidents because he was always on the golf course.

In the course of doing this study, I looked into the U-2 crisis quite closely and finally went to the man who was in charge of the U-2 program from beginning to end, who had left the CIA at that point. He said that President Eisenhower went over the flight plan of every U-2 flight over Russia in the greatest detail, which usually occupied no less than four or five hours. He said that for every flight of the U-2 over Russia, he brought the detailed flight plans with the full schedule to the White House for President Eisenhower, and in no case did Eisenhower fail to make some modifications in the flight plan.

He said the questions that President Eisenhower asked were: What was the intelligence value of the flight and to what objective assigned to the flight and to weigh it

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continued



MORE CONSIDINE

Fasten Your Seatbelt and Live

ONE OF THE OLDEST PRACTICES in the world is the exchange of rich gifts when one head of state visits another. Right now, somebody in the State Department's protocol division -- probably Bus Mosbacher himself -- is shopping for just the right baubles for President Nixon to press upon Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Biao when he visits them in Peking. The Foreign (devil) Office of the Peoples Republic of China is engaged in the same pursuit.

There has been an understanding since about the time Cleopatra called on Julius Caesar and presented him with, among other gifts, a son, that the loot belongs to the individuals concerned, not their respective states. In our times, this has enabled our former presidents to fill their museums and libraries with treasures of great value. The gifts President Nixon receives in Peking will be viewed -- perhaps with wonder -- by future generations of sightseers trudging through his museum.

I sometimes wonder whatever became of the fibre-glass lake boat which the State Department bought for President Eisenhower to present to Nikita Khrushchev in the spring of 1959. It was to be used on the pleasant stretch of water near Nikita Sergeyevich's dacha about 50 miles out of Moscow. But something happened on May 1, 1960

... something called a U-2 spy plane piloted by CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers. A Soviet ground-to-air missile winged it at 63,000 feet over Sverdlovsk. Khrushchev canceled his invitation to Ike to visit him. The State Department was left holding the bag. Or, rather, the boat.

In view of subsequent events, maybe it's a ferry on the Styx.

When Vice President Nixon visited Khrushchev in 1959 he presented him with an expensive inter-continental radio. Khrushchev gave Nixon a shotgun, for unexplained reasons.

STATINTL

21 SEP 1971

Eisenhower Approval of U-2 Flights Claimed

He Personally Reviewed Plans of Missions
and Sanctioned Risks, Daniel Ellsberg Says

NEW YORK (UPI)—President Dwight D. Eisenhower personally reviewed the flight plan of all U-2 spy missions over the Soviet Union and it was he, who decided the ill-fated flight of Francis Gary Powers was "worth the risk," Daniel Ellsberg said Monday.

Ellsberg, the former Defense Department analyst who leaked the Pentagon papers on the Vietnam war to the press, said in an interview in Look magazine that he learned of Gen. Eisenhower's personal involvement in the U-2 flights when preparing an early study of the decision-making process in crises.

The shooting down of Powers' U-2 reconnaissance plane by the Russians in 1960 shortly before a planned summit conference between Gen. Eisenhower and then Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev strained U.S.-Soviet relations and prompted Mr. Khrushchev to cancel the conference.

"Most Americans assumed that Eisenhower had not known of the flight, certainly in detail," Ellsberg said.

But, Ellsberg said, in the course of his study he learned differently from "the man who was in charge of the U-2 program from beginning to end, who had left the CIA at that point."

He said that President Eisenhower went over the flight plan of every U-2 flight over Russia in the greatest detail, which usually occupied no less than four or five hours.

He said the questions that President Eisenhower asked forced him to justify every reconnaissance objective assigned to the flight and to weigh it against the precise marginal risks on each leg of the flight.

"In fact, he said that on the specific flight where Powers was shot down, they were well aware that there were SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) in that area that were becoming operational.

"There was already a risk, and they had to balance that leg of the flight against the desirability of covering those objectives," Ellsberg said. "President Eisenhower made the decision that it was worth the risk."

9 SEP 1971

STATINTL

Use of Spy Satellites Held Major Factor in Preservation of Peace

NEW YORK, Sept. 8 (Reuters)—The remarkable performance of spy-in-the-sky satellites and a "tacit understanding" by the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union not to interfere with them could be a major factor in preserving the peace, an expert on the subject has reported.

There even were two occasions in a one-year span when the information from reconnaissance satellites saved the peace, according to Philip J. Klass, an avionics editor of the magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology.

Product of Think Tank

Klass gives the first detailed study of the history and ability of reconnaissance satellites in the book, "Secret Sentinels in Space" [Random House, \$7.95].

According to Klass the first concept of spy-in-the-sky satellites stems from a report by the Rand Corp., the Air Force's think-tank—in 1946. The technology to actually build the satellites was created when Bell Labs invented the transistor in 1948.

All that was needed were rockets big enough to launch the satellites and the will to do so. During the Eisenhower years many government officials believed space was a "frivolous" diversion and gave little credence to the possibility it could have military importance.

Balloons Landed in Russia

The first attempt at aerial surveillance during the post-war period came in the late '40s when the U. S. launched high-altitude balloons with cameras attached to them near the Soviet border. The cameras did not work very well and Klass says several balloons landed in Russia, prompting complaints from the Russians.

In the late '50s, when the Soviets appeared to have taken the lead in intercontinental [ICBM] and intermediate range ballistic missiles [IRBM] [the so-called "missile gap"], U-2 high altitude aircraft gave the U. S. the first "hard" look at what the Russians were up to. So did RB-47 jets flying around the Russian borders.

But when the Russians shot down a U-2 and an RB-47 the U. S. was left with no way to find out exactly what the Russians had developed, Klass writes.

By this time work on spy satellites was beginning to bear fruit.

Then, in 1961, during the height of the Berlin crisis, the first hint the U. S. was using the satellites came in a column by Joseph Alsop—probably a Pentagon "leak," Klass writes—that stated that the U. S. now thought the number of [CBMs] the Russians had were only a quarter of previous estimates.

Learned They Had 14

Klass says the U. S. found out some time later exactly how many the Russians had [14].

He speculates President John F. Kennedy may have let the Russians know about the satellite by actually showing pictures taken by the satellites to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko during a Washington meeting. This, he believes, may have contributed to the Russian backdown on Berlin.

Later that year during the Cuban crisis the Russians may have again backed down, because of satellites, in this case their own. They may have had pictures that showed the U. S. was spying on them near Cuba and was capable of using it.

Klass writes there are probably two kinds of satellites. They are those that drop packages of film from orbit for aircraft pickup, and that use television to scan the pictures and transmit them to earth later. Newer satellites are hooked into communications satellite beams to speed up delivery of the television pictures.

New One Launched

Klass says the U. S. is now producing the fourth generation satellite, called "Big Bird." It weighs 12 tons and will remain in orbit several months. One was launched recently.

He says cameras aboard the newer satellites may be able to pick out objects several inches wide, use infrared for taking pictures at night, use zoom lenses, and have special radar cameras for shooting thru clouds.

A fifth generation satellite now planned could give "real time" information, meaning television pictures of exactly what the satellite sees as the satellite sees it.

Killer Satellites Feared

There are also early warning satellites parked in orbit—probably over the Indian Ocean—watching for missile launches from the two Russian launch sites at Plesetsk or Tyuratam.

Klass sees two clouds on the horizon that could change the delicate balance the satellites have given the two big powers. One is the fact the Russians probably have killer satellites that can knock down American satellites. That would end the "understanding."

Klass also thinks it's possible to someday make laser beams so powerful they could be used to create "death rays"—a Buck Rogers concept he believes is no longer complete.

NO. 19 1971

September

STATINT

A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was 'off the record', the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'états consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements, rivalries, to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.


It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group which will pub-

lic it.

CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.



SATELLITE LAUNCHING

ESPIONAGE

The Spies Above

If a U-2 overflight could once provoke crisis, as the Francis Gary Powers incident did in 1960, the elaborately precise spy satellite systems of the U.S. and Soviet Union a decade later have created and enforced a *de facto* "open skies" policy between the two superpowers. Today such satellites slide through space like disembodied eyes recording an astonishing variety of information. Just over a month ago, for example, the Pentagon revealed that the latest Soviet SS-9 ICBM ground tubes are exactly 20 ft. in diameter.

Neither country, naturally, is very talkative about its espionage system. But in a new book, *Secret Sentinels in Space* (Random House; \$7.95), Philip J. Klass, senior avionics editor of *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, offers a first, fascinating look at the space hardware that has, so far, contributed to global stability. By allowing the two major nuclear powers to examine one another's military installations in exact detail, the satellites have considerably diminished the danger of war through miscalculation.

Florida Force. During the 1961 Berlin crisis, the "first generation" of Discoverer satellites was aloft, and John Kennedy was able to show Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko photographs indicating exactly how few ICBMs the Soviets really had. "I believe," says Klass, "that after Gromyko saw those pictures he persuaded Khrushchev to back down."

Similarly, Klass writes, "the President entered the Cuban missile crisis with a very precise inventory of Soviet strategic missile and bomber strength, thanks to U.S. satellite photos. At the same time, the Soviets undoubtedly used their Cosmos satellites to watch the buildup

of U.S. aircraft in Florida and the American task force assembled in the Caribbean. "What role, if any, Russian satellite pictures played in convincing Kremlin leaders that the U.S. was prepared to go the limit," Klass writes, "probably is known only to a few Russian leaders."

The author concludes that "the automations-in-orbit, adolescent as their performance was at that stage, had kept the two giant thermonuclear powers from bombing into World War III at least once, perhaps twice." Another round of reconnaissance dueling came last year over the Middle East, when U.S. satellite pictures confirmed that



RECOVERING CAPSULE
Also for poppy fields.

the Soviets and Egyptians had moved missiles into the cease-fire zone, in violation of the cease-fire agreement.

Klass submitted proofs of his book to the CIA and the Pentagon; they objected to its publication but made no move to stop it. No one else has written in comparable detail about spy satellites. Klass describes, for example, the nation's latest SAMOS (satellite and missile observation system), "the Big Bird," launched just two months ago. A giant, twelve-ton spacecraft capable of working aloft for at least several months, the Big Bird combines the capabilities of several earlier satellites. It can transmit high-quality pictures by radio, and eject capsules of exposed film which then drop by parachute. The Big Bird also includes infrared and laser sensors that allows it to "see" through Siberian ice and snow to locate Soviet underground weapons. The heaviest concen-

tration of long-range Russian missiles, Klass reports, is behind the Urals in Central Asia and in Siberia.

Narcotics Film. Besides sniffing out weaponry, spy satellites provide a variety of data for civilian use—in geological studies, for example, or even narcotics control. Color film pictures of the poppy fields of Southeast Asia and elsewhere, taken from satellites, have been projected at the White House. When President Nixon referred recently to international control of narcotics, he had in mind the U.S. capability to point out the exact locations of the world's poppy fields.

In the past 18 months, the Soviets have moved one step ahead of the U.S. They have devised a killer satellite that can track, inspect and blow up another satellite aloft. The situation is not unlike that in the James Bond epic *You Only Live Twice*. The U.S. is still developing such a destroyer, and the possibilities are ominous. Should one side decide to knock out the other's spies, Klass concludes, "it will turn space into a battleground, precipitate a still more costly arms race and return the world to the perilous days of the late 1950s."

STATINTL

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,967

S - 566,377

AUG 25 1971

REPORT FROM CUBA: 3... By JAMES HIGGINS

Long list of grievances against CIA

HAVANA — "From April 19, 1961, up to the present," said the young man from Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations, "we have publicly announced 87 separate aggressions against our country by the CIA." He emphasized the "publicly."

He said that Cubans had been very interested in the information which the Pentagon Papers had provided to the people of the US.

"Partly," he added, "because we are sure that the people in your country do not yet know that for 10 years, ever since the Bay of Pigs invasion, which we defeated, there has been consistent espionage, sabotage, infiltration and raids conducted by the CIA against Cuba."

I asked if he were certain that all were the work of the CIA. I reminded him that there were several thousand Cuban exiles in the US and that a number of them, especially those of the Alpha 66 organization insisted they were operating on their own in their efforts to penetrate Cuba.

"Well," he said, "if there were several hundred thousand North Americans in Cuba, and if some of these were not only openly declaring their intent to invade but also, from time to time, sneaking ashore with guns, ammunition and explosive equipment, you would assume that all this could not happen without the cooperation of agencies of the Cuban government."

And, he went on, if, in addition, official Cuban government planes, such as US U-2s and SR71s were flying along the US coast and photographing US territory, it would be hard not to conclude that the nation which did this had bad intentions

upon your territory and sovereignty.

"Let me give," he said, "a few specifics from a document we published about a year ago." He quoted:

"1—On June 13, 1964, a CIA craft based in the US attacked and sank a Cuban ship to the north of Isabela de Sagua."

"2—In May of 1965 members of a network of CIA agents who were sending secret information to the US through the Guantanamo Naval Base were captured in Camaguey."

"3—On Dec. 29, 1967, a light plane proceeding from Homestead, Fla., was shot down here. The pilot, US citizen Everett D. Jackson, was captured. He had air-dropped arms and espionage equipment in the northern part of Las Villas Province."

"4—On Sept. 12, 1969, counter-revolutionary agent Jose Antonio Quesada Fernandez landed in Oriente Province. He was captured with war material and espionage equipment found on him. He was tried by a revolutionary court, convicted and executed."

"5—On April 17, 1970, a group of mercenaries proceeding from the US and armed with the latest weapons used by the US Army landed near Baracoa in Oriente Province. The group was put out of action. Some were captured, others killed."

He said that two years ago a CIA spy had been detected here in the Mexican Embassy where, in the guise of a diplomatic officer, he attempted to cover his efforts to gain information from highly placed Cubans and to communicate reports by radio to the CIA as well as sending written messages and photographs. "Every-

thing the spy Humberto Carillo Colon did was intercepted by our counter-intelligence authorities," he said, "and most of the documentation was published, including the instructions he had received to pretend he was writing a book about 'The Men Around Castro,' one of the stated objectives being to try and find out who might lead a faction against Fidel."

Perhaps in time to come, he said, from CIA or other US government files, it will become clear that a long campaign of secret aggression — secret from the US people but not from us — has been waged against Cuba. He said that he thought it was even possible the US people did not know of their government's interference with Cuban trade, using such methods as pressure upon other governments and private companies to prevent Cuba from selling nickel, for example, or from buying machinery, tools and spare parts.

"We regard the haven and support the US government gives to Cubans who have left their country," he added, "as similar to the policy the US government has followed — up to lately — toward the Chiang Kai-shek elements on Taiwan, a US protectorate for more than 20 years. These elements have, it is now admitted, been raiding and penetrating the Chinese mainland, just as Cuban exile elements have been doing here. The only difference is that now the US-sponsored activities against the Peoples Republic of China are becoming public knowledge. Presumably this means they will stop. Of course that is a guess. We don't know."

NEXT: If a student is bad, he goes to the head of the line.

WASHINGTON POST
6 AUG 1971

CIA Patrols Into China Said Halted

By Michael Gettler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has ordered a halt to the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos, according to well informed diplomatic sources.

These patrols—which sometimes range 200 miles inside China's Yunnan Province on road-watching, telephone-tapping missions—have been going on for a number of years, and their existence was known to the Peking regime.

Nevertheless, in a recent action designed to avoid any possible incident which could sour U.S. relations with Peking before President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the Chinese mainland, the forays have been halted, according to official sources here.

Some sources also suggest that the intelligence value of these operations may also have decreased somewhat.

Although no Americans go on these patrols, the Laotian hill tribesmen who carry them out are recruited, trained and equipped by the CIA, and the staging area for the patrols is a CIA outpost in northern Laos.

The Laotians are native to the border region, and the intelligence-gathering operation took advantage of the normal movements back and forth of these hill people.

While the White House, CIA and the U.S. embassy in Vientiane have never commented on or confirmed these activities—which reportedly date back to the Johnson administration—the patrols have been mentioned in numerous press reports by U.S. correspondents in Laos.

In late 1970 and early this year, articles by Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International described the reconnaissance operations in considerable detail.

As recently as June 27, Arnold Abrams of The Philadelphia Bulletin reported that the raids were still being carried out despite the onset of Ping Pong Diplomacy.

The order to stop these patrols, according to informed sources, came very recently. Presidential aide Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking was made July 9 to 11.

In another move relating to the forthcoming Nixon visit, a press report last week, citing administrative sources, said the United States had suspended flights over Communist China by high-flying SR-71 spy planes and unmanned reconnaissance drones. This concession was also depicted as a move designed to avoid any incident which could interfere with the President's journey.

However, well placed defense and intelligence officials, asked about the reported suspension, said privately that to the best of their knowledge there had never been any SR-71 flights over the Chinese mainland.

Officials say there was a suspension of the unmanned drone flights some months ago, partly for diplomatic reasons and partly because of technical problems and the vulnerability of these drones to Communist gunners. At least two of the drones were shot down since late in 1969, one over the mainland and one over Hainan Island.

There have been flights of the older-vintage U-2 spy plane over mainland China carried out by the Nationalist Chinese, but officials hint that these flights, too, have not been scheduled for about a year.

The United States for some time has relied on satellites for photographic coverage of goings-on inside China. The SR-71s based in Asia, sources say, are used primarily for flights over North Korea.

3 AUGUST 1971



BOB CONSHIDINE

Avoiding Another Gary Powers

For the time being, we're going to stop sending spy-in-the-sky planes over the Peoples Republic of China, formerly Red China. We don't want to risk the chance of having one of our latter-day Francis Gary Powers shot down over Peking while President Nixon is on his way to tea with Chou En-lai.

Whether we'll request or demand that the Nationalist Chinese follow suit has not yet been leaked. But the chances are that we'll take care of that, too. We gave Chiang Kai-Shek's forces their U-2 spy planes, taught his pilots how to use them, and asked only that they keep a peeled eye on mainland China.

It would be relatively simple to knock that off until further notice, just as -- in massive mortification -- President Eisenhower cancelled out U-2 flights over the Soviet Union in the wake of the shoot-down of Powers, Khrushchev's angry protests, and the State Department's clumsy attempt to fob off a hoax to the effect that Powers' U-2 was a weather plane that had been blown off course.

SPYING ON CHINA will not be suspended completely during the period of the new rapport. Our inquisitive satellites will continue to criss-cross the world's most populous nation night and day, taking pictures, sniffing out nuclear tests and production, keeping tabs on steel production, counting missile installations and bombers parked on runways, and watching for unusual movements of large armed forces.

Russia's many satellites will be attending to the same flabbergasting chores at the same time. In addition, they will also be checking over every part of the U.S., and ours will be zipping over the great land mass of the Soviet Union.

But the administration has decided wisely that it wouldn't be cricket to continue our spying from within the Earth's atmosphere. Spying from space is different, as any UN diplomat can explain at great length. It is different principally because nobody yet has come up with a sure-fire way to knock down the other fellow's orbiting robot spies. The Russians amply proved when they knocked down Powers from 68,000 feet over Sverdlovsk, even the best of spy planes operating in the at-

mosphere with a guy at the wheel can be knocked out.

WE'VE BEEN LUCKY with our spying on China from manned planes. U-2 pilots who have been shot down have been Nationalist Chinese. So have the unmanned planes the mainland gun batteries have claimed -- remote control drones that zip across the Straits of Formosa, cross over into China, take a few pictures, and try to zip home.

We've been using a super version of the old UAWN the SRAUCN which has a top speed three times that of sound. This is the plane that will now be grounded voluntarily to avoid a foul-up in the Peking talks.

We'll probably put it to work elsewhere, but not over the Soviet Union. We still give Cuba a regular look-see from on high, just to make certain Castro isn't stashing any missiles or moving his guns too close to the wire fence at Guantanamo.

THE HAYOC RAISED by the shooting down of Francis Gary Powers is still unnerving, even after a Japanese of 11 years. The incident gave Nikita Khrushchev the sledgehammer he needed to break up a summit conference in Paris attended by himself, President Eisenhower, Charles De Gaulle and Harold Macmillan.

Khrushchev's dressing down of Eisenhower at the Elysee Palace was the most humiliating moment in the President's life. The Soviet Premier's news conference the following day in Paris sounded for a time like a declaration of war.

The scheduled Eisenhower trip to the Soviet Union -- returning Khrushchev's U.S. visit to the year before -- was revoked. It had promised to be the high point of his life as Chief Executive. It was planned for him to make half a dozen major speeches to the Soviet people. They had been written for him and, in the opinion of one of the writers, Dr. Kevin McCann, could have brought about a fine relationship between the world's two great powers. Dr. McCann is also sure that the speeches, which had to be junked, would have eliminated all chance of the subsequent eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and threat of thermonuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

So, this time we'll play it cozier. President Nixon does not want a fly (or a flier) in his oolong.

3
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEX.

CALLER

M - 68,322

CALLER-TIMES

S - 82,638

AUG 2 1971

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

Prudent Insurance

✓ President Nixon has much better liaison with the military and the Central Intelligence Agency, or more alert advisers than his predecessor President Dwight D. Eisenhower. As a result, he has ordered a suspension of SR71 and drone reconnaissance flights over mainland China.

This is prudent insurance against an incident which might disrupt the President's plan to visit Peking sometime before next May. The Chinese resent the intrusion of reconnaissance planes into their air space, just as we would if we were in their place. Most important intelligence information can be gained from reconnaissance satellites anyway.

Perhaps we can never know the true impact on Russian-U.S. relations of the U2 flight over Soviet Russia on May 1, 1960. This reconnaissance plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down approximately 1,200 miles within the Soviet Union. Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev refused to participate in the Paris summit conference scheduled for May 16 unless President Eisenhower apologized for the U2 flight. Eisenhower refused and the summit conference failed.

We assume that the U2 incident contributed to the downfall of Khrushchev two years later, although his

performance in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 probably played a dominant role.

We cannot know what will come from the visit of Nixon to Peking. But we do know that we should not invite any incidents that might abort that mission.

STATINTL

A Venture in Symbolic Diplomacy

By GEORGE W. BALL

It has been evident for some time that our Government was seeking to detach itself from a China policy congealed in aspic for the last twenty years. What no one expected was the spectacular means chosen to bring it about. Presumably the President might have explored, and with luck developed, an improved understanding with Peking by traditional diplomatic means. But, in announcing arrangements for a personal visit, he quite deliberately adopted what might be called symbolic diplomacy—a form of international maneuver in which the chosen method of diplomatic interchange is itself a political act producing major consequences regardless of any substantive agreement that may emerge.

Though I accept the President's selection of diplomatic tools as a shrewd and useful ploy, it may still be profitable to speculate as to its far-reaching implications. The classical objection to summit meetings is that they raise expectations which, if unfulfilled, can lead to disillusion and even greater tensions, but in the present special circumstances, the mere announcement of the projected meeting has already produced irreversible effects. At the heart of the President's calculations is the hope that those effects will, on balance, be more useful than otherwise.

By his unexpected action he has set in motion forces that can free us from the fictions and rigidities of the past. On the home front, the irrevocable effect of the announcement—the fact that, no matter what happens, it has already eroded our unrealistic China policy—is instinctively understood. It has compelled Americans to adjust overnight to a new set of ideas they might stubbornly have resisted if presented progressively and undramatically. To a public discouraged by our manifest impotence in Indochina, a demonstration of colorful and incisive action is a long-overdue stimulant.

Yet if the element of fait accompli is tonic to the home front, its effect in operational terms is to limit both sides' freedom of action. Since Washington and Peking have each acquired their own peculiar vested interests in the making of the visit as well as in at least its outward success, each

capital must—in shaping its policies between now and the meeting—factor in the forces of constraint on the other side.

During this period President Nixon will be under pressure to pursue courses of action, at the United Nations and elsewhere, calculated not to provoke Chou En-lai to renounce his China visit as Khrushchev used the U-2 incident in 1960 to torpedo the conference with President Eisenhower. And, on its side, Peking, oblivious to domestic opinion yet sensitive to reactions throughout the world Communist party structure, will—so long as it finds it useful to keep Moscow off balance—tend to avoid outrages that might force Washington to cancel the visit.

For our Western friends and allies the announcement has come at a good time. It is a welcome reassurance of America's resilience and good sense. For the Soviet Union it is a blow and a worry—which may not be a bad thing. In India there is anger that Mr. Kissinger's visit was connived with Pakistan, while a shell-shocked Taipei is apparently scrambling toward greater flexibility and maneuver in an effort to face up to its alarming predicament. Since five out of six Japanese shipping lines have abruptly canceled their service to Taiwan, and American and other foreign companies are sharply curtailing their direct investment plans, it requires no special Oriental insight to read the message in the entrails and tea leaves.

Only in one major capital is there urgent need for diplomatic repair work and that is Tokyo. Unable, because of the requirements of secrecy, to inform him in advance, President Nixon's announcement left Premier Sato and his colleagues in a bad spot. Having pressed Japanese governments for two decades not to get too close to Peking but give political and economic support to Taiwan, we have suddenly cut the ground from under our most loyal friends in Japan, just at a time when our commercial differences are proving dangerously abrasive.

Unless we act quickly this could well produce a crisis we cannot afford; for, given the fact that Japan's Gross National Product is two and a half times mainland China's, it would be no bargain to trade a functioning friendship with a functioning superpower for the chance of a fragile arrangement with a potential one.

George W. Ball served as Under Secretary of State from 1961 to 1969.

2 AUG 1971

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Kennedy Papers: Insight on Bay

Castro Detailed Invasion Flop

By Murray Seeger
Los Angeles Times

WALTHAM, Mass., Aug. 1 — Two years after the American-sponsored invasion of Cuba, Fidel Castro took two American lawyers to the Bay of Pigs site and demonstrated why it had failed so disastrously.

It was April 1963, just days short of the second anniversary of the invasion which John F. Kennedy later acknowledged was one of the great mistakes of his presidency, and Castro was playing host to James B. Donovan and John E. Nolan Jr., as he had several times in the previous five months.

"He'd get out of the car and describe different aspects of the battle; where he was when he got such and such a message from the troops and what he did, and so on," Nolan recalled in a recorded interview made for the John F. Kennedy Library located in temporary quarters in this Boston suburb.

This interview, recorded in April 1967 by Nolan in Washington, is just one of the many revealing new pieces of history now available to researchers at the library.

Effective Monday, the Kennedy Library is making available 95 per cent of the 3.3 million documents it has relating to the Kennedy administration. A small, initial portion of the documents was opened to the public in October, 1969.

The Nolan interview is especially interesting for its descriptions of Castro with whom he and Donovan negotiated for the release of the 1,100 survivors of the disastrous invasion and 23 other American prisoners. Added to other recorded memories of the Bay of Pigs are the prisoner deal as retired Gen. Lucius D. Clay and the late Richard Car-



FIDEL CASTRO
... explained debacle

dinal Cushing, the interview supplies details not previously known of the negotiations with Castro.

Wouldn't Square

Speaking of the mercurial Cuban leader, Nolan said, "Many of the impressions that we had, and I think that my impressions were about the same as Jim's (Donovan), would not square with the commonly accepted image of Castro in the United States.

"During the time that we were with him, Castro was never irrational, never drunk, never dirty," Nolan recalled. "In his personal relationships with us and in connection with the negotiations, he was always reasonable, always easy to deal with. He was a talker of very significant proportions. I mean, he would come over at midnight or 1 o'clock in the morning and stay all night talking. But he wasn't a conversational hog. He'd ask questions, listen for viewpoints. He was easy to talk to, good conversationalist, hardsell guy, constantly plugging his programs, his government."

Donovan, a New York attorney who had previously negotiated the exchange of Soviet spy Col. Rudolf Abel for the American U-2 pilot held by Russia, Francis Gary Powers, died in May 1970 and did not have an interview at the library.

Nolan was enlisted to help

of Pigs, Dallas '63

by Milan Mikovsky, one of the Justice Department aides of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. They were under orders to get the Cuban invaders back to the United States by Christmas Eve.

Donovan negotiated an agreement under which the United States would give Castro food and medicine worth \$53 million in exchange for the prisoners. In addition, Castro insisted on getting \$2.9 million in cash which had previously been offered by Cuban refugee organizations as payment for sick and wounded brigade members already released.

It was during a conversation that lasted until 1 a.m. in early April, 1963, that Castro announced he would take Nolan and Donovan to the Bay of Pigs. They left from Castro's beach home at Vedredera, on the north side of the island nation, at 5 the same morning and drove to the bay on the south shore.

Sampled Swamp

"At one point, there's an area there which is marshy land, swamps and there's only one road that runs across it to solid ground," Nolan recalled. Castro "got out, walked off the road and into the marsh to see how swampy it was.

"You really had a sense of history listening to someone like Castro describe something like the Bay of Pigs. And then the feeling that in walking out into the marsh, which was considered impassable by him and also by the brigade, if he stepped in the wrong spot or something, that he might just disappear beneath the ooze and that would be the end of the whole problem.

"And he sank down and it was up to his boots, but he got back."

Castro and Donovan developed a warm relationship that enabled the hard-drinking lawyer to joke with the dictator in a way that his associates could not, Nolan related.

Just before Christmas, 1962, when Castro came to Havana airport where the prisoners were waiting for the ransom goods to arrive, a flight of Cuban Mig fighters swooped so low over the field that the men on the field had to crouch down.

"Donovan was standing next to Castro, elbowed him and said, in his loud voice that was clearly audible to me and other people around, 'It's the invasion.'

"It seemed to me to be a very jocular remark to make. Castro laughed at it. And then it seemed to me that the other people around, who initially didn't think it was funny at all, looked at Castro and saw his reaction, and they laughed, too."

In the April meetings, held to clean up details of freeing the 23 Americans, including three CIA agents, Donovan and Castro talked about improving relations between the United States and Cuba.

"I think Jim (Donovan) always had his eye on this as a possibility," Nolan said. "He felt that his maximum usefulness lay in the direction of providing that kind of alternative to American policy. And I think that Castro had a similar interest in Donovan . . ."

Nolan gave another example of Donovan's manner with the Cubans, describing a tense scene when the Americans were desperately trying to get \$2.9 million into a Havana bank before 3 p.m. Christmas eve, 1962.

"Look, Mr. Minister, if you want to be helpful in this regard, there's one thing you can do," Donovan told the cabinet official who was driving Nolan to the airport. "When you get out there and that big plane is waiting to take off for Miami, don't defect."

In his interview, Gen. Clay recalled that he was summoned to Robert Kennedy's office on the day before Christmas, 1962. "Almost before I knew, I signed a note for the \$2.9 million

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No more China flights?

One week after the announcement of President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China, the Peking government issued a "serious warning" about the 40th U.S. military aerial intrusion.

Now the White House has announced that there will be no more flights over China by the SR-71 spy planes. It seeks to avoid an unpleasant incident.

However, U.S. reconnaissance satellites will continue to conduct military operations over China, as will "private" SR-71s on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, and American U-2s flown by Chiang Kai-Shek airmen.

The ceremonial pause in U.S. SR-71 spy flights over China do not prove Nixon's peaceful intentions.

The flights prove that China is an "enemy" target, that U.S. imperialism is an enemy of People's China, even as it is an enemy of the entire socialist world and the national liberation movements. The Chinese leaders' hostility to the Soviet Union is not enmity to "revisionism," as they assert, but enmity to the world's first socialist state.

Security of the People's Republic of China lies in the unity of the socialist world in the first place.

U.S. SPY FLIGHTS OVER CHINA ENDED TO AVOID INCIDENT

Missions Suspended to Bar
Interference With Nixon
Trip, Officials Assert

U-2 DOWNING RECALLED

Reconnaissance Satellites,
Termed Not Provocative,
to Continue Surveillance

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 28—Administration officials said today that the United States had suspended flights over Communist China by manned SR-71 spy planes and unmanned reconnaissance drones to avoid any incident that might interfere with President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking.

But, it was reported, American reconnaissance satellites will continue missions over China. Such missions are considered relatively unprovocative since they are well above the airspace of China.

In 1960, it was recalled, a planned conference between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was called off by the Soviet Union after an American U-2 spy plane had been shot down over Soviet territory.

U-2 planes are flown over the Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalists from Taiwan, an official informant said "the mainland Chinese have good enough radar to distinguish between an overflight by the kind of aircraft we possess and the kind flown by the Chinese Nationalists."

Political Reasons Override

Informants said the political reasons for the decision to halt American flights were regarded

as much more compelling than continued intelligence from an occasional SR-71 or drone mission. Some sources also noted that the suspension conceivably might be lifted after President Nixon's visit to China, although a similar suspension of flights over the Soviet Union, instituted after the 1960 U-2 incident, remains in effect.

White House officials, in reporting July 16 on Henry A. Kissinger's conversations in Peking with Premier Chou En-lai about the Nixon visit, expressed confidence that neither nation "will knowingly do something that would undermine the prospects of something that it took so long to prepare and that it took such painful decisions to reach."

Satellites Play Key Role

Although officials were reluctant to discuss the specifics of American intelligence-gathering activities in relation to China, the following details have been pieced together from well-informed sources:

The bulk of photographic reconnaissance is done by spy satellites operating at altitudes of about 100 miles. Photos taken from that altitude would allow analysts to determine, say, the type of aircraft sitting on a field but not to read its wing markings or discern details of armament.

If a new type of aircraft was spotted by a satellite, intelligence officials could call for an SR-71 mission to get clearer, more detailed pictures. Cameras carried by the SR-71, which flies at an altitude of about 80,000 feet, reportedly can capture small details.

According to the informants, a handful of SR-71, operated by the Air Force, normally fly from Okinawa. There are additional SR-71's in the Far East, they say, flown by civilian pilots under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Because of its high altitude and great speed—more than 2,000 miles an hour—the SR-71 is not believed vulnerable either to Chinese surface-to-air missiles or interceptor aircraft. It can provide photographic coverage of about 60,000 square miles in an hour.

The U-2, by contrast, has a maximum altitude of roughly 70,000 feet and a top speed of about 560 miles an hour.

The drone, the Ryan Firebee, is also used for some reconnaissance missions. Typically a C-130 "mother ship" carries two drones to a point outside the defenses of mainland China, where it launches them. They fly a predetermined course and return to a safe point over water where they are parachuted down and recovered.

Peking has publicly protested nearly 500 incursions of its airspace by United States aircraft.

The United States also uses SR-71's and drones over North Vietnam and North Korea. Besides cameras, the SR-71's also carry equipment to monitor and record radar and radio transmissions.

STATINTL

MIDDLE EAST

Flybys and Superspies

Israel celebrated the 23rd birthday of its potent air force last week with flowery words and impressive flybys. The words came from the air force commander, General Mordechai Hod: "We breathe the air of the summit of Mt. Hermon, our wings trace the tranquil waters of Mirfat Shlomo [Sharm el Sheikh] and the reaches of Sinai, and our jets embrace the skies of Jerusalem, which has become a united whole." Then at Hod's order came phalanxes of Phantoms, Skyhawks, Mirages, Mysteres and Ouragans, of Sikorsky helicopters and Noratlas, Dakota and Stratocruiser transports, and even of gnatlike Cessnas.

The only disappointing aspect of the display for Israelis was that it did not include more of the swift, dangerous U.S.-built Phantoms, the backbone of the air force. Israel has so far received approximately 85 Phantoms and lost nine in sorties over Sinai or in accidents. Last year it requested another 40 or so to keep its military power on a par with that of the Arabs.

The Administration has postponed a decision, partly because it sees the Mid-

dle East power balance differently from the Israelis, partly because it considers the Phantoms a useful lever for moving Israel into a Suez Canal agreement. The Phantom decision is still, so to speak, up in the air, but Jerusalem hopes for some progress when Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco makes a scheduled visit this week. "We don't expect Sisco to come flying over in a flotilla of Phantoms," says a government official. "But we do hope that he will come with words of encouragement."

Arab Buildup. On the eve of Sisco's trip, pro-Israel politicians in the U.S. have been spreading alarmist reports about a significant buildup of Arab airpower. The Egyptians, according to Washington estimates, have received 100 MIGs since last September, in addition to 80 MI-8 troop-carrying helicopters. Syria has got 30 MIGs, five Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers and 22 helicopters. All together, there are now nearly 600 So-

viet-built planes in the area, some flown by Soviet pilots.

points discussed when Helms conferred with officials of Ha'Mossad, or "the Institution," the Israeli equivalent of the CIA:

- Soviet-flown MIG-23s, which can fly at 80,000 ft., an altitude that Phantoms cannot reach, are conducting intelligence missions out of Egyptian bases.

- Two electronics-crammed Russian "listening ships" have been stationed about 80 miles off the Israeli coast.


- Soviet radar installed on the ground in Egypt can monitor air routes over Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan.

- Hundreds of Soviet intelligence experts are at work in Middle East evaluation centers in Cairo and Alexandria.

- Soviet agents are visiting Israel in increased numbers in the guise of tourists, journalists, European businessmen and even immigrating Jews.

The Russians are gathering information more openly than they once did; they are ready to risk more in order to

GRAYSHITH—SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE



"A fine job of camouflage, comrade..."

viet-built planes in the area, some flown by Soviet pilots.

The Administration argues that Soviet plane figures look more formidable than they are. U.S. officials point out that while the Arabs have about a 6-to-1 advantage over Israel in planes, the Israelis have the edge in qualified pilots and able ground crews. Egypt lost so many pilots in the war of attrition that after Russian resupply it had four times as many jets as men to fly them. The Israelis fret nonetheless about the growing number of aircraft in Arab countries, and there are signs that they will not discuss a Suez agreement until there is some redressing of the balance.

► **Soviet Activity.** If the weapons buildup is worrisome to Israel, the U.S. has shown concern over a marked buildup of Soviet military activity in the Middle East. It was partly to investigate those activities that CIA Director Richard Helms recently visited Israel. Some

learn more. Helms and his hosts apparently came to no firm conclusions about the objectives of the current Soviet operation. But they did reach some decisions, including an Israeli agreement to provide facilities for U-2s and SR-71 U.S. spy planes.

It will be no surprise if Sisco, fresh from conferences with the National Security Council, makes less headway on the diplomatic front. His object is to probe for possible areas in which U.S.-sponsored discussions on reopening the Suez Canal can be continued.

In Cairo last week, State Department Middle East Specialists Donald C. Bergus and Michael Sterner received assurances from President Anwar Sadat that Egypt still wants the canal reopened—but on its own terms. Sisco is likely to find the same thing in Jerusalem. At present the Israelis are convinced that the talks are dead and that visits like Sisco's are merely cosmetics for a corpse.

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STATINTL

Russian Defector's Story

Scientist Describes Role in Research Used in Downing of Powers U-2

The following article is by a writer for the London Daily Telegraph.

BY DAVID FLOYD

LONDON, July 24—Anatoli Fedoseyev, the Russian scientist who was given asylum in Britain last month, was responsible for developing the device which enabled the Russians to shoot down the American U-2 spy plane in May, 1960. This has emerged from conversations I have had with Fedoseyev in the last two weeks.

The U-2, down by the American pilot Francis Gary Powers, was shot down at a height of 68,000 feet during a reconnaissance mission over Russia. At the time the Americans were trying to find that the Russians had missiles capable of hitting a target at such a height.

Russ Lands Rocket

Marshal Andrei Gromiko, new Soviet defense minister, boasted at the time that the spy plane had been brought down by the first shot fired by a "wonderful rocket". He said Premier Nikita Khrushchev had himself given the order for the rocket to be fired.

The incident led to heated exchanges between the Russians and Americans and the breakdown of the summit conference between Russia and the Western powers due to be held in Paris. Powers was tried in August, 1960 and sentenced to 30 years detention but was exchanged in 1962 for Col. Rudolf Abel, the Soviet agent held in America. It was Fedoseyev's researches in the field of electronics and radar which

enabled the Russians to develop a guided missile capable of hitting a target at a height of 13 miles. The missile guidance system was designed by men who had worked under him at his institute.

Won Lenin Prize

It was, significantly, in 1960 that Fedoseyev was awarded the Lenin Prize, tho the award was kept secret. He received it primarily, he says, for devising ways of defeating the "jamming" devices on the U-2 plane.

"I don't want to give the impression

Powers Spies Traffic Jams

FRANCIS Gary Powers, the U2 spy plane pilot shot down over Russia in 1960, is back doing "overflights" — over the Los Angeles freeways.

Powers, 49, has been hired to pilot the traffic spotter plane of radio station KGIL.

Powers was 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, when his plane was brought down by an anti-aircraft missile. He begged out, stood trial as a spy and was sentenced to 30 years. He was released in February 1962 in exchange for Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel, imprisoned by the United States.

Powers, on his return, left the CIA and was given a job as a test pilot by Lockheed, working on U2s. He complained last year that he was

out of work and was thinking of "going to the unemployment office to see if they need and experienced U2 pilot."

He said that when he went to work for the CIA as a spy pilot, there was an agreement that he would return to the Air Force later, "but they reneged."

The disclosure that the United States conducted such spy flights over Soviet territory exploded chances of a summit conference between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev.

Exchanged for Able

After a Soviet trial and 21 months in prison, Powers was released in a prisoner exchange for which the United States sur-

year.

"I guess I didn't really know how much I missed flying until this year," Powers said.

THE WASHINGTON POST

STATINTL

How the Pentagon papers battle shielded Nixon plan for China trip

STATINTL

"Pentagon papers 'delay also saved CIA agents' lives, helped ailed regimes, safeguarded key emissaries."

By J. E. TER HORST

Chief of Our Washington Bureau
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WASHINGTON — One prime reason why the government went into court to try to stop publication of the Pentagon papers was a fear that certain disclosures might wreck the secret planning then under way for President Nixon's anticipated trip to Communist China.

In going to court, the government's top lawyers believe they also saved the lives of several Americans, headed off some grave security leaks and preserved the machinery of some of today's most delicate and secret peace moves involving many countries of the East and West.

The Washington-Peking thaw is one of them. Mr. Nixon, it can be said on high authority, shares this view.

So even though the Supreme Court ruled, 5-3, that the New York Times and Washington Post could resume printing material from the top-secret Pentagon study of U.S. involvement in Indochina, the government feels it won more than it lost.

Two factors are vital in the government's reasoning.

One was the two-week period, June 15 to July 1, during which the administration's court tactics kept the Times, Post and some other newspapers from publishing the documents.

The second factor, now in the Supreme Court's vault, is a single-spaced typewritten list of "10 items" from the 47-volume Pentagon study. The government contends these items would cause "grave international harm" if disclosed at any time.

These two elements—the two-week time span and the 10-item list—are interlocking.

Together they constitute the heart of the government's contention that it went into court, not to prevent embarrassment to previous administrations or to thwart the First Amendment, but to head off "irreparable injury" to the global security of the United States.

(Daniel Ellsberg, the former Pentagon staffer and Rand Corp. employee, has said repeatedly that he was the conduit to the New York Times, the Post and other newspapers.)

As proof of the government's success in this respect, the official cited the nature of stories in the Times and Post after the Supreme Court gave them permission to resume publication of the Pentagon papers.

"They haven't surfaced any of the ultra sensitive stuff on the 10-item list," he said.

What the government feels it gained from its lawsuits, in spite of the Supreme Court verdict:

• The two-week injunction period gave the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sufficient time to "extract" key agents from dangerous assignments abroad.

These agents "almost certainly would have been killed," one source said, had several Pentagon documents been printed or described in detail.

"By going into court we gained enough time to get them the hell out," he said.

Removal of these agents—six in particular—appears to have been accomplished "without blowing anybody's cover," to use the phrase of one intelligence official. In other words, the agents may be able to resume their assignments later, without tipping off unfriendly governments.

• The lawsuits gave the government an opportunity, beneath the formal umbrella of the federal courts, to use in-chambers sessions to acquaint the judges and Times and Post editors with the highly sensitive nature of some portions of the 47-volume Pentagon study.

"It might have appeared to be only ancient history to some people," one knowledgeable official said. "But for us and other governments affected, it was an acute and current matter of highest priority. Disclosure certainly would have been a disaster."

tries, especially behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains.

In other words, since the newspapers involved had not availed themselves of the government's declassifying process for the Pentagon papers, the government used the courts as a mechanism to "get the message across."

U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour first submitted a 22-page "special appendix" before the federal Appellate Court in New York in the New York Times case, citing items in the Pentagon study which the government believed would cause grave national danger if disclosed. When the case moved to the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Irwin H. Griswold summarized these matters in his 10-item list given to the justices in a sealed envelope for in-chambers perusal.

What the government believes it has been successful in preventing is the publication of details of certain Pentagon papers on that list, obtained by this reporter. The contents are summarized here only in general terms so as not to violate security.

The News has been assured that the following points, without further amplification, do not offer any security breach or threat to the people involved.

• The Pentagon study included precise documentation of American reconnaissance and intelligence activities involving certain Asian countries supporting Hanoi's side in the Vietnam war.

These activities were known to be taking place by the spied-upon countries but they were technically unable to stop it and so had said nothing publicly.

But publication of official U.S. documents from the Pentagon papers, detailing specifics of the reconnaissance activity, undoubtedly would have required these countries to respond publicly against the United States "in a most bellicose fashion" to quote American officials.

The ensuing diplomatic crisis, they believe, would have undercut current U.S. efforts to improve relations with these countries.

One can assume that among initiatives that would have been jeopardized, if not destroyed, is Mr. Nixon's scheduled trip to mainland China before next May and his administration's efforts to normalize relations with that diplomatically-unrecognized country of 800 million persons.

At the height of the Pentagon papers controversy in March, American and some key foreign diplomats were secretly arranging with Peking the two-day visit by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

CIA Boss in Israel

AT THE end of June CIA director Richard M. Helms, President Nixon's chief adviser on matters of intelligence, made a trip to Israel. At first the visit was kept secret. But, on his third day in Tel Aviv, news of his talks with Premier Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and Foreign Minister Abba Eban leaked into the American press. Another Washington secret became public knowledge.

True, it was only the fact of the visit that ceased to be a secret. As regards its actual purpose, and the subject of Helms' talks with the Israeli "Hawks," the Western press could only hazard some guesses. Most observers, however, agreed that one of the principal aims of the visit was to co-ordinate the subversive anti-Arab activities of the Israeli secret service with the U.S. Middle East plans.

It is not so very difficult to arrive at such a conclusion. As a result of the exposures made in the last few years it has become generally known that there is probably no imperialist secret service that co-operates more closely with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency than the Israeli. But that is not all. It is also widely known that relations between the CIA bosses and their counterparts in the Israeli secret service can in no way be characterized as relations between equals. The CIA subsidizes many of the Israeli spy operations. And he who pays the piper calls the tune: on CIA instructions, the Israeli secret service collects information of interest to Washington and organizes subversive operations in the Arab world and Africa, in the socialist countries and even in the capitalist West, where Tel Aviv has very many agents (in France and Italy, for instance). That is why many observers regard the Israeli secret service as a sort of giant agency of the CIA, its branch. In which case Helms' visit to Israel might be seen as more of an inspection tour than anything else. It was not for nothing that he was accompanied by twelve advisers whose job was to study on the spot various aspects of the activity of Israel's secret service.

Helms is known to be a specialist in espionage and subversion, particularly against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He was one of those who organized the building of a spy tunnel from the American sector of Berlin to the G.D.R. In 1956 and the flights of U-2 spy planes which continued until 1960, when Francis Powers was shot down over Soviet territory. For a long time he headed the CIA "black" propaganda department which draws up plans for ideological subversion against the socialist community. All this has given observers plenty of food for thought in connection with Helms' mission to Israel. Many believed that it was undertaken with the view to elaborating new methods of subversion which in Washington's view should serve to neutralize the effect the treaty between the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. may have on the normalization of the situation in the Middle East.

STATINTL

U.S. Monitoring China From Indian Radar Site

By William J. Coughlin
Los Angeles Times

NEW DELHI, June 24—The United States has installed a highly classified surveillance system in northern India, replacing its former spy base in Pakistan, to monitor Communist China's nuclear and missile activities, it was learned today.

The system is manned by American personnel from the Defense Communications Agency, the Pentagon's centralized communications establishment.

[In Washington, U.S. Defense Department officials declined to comment on the report.]

The installation includes at least six radar units, quietly supplied to India in a clandestine Pentagon program despite the supposed cutoff of U.S. military aid to India.

which followed its clash with Pakistan in 1965. There has been no open American military mission here since withdrawal of the U.S. Military Advisory Group shortly after that outbreak.

The system serves much the same purpose as the former electronic spy base at Peshawar, in northern Pakistan, and as the radars set up in Turkey to monitor Soviet missile and space installations in southern Russia.

Much of the intelligence on Chinese nuclear and missile installations in Sinkiang Province, to the north of India, comes not from satellites but through electronic "cavesdropping" from here. The new system also can monitor activities in Pakistan.

The Indian installation has been of major importance since the Pakistan government forced the U.S. to close its secret base at Peshawar, 150 miles from the Chinese border, in July 1969, presumably as a result of pressure from China. Some of the equipment from Peshawar is believed to have been brought to India, although U.S. authorities let it be known at the time that it was destined for Australia.

A hint at the existence of the network came this week in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, when a

member asked if a Chinese aircraft reported to have dropped supplies to rebels in Bihar State had been tracked "on the radar." (The so-called supplies turned out to be propaganda leaflets and other goods from a Nationalist Chinese balloon destined for the Chinese mainland but carried to India by the winds.)

Former Defense Minister Khrishna Menon, now a member of Parliament, asked whether American U-2 aircraft were operating over India.

Peshawar, it will be remembered, was the base from which Francis Gary Powers took off on his ill-fated U-2 flight over the Soviet Union in 1960.

[An unofficial Indian source in Washington termed the report "unimaginable." The source also said India maintained six radar stations of its own beamed toward China and used for Indian border security. The equipment for the six stations, according to this source, was given to India by the U.S. government in 1962 as military aid.

[At the same time, official Indian sources claimed no knowledge of the alleged U.S. installation and stated: "we have no foreign base of any kind in India at all."]

14 JUN 1971

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U.S. Planned Before Tonkin For War on North, Files Show

By Murrey Marder
and Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Johnson administration planned for major American military action against North Vietnam nearly five months before the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, according to secret government documents made public yesterday by The New York Times.

These plans were made, the documents show, at a time when the United States already was directing clandestine sabotage operations in the North.

Two months before the attack on two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, the administration sent a Canadian diplomat, J. Blair Seaborn, on a secret mission to Hanoi where he is quoted as telling Premier Pham Van Dong that "in the event of escalation (of the war) the greatest devastation would result for the D.R.V. (North Vietnam) itself."

It was the Tonkin incident—called totally unprovoked by the administration—which led Congress on Aug. 7, 1964, to pass a resolution declaring that the United States was "prepared, as the President directs, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," to assist South Vietnam. It was on this resolution that President Johnson subsequently leaned heavily to widen the war.

The documents are part of a multi-volumed collection of records and comments assembled under the direction of then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The bulk of the documents disclosed thus far by the Times are of military origin but include some White House and State Department papers that reached the Pentagon. Other documents were only alluded to or quoted from in the newspaper's story.

A National Security Action Memorandum of March 17, 1964, presumably the result of a presidential decision, set out both the administration's political aims and the basis for its military planning. A cable sent three days later by the President to Henry Cabot Lodge, then the American ambassador in Saigon, illuminates his intentions.

The memorandum says that "we seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam" but "do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security."

Repeating language from a McNamara memorandum of March 16 to the President (language in part drawn in turn from a memorandum to McNamara on Jan. 22 from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor) the National Security Council document reflects the prevailing belief in what President Eisenhower had called the "domino effect" of the loss of South Vietnam.

Unless the objective is achieved in South Vietnam, it says, "almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance" or accommodate to Communism. The Philippines, it was judged, "would become shaky" and "the threat to India on the west, Australia and New Zealand to the South, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north would be greatly increased."

The policy decision, then, was to "prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian 'border control actions'" as well as "the retaliatory actions" against North Vietnam and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "graduated overt military pressure" against North Vietnam.

The President's cable to Lodge says that "our planning for action against the North is on grounds that 'overt military

action" then was "premature." Mr. Johnson offered as one reason that statement that "we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown."

The President also told Lodge that part of his job then was "knocking down the idea of neutralization" of Vietnam, an idea advanced by then French President Charles de Gaulle, "wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can."

The resulting contingency planning is shown in several documents. But other documents also show that as early as Dec. 21, 1953, a memorandum from McNamara to President Johnson referred to "plans for covert action into North Vietnam" that "present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations" that should "provide maximum pressure with minimum risk."

This clandestine program became "Operation Plan 34-A," launched on Feb. 1, 1964. It was described in a National Security memorandum the next month as "a modest 'covert' program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalist)—a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect."

One source yesterday said, in retrospect, that these covert operations were in fact "very modest—and highly unsuccessful." But they came to have profound significance in the Tonkin Gulf incident. McNamara, even in 1968 testimony reexamining the 1964 Tonkin affair, professed to know little about the plan 34-A operations. He told Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that they were carried out by South Vietnamese against the North, "utilizing to some degree U.S. equipment."

"I can't describe the exact nature of the operations," Fulbright, although I can be happy to try to obtain the information for you."

It was charged by then Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) that the South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin caused the North Vietnamese to fire upon U.S. destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy. McNamara, in 1968, told the Senate committee, however, that it was "monstrous" to insinuate that the United States "induced the incident" as an "excuse" to take retaliatory action. The retaliatory action was the opening rounds of U.S. bombing attacks upon North Vietnam.

According to the information disclosed by the Times, the Plan 34-A operations against the North during 1961 ranged from U-2 spy plane flights to parachuting sabotage and psychological warfare teams into the North Vietnamese citizenry, sea-launched commando raids on rail and highway bridges and bombardment of coastal installations by PT boats.

These attacks were described as being under the Saigon control of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, then chief of the U.S. military assistance command, with joint planning by the South Vietnamese who carried out the operations themselves or with "hired personnel."


Even before these covert operations began, however, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were reported recommending "increasingly bolder actions" including "aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets" and use of "United States forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

After the August, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin breakthrough to more open U.S. involvement in the fighting, the published documentation shows recommendations for considerably expanded covert operations against the North.

A memorandum prepared for Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy shows that part of the clandestine operations against the North were suspended immediately "after the first Tonkin Gulf incident" on Aug. 2, 1964, but that "successful maritime and airborne operations" were carried out in October.

The documents discuss clandestine operations carried out not only from South Vietnam but from Laos, against North Vietnam and against enemy-held areas of Laos. One docu-

continued



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BY JACOB BRACKMAN
With Original Illustrations by Sam Kirson

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16 MAY 1977

STATINTL

Letters To The Editor

The CIA's Contribution

I am moved to respond to your editorial "Taking the CIA on Faith" (April 18). The editorial contained some interpretations of statements made by CIA Director Richard Helms with which I must take exception.

The editorial repeated Mr. Helms' statement that the public cannot judge the value or the efficiency of the operations of the agency because of the secrecy requirements which surround it. This fact is unassailable and was stressed by Mr. Helms; however, the editorial ignored the common sense of this statement and continued to bemoan the lack of public scrutiny. While secrecy is an important component of the operations of an intelligence organization, a dearth of information does exist concerning the general theory and practice of intelligence operations; this information is available—without the need for a security clearance—to the interested individual. Furthermore, public information is available, often to the chagrin of CIA officials, concerning more specific details of certain agency operations, witness the operations of the Meo tribesmen in Laos and the U-2 operations over the U.S.S.R. (which was highly successful by all accounts until May 1960). Therefore, while much of its daily operations are necessarily veiled in secrecy, the agency is not the ultra-secret "invisible government" as some would have us believe.

Mr. Helms' statement that the CIA is not involved in drug traffic seem to me to be as definitive as he could make it. The nature of intelligence operations, however, often necessitates the conduct of business with certain individuals who may have connections with the traffic of drugs. So long as the operations of the agency do not promote the worldwide traffic of drugs, it must be accepted that we will occasionally have to deal with these individuals so long as they can be of value to these operations.

Finally, the editorial questions, "how

much intelligence is enough?" The obvious answer is that there can never be too much knowledge. The policy planners and decision makers who are charged with the responsibility for charting the course of the United States in the sensitive area of international affairs must be provided with, as Mr. Helms stated, "a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence." The need for objectivity in the production of intelligence is paramount, as Mr. Helms stated in his speech. This objectivity is required in order to preclude the agency from becoming ambitious, and either making its own policy or inducing "policy makers to posit an American interest..."

The CIA continuously makes a great contribution to the security of this nation and to the well-being of its citizens. Mr. Helms' speech has served to inform the American public just a bit more as to the extent of that contribution.

PAUL D. WARREN SR.

Glen Burnie.

14 MAY 1971

No 007 he, newsman Sam Jaffee

spurns CIA

NEW YORK, May 13—Radio reporter Sam Jaffee last night told the world how the Central Intelligence Agency tried to recruit him as a spy on two separate occasions.

The former ABC and CBS newsman reported this information on a videotaped WNYC-TV program "All About Television." WNYC is a municipal station whose existence is threatened by city budget cut-backs.

Jaffee said his initial encounter with the CIA occurred in California while waiting to hear from CBS News where he had filed a job application. A young man, whom Jaffee believed to be called Jerry Rubins, told Jaffee that if he was willing to work as a spy, he would get a paid trip to Moscow.

Jaffee quoted the CIA as saying we "are willing to release certain top secret information to you in order that you try to obtain information for us." Jaffee cordially refused the offer.

The correspondent had formerly worked at the United Nations when he returned from Korea and had contact at the U.N. with Soviet citizens.

Wanted check on spy pilot.

The second encounter with the CIA occurred around the time of the U-2 incident in 1960 when Jaffee was assigned to CBS to go to Moscow to cover the downed spy pilot trial, Francis Gary Powers. Jaffee said that the CIA wanted him to discover whether Powers was brainwashed.

"What they really wanted," says Jaffee, "I don't know to this day."

He has not seen the CIA since that time.

News of the Jaffee telecast was front-paged in Variety, newspaper of the entertainment world, in its May 12 issue.

Jeff Erdel, Director of Public Relations at WNYC to the Daily World today that the program "All About Television," is another "first" for the radio and T.V. station.

"We have always been an open microphone to those who were denied time on other stations," he said. Proposed city cut-backs which threaten the existence of WNYC "can only be interpreted as a withdrawal of that right to free speech," he added.

How's Your Political IQ?

1. May 1 is May Day, the international Communist holiday. What happened on May 1, 1960, which caused a major stir in both the free and Communist worlds?
2. Christian IX, Frederik VIII, Christian X and Frederik IX were all kings of what country? (Frederik IX is still reigning.)
3. Identify the author and date of the following close of this famous speech: "You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."
4. There are 13 black Americans in both houses of Congress (14 if you count non-voting delegate Walter Fauntroy (D.-D.C.). How many Mexican-Americans are there in both houses and can you name them?
5. Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov gave his name (and ultimately his life) to a series of events in Soviet Russia during the 1930s that was to have a profound effect on the development of that country. What was the "Yezhovshchina"?
6. Drug abuse is a serious national problem. From which country does most of the illicit heroin used in the United States originate?
7. Who said: "No nation is drunken where wine is cheap; and none sober when the dearness of wines substitutes ardent spirits as a common beverage."? (Hint: he was one of the three secretaries of state who later became President of the United States.)
8. Rep. Emanuel Celler (D.-N.Y.) is the dean of the House of Representatives in terms of seniority. Who is the No. 2 man in House seniority?
9. Which state is nicknamed the Sooner State?
10. Iva Toguri d'Aquino is the real name of which well-known propagandist?
11. The Mason-Dixon Line divides

IQ Answers

1. On May 1, 1960, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down during a CIA reconnaissance flight over the Soviet Union, thus killing a summit conference between President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Powers was sentenced to 10 years in prison, later released in exchange for Red spy Rudolf Abel.
2. Denmark.
3. The quote is from William Jennings Bryan's speech to the Democratic National Convention in 1896. Bryan, who favored free coinage of silver, was that party's candidate for President in that year as well as in 1900 and 1908.
4. One senator and four congressmen: Sen. Joseph Montoya (D.-N.M.), Representatives Manuel Lujan (R.-N.M.), Edward Roybal (D.-Calif.), Eligio de la Garza (D.-Tex.) and Henry Gonzalez (D.-Tex.).
5. Yezhov, head of the dreaded NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), directed the climax of the great purges which resulted in the loss of millions of lives. Yezhov himself was demoted, then apparently executed.
6. According to a recent *Reader's Digest* article, some 80 per cent of the illicit dope is grown in Turkey and refined into heroin in France.
7. Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States. Among his many other accomplishments, Jefferson was something of a gourmet.
8. He's Rep. Wright Patman (D.-Tex.), chairman of the powerful House Banking and Currency Committee.
9. Oklahoma.
10. She's Tokyo Rose, who was born in the United States, was famed for her broadcasts to U.S. troops in the Pacific theater during World War II. She was tried for treason, convicted, later released and now lives in relative anonymity in Chicago, Ill.
11. Pennsylvania and Maryland.

M - 42,069

S - 72,623

MAY 6 1971

Credibility Gap's Birth Traced

'Official Lies'
Now ExpectedBy WALLACE BEERNE
Special To The Star

Eleven years ago this week, the credibility gap was born.

Today it is a fact of life — no thinking person can still believe the United States Government doesn't lie.

This turning point in the ethics of American history began on May 2, 1960, when the information office at Incirlik AFB, Adana, Turkey, issued a brief release: A weather recon plane of the U-2 type had vanished the day before on a routine flight over the Lake Van area of Turkey.

The release added that a search had been launched, and the radio contact with the pilot — identified only as a civilian employee of Lockheed Aircraft — indicated he was having problems with his oxygen equipment.

As a newsmen working in Germany at the time, this correspondent gave the release only cursory attention. Having visited the air base at Adana several times, I was aware that U-2 "weather planes" were stationed there, so there was no reason for questioning the story.

No doubt the release was read with considerably more interest by the editors of Pravda and Izvestia.

A day or so later, the Air Force issued a second release: Because of the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the plane, NASA was grounding all U-2 aircraft to check the oxygen equipment.

Summit In Paris

But there was no doubt of the political horizon. Everyone

was looking forward to the May 15 summit conference between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev in Paris. My assignment was to spend the week in Moscow covering the reaction to the talks, and my visa was approved without hesitation.

Then came the bomb: Speaking to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on May 5, Khrushchev suddenly departed from his routine report and thundered "Comrade Deputies! Upon the instructions of the Soviet government, I must report to you on aggressive actions against the Soviet Union in the past few weeks on the part of the United States of America.

"What were these aggressive actions? The United States of America has been sending aircraft that have been crossing our state frontiers and intruding into the airspace of the Soviet Union . . . Therefore we must act — shoot down the planes! This assignment was fulfilled — the plane was shot down!"

(Stormy, prolonged applause. Shouts "Correct!" and "Shame to the Aggressor!")

As the shock wave ripped across the news wires of the world, in Washington a NASA spokesman conceded that the missing U-2 might have strayed across the Soviet border while the pilot — listed as Francis Gary Powers — was unconscious.

An Accident

On May 6, the State Department reported, "An unarmed U-2 weather reconnaissance craft of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration might have crossed the Soviet frontier by accident."

Lincoln White, the State Department spokesman, stated, "There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space, and there never has been."

The statement was duly published in the American press, along with irate statements from certain congressmen castigating the Soviets for shooting down an unarmed plane.

One British journalist called a top State Department official for an off-the-record statement and was told "Utterly fantastic! Take one technical point alone: the single-engine U-2 has a range of only 2,500 miles — not 4,000 as Khrushchev's fantastic tale implies."

And the State Department even went so far as to send the Russians a formal note of protest and inquiry regarding the fate of the pilot — the pilot presumed dead.

Then on May 7, Khrushchev dropped the other shoe.

Addressing the Supreme Soviet again, Khrushchev explained, "I did not say the pilot was alive and in good health, and that we have parts of the plane. We did so deliberately, because had we told everything at once, the Americans would have invented another version."

Sharing In A Lie

It was only then, the newsmen discovered, to their horror and indignation, that they had been participating in a lie. They had believed what they had been told, and so, presumably, had President Eisenhower.

Secretary of State Christian Herter insisted the President was blundering. It was admitted the U-2 had probably

made an "information-gathering" flight over Russia, but "there was no authorization for any such flight."

Again the press accepted the word of the government, although it was now obvious that someone had sent Powers aloft, quite willing if he were downed (after he had demolished the plane and killed himself with his poison needle) to let America believe that Moscow was the real aggressor.

James Reston of the New York Times noted, "As to who might have authorized the flight, officials refused to comment. If this particular flight of the U-2 was not authorized here, it could only be assumed that someone in the chain of command in the Middle East or Europe had given the order."

Behind the scenes, CIA chief Allen Dulles met with President Eisenhower and offered to resign on May 9 to save the government further embarrassment.

Khrushchev had left President Eisenhower an opening by indicating the deed may have been done without the President's knowledge, and Press Secretary James Hagerty was quoted as saying "in his opinion" he didn't think President Eisenhower had been aware of the mission.

Hopeless Situation

But the situation was hopeless. On May 11 President Eisenhower admitted that he had personally approved the flights because espionage was "a distasteful but vital necessity."

And amid the shambles, both Herter and Vice President

The fall guy

OPERATION OVERFLIGHT

By Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry.
Hodder and Stoughton. 375 pages.
 £2.50.

After being shot down in the Urals in May, 1960, Mr Powers, the pilot of the most famous of the U-2 aircraft that preceded today's "spy satellites," spent 21 months as the Russians' prisoner before being part-exchanged for their equally celebrated spy, Colonel Rudolf Abel. After his release his former employers in the Central Intelligence Agency effectively discouraged him from writing about his experiences until 1968, when they consented to his undertaking the book which he and Mr Gentry have now produced. Rather generously, Mr Powers acknowledges that the delay has enabled him to tell his story more fully—though even now he omits, as he recalls he did when interrogated by the Russians, many points which they would still probably like to know more about.

Much has certainly changed since Mr Khrushchev, staging one of his alarming but deftly controlled tantrums, extricated himself from the 1960 summit project and cancelled Mr Eisenhower's visit to Russia on the ground that Mr Powers's overflight of that country had been an intolerable action. The truth, at that time, was that the Russians had known of the U-2 overflights for several years, but had never complained about them. Instead they concentrated on developing means of shooting down the high-flying reconnaissance aircraft, and their feat in May, 1960, meant that the Americans could no longer use this method of redressing the imbalance of secrecy between the two super powers. Today's calm acceptance on both sides of mutual surveillance by photographic satellites contrasts ironically with the Russians' hullabaloo 11 years ago. True, Mr Powers argues that the U-2 could still do some things better than any satellite, but one must allow for his professional loyalty as a pilot to this strangely beautiful jet-powered glider. In 1962 he went back to flying U-2s as a test pilot for Lockheed, and had a few more "close calls," as he puts it.

He does not complain that he was required to try to fly the 3,800 miles from Peshawar across Russia to Norway in a plane that revealed several mal-

He does complain that the U-2 pilots got no guidance at all about



Powers in Moscow: awaiting sentence

the possibility of capture, except an intelligence officer's offhand advice to "tell them everything"—advice which Mr Powers declined to follow. His account of his experiences in Russia is only too credible; it includes the usual "counsel for the defence" who, at the show trial, devoted himself to assisting the prosecution, and the usual revelations of obsessive Soviet bureaucracy inside as well as outside the prison system. Equally credible is his story of the somewhat schizophrenic way the American authorities treated him after his release, when he was alternately laden with commendations and left to play something of a scapegoat role. Inevitably his book contains a vein of self-justification, but this is not strong enough to obscure the interest of the narrative. And when he speculates, he does so explicitly and cautiously; for example, when he discusses the possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald may have informed the Russians about the altitudes at which the U-2s flew when he went to Moscow in 1959 after working as a radar operator at the Atsugi base in Japan while the aircraft were flying from there. Mr Powers's fateful flight was only the second U-2 flight over Russia after Oswald's arrival there.

STATINTL

15 APR 1971

STATINTL

CIA's Helms Talks Of '62 Cuban Crisis

Washington, April 14 (AP)—Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, implied today that there was more than one high-level Western spy in the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Helms' memoirs were published here in 1965, was said to have supplied vital information on Soviet plans and ability to carry them out during the Berlin crisis in 1961 as well as the Cuban crisis the next year.

In his first public speech since he became chief of the CIA, Mr. Helms told a newspaper editors conference here that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians," along with U-2 reconnaissance planes, had provided data on Soviet missile systems at the time. President Kennedy was said to have relied heavily on this information in planning his own moves. Mr. Helms was not available to comment further on his remark following the speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in which he said U.S. intelligence "will have a major and vital role in any international agreement to limit strategic arms."

The only name previously connected with high-level leaks of military information has been Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a senior Soviet military intelligence officer who was tried and executed for espionage by the Russians in 1963. He said it would be "unthinkable to conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union without the means for monitoring compliance."

Penkovsky, whose purported



Associated Press

CIA Director Helms addresses newspaper editors.

CIA 3.03 Cuba
CIA 4.02 U-2
CIA 1.01 Dulles, Allen
CIA 4 - Cuba - Bay of Pigs
CIA 2.01.2

Russians 1902A11 Confirmed by CIA

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

In his first public speech as CIA director, Richard Helms yesterday declared that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians" helped the United States in identification of Soviet weapons in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.

He mentioned no names, but the reference clearly appeared to be to Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet intelligence officer who brought much information out during visits to London in the 16 months prior to the missile crisis. He was arrested that October and subsequently executed for treason.

"The Penkovsky Papers," published as a book in 1955, were widely believed to be based on CIA interrogations, and the claim was made in the introduction that Penkovsky's information was invaluable during the Cuba crisis. Talking to newsmen after the speech, Helms acknowledged that the Russians he mentioned included Penkovsky.

However, not until Helms' speech yesterday at a luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors had an American official in a position to know come so close to crediting Penkovsky openly.

Helms detailed the kind of work the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies did at the time, trying to separate fact from fiction about what Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was doing in Cuba. He then included this paragraph:

"Our intelligence files in Washington, however—thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters and other associated equipment, and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union."

This enabled specialists, with the help of pictures taken by U-2s, to identify the threat, Helms said.

Much of Helms' speech was a defense of the CIA against charges it is an "invisible government." He denied reports the CIA is "somehow involved in the world drug traffic." Without mentioning recent charges against the FBI, Helms said that "we do not target on American citizens."

The closest Helms came to discussing the CIA's role in current policy issues was his reference to the ongoing strategic arms limitation talks. He said it would be "unthinkable" to conclude a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union "without the means for monitoring compliance."

He mentioned checking on both offensive and defensive missile systems with a special reference to the possibility raised in the Pentagon that the Soviets might upgrade certain surface-to-air missile systems.

The United States "must have the means of detecting new developments which might convert one of the regular Soviet air defense missile systems into an ABM network," Helms said.

"We make no foreign policy," he said. "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service. I can assure you that we are but I am precluded from demonstrating it to the public," he added.

Helms, who has been with CIA since its creation in 1947 and has been its director since mid-1966, declared that "we not only have no stake in policy debates" within the administration "but we cannot and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts—relevant to the problem under consideration."

The CIA under one of Helms' predecessors, Allen Dulles, was widely charged with advocacy in the Bay of Pigs debacle and in other covert activities. This was said to have been a mistake after a probe of the Bay of Pigs that set up the guidelines listed by Helms.



—United Press International

CIA Director Richard Helms (left) talks with Newbold Noyes Jr., president of the American

Society of Newspaper Editors and editor of The Star, during the editors' conference yesterday.

CIA Has Agents in Kremlin

Spies Are 'Well-Placed,' Helms Tells Newsmen

By THOMAS B. ROSS
Chicago Sun-Times Service

British, CIA Agent

The head of the Central Intelligence Agency says the CIA has penetrated the Soviet government with a "number of well-placed" Russian spies.

Richard M. Helms, in his first public speech in five years as director of the CIA, yesterday cited the spies' key role in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and implied that some of them still are operating in the Soviet Union.

By making the claim at this time, Helms apparently sought to serve notice to the Kremlin that the United States has secret ways of checking on its good faith in current negotiations on strategic weapons, the Middle East and other critical issues.

Helms said the CIA was able to detect Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962 "thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians" who provided crucial details on Soviet

Helms was asked later if he was referring to Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, the Soviet military intelligence official who served as an agent for both the CIA and British intelligence. Helms replied that his remarks covered Penkovsky and "others."

Penkovsky was arrested Oct. 22, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile crisis, and executed May 16, 1963. But the Soviet government has made no public mention of additional spies in the case.

Helms' speech thus left the implication that "other" CIA agents remain in place inside the Soviet Union.

Helms obtained clearance from President Nixon before accepting the invitation to speak before the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Helms' speech created a current clamor over charges of Army and FBI "spying" on civilians. He went to great lengths

to insist that the CIA has no domestic security role.

Helms acknowledged that the CIA collects "foreign intelligence in this country" by tapping university experts and interviewing persons who travel to Communist countries.

Semantic Troubles

"The trouble," he lamented, "is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious and pervasive secret government, our words 'interview' and 'hire' translate into suborn, subvert and seduce or something worse."

He denied as "vicious" a charge that the CIA is involved in world drug traffic. Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., demanded yesterday that the CIA and the State Department investigate allegations by Ramparts magazine that the CIA facilitates the movement of opium out of Southeast Asia.

Helms conceded, on the other hand: "Our mission, in the eyes of many thoughtful Americans, may appear to be in conflict with some of the traditions and

ideals of a free society... Assertions are made that the Central Intelligence Agency is an 'invisible government' — a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls...

It is difficult for me to agree with this view, but I respect it."

STATINTL

THE PRESS

President and Press: A Debate

While he was a Presidential Counsellor to Richard Nixon, easygoing and accessible Daniel Patrick Moynihan was widely popular with the press. He was the friend of many reporters, including Max Frankel, Washington Bureau Chief for the New York Times. Now Moynihan is back to university teaching and provocative writing. In a recent Commentary article titled "The Presidency & the Press," he decries a shift in power away from the White House to the press that he claims might, if it continues, seriously weaken effective Government. Frankel subsequently wrote a 15-page, single-spaced "Dear Pat" reply. Moynihan's five-point attack, and Frankel's rebuttal:

The tradition of muckraking, Moynihan says, has fallen into the hands of an unlikely new breed of Washington journalists: not only professionally elite, but "one of the most important and en-



MAX FRANKEL

during social elites of the city." Even worse, those who have what Moynihan calls an "Ivy League" outlook bring to their work "attitudes genuinely hostile to American society and American government." Frankel's reply: "We are, of course, guilty of having switched, over the last generation, to a more educated corps of reporters, if only to keep up with the credentials and footwork of the holders of public office." It is, he adds, "one of the more enduring attractions of our business that any bright lad of proletarian or other origin can rid himself of the social and hierarchical pressures of our society to participate, as a journalist, in the political process of our country." (Frankel himself is a German-born naturalized citizen who was graduated from Columbia in 1922.) Coincidental with the rising power of

the press, Moynihan charges, the nation has developed a concept of "near-omnipotence" in the office of the presidency, which is largely the result of Franklin D. Roosevelt's strongman tenure. The press, particularly such "presidential newspapers" as the Times and the Washington Post, sets so high a standard for the performance of any President that he is doomed to perpetual failure on their pages. Frankel argues that criticism is not the result of unrealistic expectations "but the habit of regular deception in our politics and Administration . . . the damnable tendency toward manipulation that forces us so often into the posture



DANIEL MOYNIHAN
Is the balance shifting?

of apparent adversaries." Naive credulity on the part of the Washington press corps, Frankel adds, was shot down with the U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960, and he prefers the "informed skepticism" that has replaced it.

Moynihan questions press use of material leaked by lower-level bureaucrats who are often motivated by personal or parochial departmental interests and actually antagonistic to the policies of the President they serve. "What the press never does say is who the leaker is and why he wants the story leaked," Moynihan contends. Frankel insists that "deliberate disclosure of information for the purpose of injuring the President is relatively rare" and asks: "Even if the deliberate 'leaking' were as harmful as you suggest, is it your contention that the press should ignore such information and pretend it was never received?"

Self-Correction. Point four in Moynihan's indictment is one that journalists have posed for themselves ever since the days of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy: How, in the pursuit of objectivity and fairness, can they avoid inflating a man and inflaming an issue?

Editors often err, Moynihan says, in judging "whether an event really is news, or simply a happening, a non-event staged for the purpose of getting into the papers." He, too, cites McCarthy, as well as a more recent focus of news and controversy, the Students for a Democratic Society. "If the S.D.S. stages a confrontation over a trumped-up issue, why oblige it by taking the whole episode at face value?" Frankel does not really contest the point but directs his rejoinder elsewhere. "Yes, we are sometimes taken in, and our readers are sometimes taken for a ride. But the culprit, far more often, is the Government, the President, if you will, than the random extremist."

The most serious failure Moynihan finds in the press is the lack of a professional corrective for failure itself. He rejects the traditional letters-to-the-editor columns as inadequate and finds a press council, like Great Britain's, unsuitable for the U.S. He applauds the Post's recent appointment of a veteran reporter, Richard Harwood, as the paper's internal ombudsman; it is, he hopes, a "profoundly important beginning" toward a self-monitoring press. Moynihan's concern is also the preoccupation of many newspaper editors, and a few newspapers use variants of the Harwood function to check their accuracy. Frankel's reply to the issue of self-correction is not a response to the specific point, but an attack on the entire Moynihan thesis. He writes: "Such opportunity for correction is rarely denied the White House . . . If our Presidents are seriously concerned about 'protracted conflict' with a large enough segment of our population and genuinely believe, with you, that they are steadily losing that conflict, they had better look well beyond the bearers of the bad news and certainly well beyond the morning paper. They might even look in a mirror."

The Right to Silence

The First Amendment guarantee of a free press has never been interpreted by the Supreme Court the way some journalists would like to have it—a blanket protection against any judicial inquiry into a newsman's activity, sources and unpublished materials. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled last November that New York Times Reporter Earl Caldwell was right in refusing to testify before a grand jury investigating the Black Panthers because the jury was on a "fishing expedition"; for Caldwell to talk, the court held, would have turned him into an investigative agent for the Government. Though an important precedent, the ruling has no binding force in other circuits. At least three new confrontations, two of them raising novel legal and editorial questions, have developed:

► The court that convicted Lieut. William Calley last week also made an unprecedented ruling on the 60 hours of taped conversation between Calley

STATINT

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S - 246,007

APR 9 1977

Downed U-2 Pilot Tells Of Sympathy

Nearly ten years ago, U-2 spy pilot Gary Powers came home to the United States from a Russian prison amid accusations from congressmen, veteran's association leaders and the press that he was a traitor.

Now, after almost a decade of silence, Powers is telling "my side" for the first time and, he said yesterday, he is getting a wave of sympathy for what he did and how he did it.

Powers, whose new book is called "Operation Overflight," spoke before the Del Mar Rotary Club at Whispering Pines.

"I am getting hundreds of letters from total strangers who are apologizing for having thought of me as a traitor for more than 10 years," Powers said.

Powers was a pilot for the CIA when he was shot down 1,260 miles inside the Russian border while on a spy flight from Turkey to Norway on May 1, 1960.

His capture and the nature of his mission led to the breakdown of the 1960 summit conference in Paris between Nikita Khrushchev, President Eisenhower, Harold MacMillan and Charles de Gaulle with Khrushchev shouting so loudly that De Gaulle later confided to Eisenhower, "I was obliged to tell him to lower his voice."

Powers was tried and imprisoned in Russia until 1959 when he was exchanged for Russian spy Rudolph Abel.

His return home was chilling. "One government official said that exchanging me for Robert Abel was like swapping Mickey Mantle for an average player. The then head of the American Legion said I had served my country badly, but he knew nothing of what I had done or anything about the program.

"Others said I should not be paid my salary, while others said take it and get out of the country," Powers said.

Powers said yesterday that

he could see some similarity between his own position and that of Lt. William J. Calley.

Both are men thrust into a position that they did not seek and both men were catapulted into the public eye, he said.

"But we rode reverse waves."

"I had a wave of public condemnation. Calley had a wave of public acclaim. I wonder if I will stay that way."

"Mine is changing to public acceptance. Once the wave wears away. I hope Calley's wave does not change to condemnation," Powers said.

He said the Calley case should have been "an internal matter for the Army" and the massive public exposure and added, "Just like now, Calley's life will never be the same again."

KNEW HE WAS SPOTTED

To the Rotarians, Powers described his fateful flight over Russia.

He knew he had been spotted because the contrails of Russian fighters tracked him far below. In fact he was flying so high that he could only see the trails and not make out the aircraft far below, he said.

He has publicly stuck to his altitude of 68,000 feet because the ceiling of the U-2 plane is classified, but yesterday he said, "I will concede that I was higher than that."

He told of the explosion behind his aircraft but he did not see anything. If it had been a plane he would have seen it and he remains convinced that it was a surface-to-air missile that downed him, he said.

First the wing folded back, then the tail fell off and part of the fuselage.

FELL SEVEN MILES

Fell seven miles down in the cockpit but the ejector would not work.

He struggled out manually but forgot to undo two oxygen hoses.

"I fought my way back to the cockpit and remembered I had not pushed the destruct switches which had a 70 second delay, before blowing up the aircraft," he said.

But the oxygen hoses snapped and he fell away without being able to push the switches.

"I knew I was within four inches of those switches when the hoses snapped," he said. He parachuted to earth and was captured.

SAYS EVIDENCE FELL

He denied that it was failure to push the switches which resulted in his mission being discovered as a spy mission, saying that evidence from the breaking aircraft was falling over a wide area.

He was captured, tried, convicted and released and a "million words have been written about it," he said.

He carried the condemnation of his nation alone despite getting support from his leaders behind the scenes, Powers said.

In fact, in 1965, the CIA gave him the Intelligence Star for Valor, one of the CIA's highest awards, but nobody would make any vocal support of him, he said.

After his release he worked as a test pilot for Lockheed testing modifications to the U-2.

UNEMPLOYED NOW

Now he is unemployed and looking for work, "but not many people want a 41 year old test pilot," he said.


Would he do the same again?

"Yes, if I only had the same knowledge. But if I knew how the press and some of the national leaders would react, I could save myself a lot of difficulty," he said.

7 MARCH 1971

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

STATINTL



FRANCIS GARY POWERS AT MOSCOW U-2 TRIAL.

LOOKING FOR TROUBLE

Every week or so Communist China announces a "serious warning" against overflights by American aircraft.

Usually the warning comes from the New China News Agency whose broadcasts are picked up in Tokyo, Hong Kong, and other Far Eastern listening posts.

A recent one declares, "U.S. military aircraft flew over Yungshing Island in Kwangtung Province on four occasions this past Friday, Saturday and Sunday."

"A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry has been authorized to issue the 480th serious warning."

It is no secret that un-

marked American spy planes are regularly overflying Red China on photographic missions. Frequently our men fly SR-71 reconnaissance jets at heights of 80,000 feet or higher. They take off from the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, streak across the Chinese mainland, return in a few hours and drop their film via parachute just in case their planes might crash.

These are definite spy missions; and while the Chinese have not yet developed anti-aircraft missiles sophisticated enough to bring down an SR-71, it is just a question of time before they do.

It was on a similar spy mission in 1960 that the Russians shot down Francis Gary Powers in his U-2, thus precipitating a crisis with the Soviet Union and leading to the subsequent deposal of Nikita Khrushchev as Premier.

For months Khrushchev had been telling the Soviet military hierarchy that he knew and understood Eisenhower, that the American President was a man who could be trusted. Then the U-2 incident developed, and Khrushchev's credibility was reduced to zero.

If American spy planes are shot down over China, we will have no recourse to the court of public opinion.

1 MAR 1971

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

INVESTIGATIONS:

Oswald and the U-2

Among the countless questions left unanswered in 1964 when the Warren commission wound up its ten-month investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy was one that piqued scholars and assassination buffs alike: did Lee Harvey Oswald, when he defected to the Soviet Union, deliver any secrets about America's U-2 spy plane?

In its massive Report and Hearings, comprising nearly 10.7 million words, the commission dismissed, on good evidence, the notion that Oswald was ever

a Soviet agent. If the Russians had recruited him as a spy, the reasoning ran, they would have advised him to stay in the Marine Corps, where he had some access to military secrets. If they had hired him as a killer, they wouldn't have sent him to Texas with no money and a Russian wife.


But the question remained—did Oswald, when he got to Moscow on a tourist visa in October 1959, volunteer any information that helped the Russians shoot down Gary Powers's U-2 plane over Sverdlovsk six months later? The possibility seemed farfetched, but the commission, in its hearings, brought out two provocative facts. (1) Oswald, in 1957-58, served as a radar operator at two bases from which U-2 planes operated—Atsugi, Japan, and Cubi Point, near Manila, and (2) when he first visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow he intimated he knew "something of special interest" that he planned to tell the Russians.

One paper among the 1,555 numbered documents in the Warren commission files was obviously addressed to that question. Commission Document No. 931, a memorandum from CIA director Richard Helms to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, was indexed "Lee Harvey Oswald's access to classified information about the U-2." But the memo itself was labeled "secret" and locked in the vault-like "Classified Records Area" of the National Archives, along with 389 other reports that the commission never made public.

Scratched: Last week, more than six years after the Warren commission was disbanded, the Helms-to-Hoover memo finally surfaced as the National Archives, after a year-long review with the CIA, FBI and other agencies, quietly scratched the "secret" and "confidential" labels from 85 commission documents. The newly declassified material, examined by NEWSWEEK's Charles Roberts, shed little light on the assassination but did provide an answer of sorts to the U-2 riddle.

In his memo to Hoover, dated May 13, 1964, Helms tartly dismissed a letter from the FBI director suggesting that Oswald may have compromised the CIA's spy plane. His rejection of Hoover's inquiry, however, was based almost entirely on his assertion that U-2s operated at Atsugi and Cubi Point from hangar areas that were inaccessible to Oswald. Conceding that "there were rumors and gossip" about the U-2s and that Oswald "could have heard such gossip," Helms maintained "there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe" that Oswald obtained "factual knowledge" of the U-2 or its mission.

Obviously annoyed at his rival intelligence chief, Helms pointed out that his agency's U-2 "did not gain worldwide notoriety" until the ill-fated Powers mission. "Therefore," he wrote, "it is highly unlikely that the term 'U-2' would have been used by Oswald, even if he had heard it and had been able to identify the term with any aircraft at Cubi Point, Atsugi or anywhere else."



Oswald and wife in Russia: No secrets

Helms's contention that Oswald was "unlikely" to understand the implications of the U-2 is itself unlikely to satisfy critics of the Warren commission. Neither will new tidbits of information in the other declassified papers. One long-anticipated "secret" CIA report on "Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnaping" is little more than a rehash of known murders and abductions by the Russian security police in the 1950s, with a conclusion by one ex-KGB agent that it was "highly unlikely" Moscow would order the liquidation of a U.S. President.

Grisly Reminders: Along with transcripts of four of the commission's eleven meetings, some 300 documents remain classified—kept in a room behind a combination lock that only three archivists are permitted to open. One, a CIA report, bears the intriguing title "Soviet Brainwashing Techniques." Another is a report on the FBI's interrogation of Yuri Nosenko, a KGB agent who defected to the U.S. ten weeks after the assassination. Also on the green metal shelves are such grisly reminders of Dallas as President Kennedy's bullet-pierced jacket, Oswald's rifle, the autopsy pictures, the bullet that fell from John Connally's stretcher and even the movie camera with which dress manufacturer Abraham Zapruder filmed the assassination.

Barring a court order—three suits are now pending against the government under the Freedom of Information Act—the archives will not conduct another "declassification review" until 1975. Officials who have seen the still-sequestered documents scoff at the idea they would incriminate anyone other than Oswald. "But as long as there is one piece of paper still locked up," one archivist observed, "there will be somebody insisting that it holds the key to the assassination."

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STATINTL

BY STEWART ALSOP

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

WASHINGTON—President Nixon, like all modern Presidents, is the target of a continuous bombardment of intelligence reports. Recently, three reports he has received must have caused the President to stop and think—and then think again. These reports, which to most readers will seem of passing interest—if any at all—may be summarized about as follows:

1. There is evidence, as yet inconclusive, that the Soviets intend to six-MIRV their 300-plus SS-9s. In other words, the huge intercontinental missiles are to be equipped with six independently targeted warheads, rather than three, as previously expected.
2. Last October, the Soviets carried out an eleven-day series of tests whose purpose was to make it possible to destroy intelligence satellites over Soviet territory, without using nuclear warheads. Similar, less sophisticated tests had been carried out in 1968.
3. Several prototypes of the Foxbat (U.S. code name) aircraft have been tested in Russia, and the plane is now believed to be in line production. The Foxbat is unquestionably the best aircraft of its kind in the world.

To most readers all this no doubt sounds like cold-war gobbledegook. But it is sometimes useful to try to put yourself in the President's shoes. For a nuclear-age President's first concern has to be the actual physical survival of the United States as a functioning society. Thus a President, unlike the rest of us, cannot afford to duck into the nearest intellectual foxhole, muttering comforting clichés about Pentagon propaganda or the horrid old military-industrial complex.

A President has to take serious intelligence, like the three items listed above, seriously. These three items go right to the heart of the great decision now confronting President Nixon—how to respond to the latest Russian proposal in the SALT talks.

In the last meetings in Helsinki, which ended in December, the Russians put on the table a reasonable-sounding proposal for eliminating all ABMs except those in the Moscow and Washington areas. Distinguished scientists and influential editorialists have passionately urged the President to give this proposal a positive response, when the talks resume in Vienna in March. To do so would certainly be politically popular. Moreover, any

agreement which might tend to slow or halt the arms race would obviously be in our interest, and the world's.

And yet—and yet. Put yourself in the President's shoes, and consider those three items of intelligence. The Soviet SS-9 is a "counterforce" weapon. Its only logical use is against our Minuteman missile complex—the SS-11 and other Soviet weapons are quite adequate to destroy our great cities. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has announced that the Soviets, having deployed about 300 SS-9s, seem to have slowed or halted deployment.

This could be good news. It could be a signal from the Soviets that they are serious about a SALT agreement. But if the intelligence about the six-MIRVed SS-9 is correct, it could be the very opposite of good news.

The Pentagon's chief scientist, John Foster, has assured Congress that our Minuteman retaliatory force will not be seriously threatened until or unless the Soviet SS-9 force reaches about 420 missiles. This assurance was based on complex mathematical computations, plus an assumption—the assumption that the SS-9s would be triple-MIRVed, as our much less powerful Minuteman III missiles are.

But the SS-9 has an immense warhead—roughly 25 megatons as against the Minuteman's 1 megaton. This very high yield reduces the accuracy requirement. For example, if the SS-9 were triple-MIRVed, each vehicle would have a warhead of about 5 megatons, and a CEP (circular error probable) of about 440 yards would be required. With six MIRVs each warhead would have a yield of about 1 megaton, and a CEP of about 300 yards would be required to destroy a Minuteman in its concrete silo.

ARITHMETIC

If the Soviets are going for a six-MIRVed SS-9, this would mean that they are confident they can build a 300-yard CEP into their SS-9s. This in turn would mean that they would need no more than 300 SS-9s, to knock out the U.S. Minuteman complex of just over 1,000 missiles, in a first strike.

This arithmetic may seem insane, something for Dr. Strangelove. But a President in the nuclear age has to consider the insane arithmetic. He also has to consider the meaning of those

Suppose there were a crisis as dangerous as the Cuban missile crisis—or more so. Suppose this President, or his successor, knew, or suspected, that the six-MIRVed Soviet SS-9s were capable of knocking out our whole land-based retaliatory force in a first strike. Suppose that, in this time-of crisis, one of our Samos intelligence satellites simply disappeared. If it were knocked out by a nuclear warhead, this would be in flat contravention of the test-ban treaty, and very close to an act of war. But suppose it has just disappeared.

STRANGELOVIAN

Suppose a second Samos has disappeared also. What then? The obvious answer would be to send over the Soviet land mass an SR-71 reconnaissance plane—the supersonic, very high altitude SR-71 is the modern descendant of Francis Gary Powers's U-2. But here the third item of intelligence has to be considered. The Foxbat is specifically designed to knock out, not only the comparatively slow and low-flying B-52s, but the SR-71s too.

So the SR-71 disappears too. The U.S. is like Samson, a blind giant. What then? Does the blind giant pull down the temple of civilization?

After the Cuban missile crisis, Russian diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov, meeting with John J. McCloy, who was acting as President Kennedy's personal representative, confirmed Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the Cuban missiles, and then added a comment: "This is the last time you Americans will be able to do this to us."

During the Cuban missile crisis the strategic advantage favored the United States, by a ratio of about six to one. Kuznetsov's comment was a clear warning that the Soviets meant to reverse the odds, and they have been working away doggedly to do so ever since. If the President accepted the Soviet SALT proposal—and if the intelligence cited above is accurate—the odds might indeed be reversed.

It is easy for a bystander to dismiss this sort of thing as a Strangelovian nightmare, and to take comfort in the uncomfortable fact that the United States will always presumably have what it takes to destroy the Soviet Union if the United States is willing to be destroyed. But the President of the United States is not a bystander. What would you do, if you were in his shoes?

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

SR-71s Eye China From 80,000 Feet

By Jack Anderson

American crews are flying spy planes over Red China, thus risking another U-2 incident, to photograph military developments on the Chinese mainland.

The downing in Russia of a U-2 spy plane, with a sheepish American pilot aboard, broke up a Big Four conference and precipitated a crisis with the Kremlin in 1960. During the uproar that followed, an embarrassed President Eisenhower halted U-2 flights over Russia.

But U-2 pilots with kaleidoscopic cameras continued to spy from the stratosphere upon China. They now, however, fly pencil-shaped, SR-71 reconnaissance jets, which soar faster than 2,000 miles per hour and higher than 80,000 feet.

The Chinese, meanwhile, are developing more sophisticated radar and anti-aircraft missiles, which might bring down a future SR-71 and repeat the U-2 embarrassment all over again.

Certainly, it's no secret to Red agents that two-man American crews blast off regularly from Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, in mid-morning on spy flights over the Chinese mainland. They streak almost straight up until they disappear like tiny black needles into the distant silver lining.

SR-71 reconnaissance planes each can film 60,000 square miles in one hour.

In late afternoon, the returning spy planes contact the tower at Kadena with a code signal. The controllers immediately warn off other aircraft. Then one by one, the SR-71s "drop the box" on their first pass.

Translated from intelligence lingo, this means the film packets are dropped by parachute. The objective is to make sure the precious film, obtained at such jeopardy to the lives of the volunteer pilot and reconnaissance officer, is safe even if the multi-million-dollar aircraft should crash on landing.

At Kadena, the black, two-engine, delta-winged SR-71s are set apart from the buffalolike B-52 bombers. There isn't a spy on Okinawa who doesn't know the mission of the unmarked spy planes. Communist runners sometimes wait on the roads for the SR-71s to take off so the news can be flashed by clandestine radio to the Chinese.

An Air Force spokesman, not unexpectedly, refused to comment on the spy flights. All he would say was that the SR-71 flies so high that "most residents along the routes are unaware of its presence."

Washing Whirl

Too Much Economy -- The White House put economy ahead of good judgment in dispatching only one funeral plane to Georgia for Sen. Richard Russell's funeral. State Secretary Bill Rogers, Defense Secretary Mel Laird, CIA Director Dick Helms and every member of the Joint Chiefs were loaded aboard the same plane. The dispatchers shuddered at the thought of what would happen if the plane should crash.

America's Air Guerrillas—

Will They Stop Future Vietnams?

What is the full story behind the man being congratulated by President Richard Nixon in the picture above? **by Donald Robinson**

The man is U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Leroy J. Manor. His name appeared in headlines as the commander of the recent daring attempt to rescue American prisoners of war in North Vietnam. As people around the world know, the mission flew about 100 U. S. commandos in a gallant but futile effort to free POW's at the Sontay camp 23 miles from Hanoi.

Few people know, however, that this brand of daredevil military action is the rule, not the exception, for General Manor and the hush-hush outfit of air commandos he commands, the Special Operations Force (SOF).

"If we can get into it early enough, we can probably keep any insurgency situation from expanding into another Vietnam-sized war," says General Manor, whose SOF has been active in 28 countries, such as Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Peru, Guatemala, Spain and North Korea.

Secretly established by President John F. Kennedy in April, 1961, the SOF has introduced a new dimension to guerrilla warfare. The hard-trained air commandos use a diversity of aircraft and a fantastic assortment of deadly weapons to harass the enemy.

SOF goes into a friendly country with approval of the State Department, often in collaboration with the CIA or Green Berets.

Top secret missions

Here are several missions, some of them untold, which SOF has carried out:

VIETNAM—The air commandos tasted battle in the spring of 1962 when President Kennedy covertly sent them to the aid of the beleaguered South Vietnamese. Wearing civilian clothes and flying planes with the markings of the South Vietnamese Air Force, the commandos attacked Vietcong concentrations in the jungles. It was the first time that SOF was already interwoven into the fabric of the nation.

SOF staff officers say without hesitation, "We should have gone into South Vietnam back in 1956 when the insurgency was beginning. Then we could easily have smashed it."

THAILAND—Here it's been different. When Hanoi-paid terrorists began infiltrating northeast Thailand in 1964, the Pentagon secretly dispatched a team of 32 air commandos, which has since grown into an entire wing, numbering many hundreds. They have kept the guerrillas on the run ever since, spilling out flares that turn jungle nights into day, then bombing and strafing the area. They've raced Thai troops from hot spot to hot spot near the Laotian border and given them fire support. They've destroyed guerrilla supply caches and cut escape routes.

They've given guerrillas a dose of their own medicine by forming six-man tracking teams who move as stealthily as American Indians. They can trail a guerrilla band through the jungle for weeks on end, even eavesdrop on their campfire conversations, and at the right moment call in an SOF plane for a surprise attack.

NORTH KOREA—The air commandos have undertaken some astonishing clandestine missions in North Korea. Details on the North Korean actions are top secret, but an SOF officer who served in the South during the mid-1960's remembers drawing up plans for commando missions into the North which would knock out some of the enemy's ability to infiltrate into the South.

TIBET—The United States trained a force of Tibetan peasants to counter the threat of Chinese aggression in the late 1950's, when the SOF was merely an unnamed collection of Air Force units working with the CIA.

Col. Fletcher Prouty, a now retired Air Force officer who helped organize the SOF in 1961, tells the story:

"We knew the Chinese were going to come into Tibet, so we started recruiting a resistance force from among the natives. Up to 42,000

Tibetans were put under arms.

"We flew groups of tribesmen from Tibet to Saipan and from there to the Rocky Mountains in Colorado, where the atmosphere is similar to the Himalayas, for combat training. In six weeks they were back in Tibet, and a fairly good ground force was built up. But then Gary Powers' U-2 was shot down in 1960, and President Eisenhower cut off all such missions."

SAUDI ARABIA—In 1963, a routine SOF training mission uncovered an Egypt-sponsored plan for revolution in Saudi Arabia. An SOF officer was flying with a Saudi Arabian Air Force pilot in an American plane over the desert, teaching him counter-guerrilla tactics, when he spotted some strange-looking bundles on the sands below. They landed and found 130 Egyptian parachutes with Czech rifles and ammunition. Cairo was trying to start an uprising against the pro-Western King Faisal, but the Egyptian pilots had missed the drop zone.

A squadron of USAF fighter-bombers soon arrived along Saudi Arabia's borders for a show of strength and President Nasser lost taste for the uprising.

LATIN AMERICA—SOF training of Latin American air forces has been extensive.

An SOF team trained and advised the Bolivian Air Force units that helped to track down the Castroite guerrilla chief Che Guevara.

I watched an SOF team instructing the Guatemalan Air Force in helicopter tactics. The Guatemalans had been employing small helicopters that couldn't fly above 10,500 feet. Any time the Guatemalan airmen pursued guerrillas into the towering mountains, the Communists climbed beyond reach and shot down at the "choppers" with impunity.

The SOF got them three big Bell helicopters from the U.S. that could soar higher than any mountain in Guatemala. Guatemalan pilots were taught how to maneuver the new "choppers" in the violent winds, how to land troops under fire, and how to attack enemy strongpoints.

STATINTL

NEWARK, N.J.
NEWSE - 267,289
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JAN 28 1971

U.S. Seeking to Reconcile Spying With Democracy

By NATHAN MILLER
Editorial Research Reports

Washington

The United States still is trying to find an acceptable formula for mixing undercover operations with democracy. The latest disclosure that the Army has been spying on thousands of civilians again raises questions about the seemingly uncontrolled growth of intelligence operations in this country.

Most of the Army's civilian-watching began in 1967 when it was called in to deal with racial and antiwar disturbances. Ranking officers discovered they had no information on potential troublemakers. An organization called Continental United States Intelligence was set up to get it. Before the unit was disbanded in 1969, it had fed the names of some 18,000 civilians into its computers, dossiers and files.

In the wake of charges that this was the entering wedge of the police state, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird last Dec. 23 ordered a shakeup of military intelligence operations to place them under stricter civilian control. Laird said he wanted to make sure these activities were "completely consistent with constitutional rights, all other legal provisions and national security needs."

Meanwhile, it was reported yesterday that the Army has ordered a "purge" of the files at its counter-intelligence headquarters at Ft. Holabird, Md. However, the directive permits continued spying on some civilians, such as those engaged in attempts to subvert military morale or in un-

authorized activities near Army facilities.

Prime Target:

Most of the past criticism of intelligence operations has been directed at the CIA. It was blamed for the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, where it had charge of planning the operation and carrying it out. The "company"—as it is sometimes known—also was strongly criticized for its handling of the U2 incident in 1960.

More recent was the outcry in 1967 when it was disclosed that the CIA was using dummy foundations to fund the National Students Association, cultural organizations and the international operations of some unions. Plans were announced to study the possibility of creating a quasi-public agency to handle such transactions, but no report was made.

Spying on civilians goes much further than Army snooping on politicians and potential troublemakers, according to Sen. Sam J. Ervin, D-N.C. His Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights has scheduled hearings for Feb. 23 in an attempt to end what he has called "this warfare on the American people."

Ervin has charged that the Civil Service Commission keeps a total of 15 million names in a security file. Thousands of other names are being fed into the computer of the Justice Department's Civil Disturbance Group. The Secret Service has a computerized list of activities. The Department of Transportation has an electronic dossier of 2.6 million Americans who ever had a driver's license suspended or revoked. America is well on the way to becoming a dossier society.

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — President Nixon has become dissatisfied with the size, cost and loose coordination of the Government's worldwide intelligence operations.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year, it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The Defense Department spends more than 80-

per cent of the total, or about \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now—half-way through his term—he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Son Tay prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted in U-2 photographs a large shipyard and a submarine buildup at Cienfuegos,

Cuba, last September. Suspicious, based on the arm of a mother ship, plus two conspicuous barges of a type used only for storing a nuclear submarine's radioactive effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intelligence behind-the-scenes negotiations and the President's rewarning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed ships "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist dealing with reporters, but in views over several months with Federal officials who deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retired from intelligence careers with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics on numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines, airpower for the talks with Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks with this extremely sophisticated formation base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon."

We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's effort to improve the quality and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, he has no direct authority over about 10 per cent—\$500-million to

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Khrushchev Remembers

With an introduction, commentary and notes by Edward Crankshaw.
Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott.
Illustrated. 639 pp. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. \$10.

By HARRISON E. SALISBURY

First things first. This is Nikita S. Khrushchev speaking—speaking in a voice that often is his familiar earthy self, flailing at Stalin (and paying off old party scores), again justifying his brashest, most dangerous maneuvers, preening himself over Eisenhower, Dulles, “that son-of-a-bitch Nixon,” Mao (“not a madman”) and Malenkov, warm but a mite condescending on J.F.K. and R.F.K., tendentiously revising history to burnish his image and, finally, like a great Russian patriarch, calling upon his countrymen to create a new and better society, a freer more pleasant community of men under, of course, what he calls the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

At the same time Khrushchev unconsciously portrays as few before him the tedium, banality, the posh-lust of the Kremlin system, the horror of the Stalin years, the abasement of Soviet morals by the gangster ethics of Stalin's police. (“Better I do it than have it done to me.”) Sometimes, he reveals, Stalin passed around to be signed by the Politburo the verdicts on their closest associates. But sometimes not. The procedure was so casual that to this day Khrushchev cannot quite remember whether he signed the death warrant of his brilliant associate, N. A. Voznesensky. “That's what was meant by ‘collective sentencing,’” he adds.

But don't let me get too deep into

Mr. Salisbury, an assistant managing editor of *The Times*, is the author of “The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad.”

“Khrushchev Remembers” without attempting to define more precisely what this book is and what it is not. It is not a memoir in the conventional sense. Indeed, Khrushchev probably has never put his thoughts down in writing.

We are dealing here with a corpus which began as an inchoate jumble of rambling family-taped conversations. These raw notes (often confused and inaccurate) have been censored, patched, edited, retted, twisted, distorted and strained through a variety of “editings” which

probably began with Khrushchev himself and his immediate entourage, including son-in-law and ex-Izvestiya editor Aleksei Adzhubei. Other fingers in the pie almost certainly belonged to a Politburo member or two, and one or more factions of the Soviet police Establishment which finally seems to have authorized the chameleon-like police literary agent, Victor Louis, to convey the package, complete with a marvelous album of family snapshots, to the West. There the button-down-collar editor-specialists of *Time*, Inc., and Little, Brown, with the not always unerring aid of Kremlinologist Edward Crankshaw, have remarkably transformed this bundle into a fascinating document which, if devoid of spectacular revelation and notably questionable in antecedents, at least gives us a Hogarthian picture of Russian life at the top under Stalin, under Khrushchev, and as it is today.

Khrushchev seems to have commenced his tapings (judging from fragmentary internal evidence) in 1965 or 1966, a year or two after his fall from power and at a time when an energetic and ambitious man might still hope for some kind of a political comeback. The latest segments were dictated toward the end of 1969 or early 1970 (this can be established by his references to events after the death of Ho Chi Minh in the autumn of 1969, and to Fidel Castro's 1970 sugar-cane quota of 10 million tons), that is, at a time when Khrushchev could not hope for a return to power but could still try, perhaps, to illuminate his reputation, encourage any persisting Khrushchevites, pay back enemies and lay some guidelines for the future.

If these were Khrushchev's motives, those of the party and police accessories who permitted the materials to reach the West almost defy intelligent analysis.

A case can be made that someone (Politburo member? Warring police bigwigs?) is using Khrushchev as a weapon against the neo-Stalinist regime of Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny. Or, alternatively, that someone is and his liberalizing philosophy by de-

liberately planting this package in the West. Two items are surely bound to catch Kremlinological fancies. The book contains a panegyric to Ivan S. Serov, Khrushchev's own police chief (“an honest, incorruptible, reliable comrade despite his mistakes”) who was dismissed in 1958, and a gratuitous tribute to the recently deceased General Penkovsky (“General Penkovsky is still alive and well. I wish him one hundred years of life and happiness”). Penkovsky was the great-uncle of Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet agent whose exposure as an extremely high-level conduit to Western intelligence caused an enormous scandal in Soviet Government and police circles.

At the same time Khrushchev makes savage condemnations not only of Stalin's police aides like Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria but of a coterie of police-political figures prominent in the Red Army, such as Kulik, Mekhlis, Shchadenko and Marshal P. I. Golikov, long the head of the Red Army's “Political Administration,” and whom Khrushchev described as crying in a paroxysm of fear at the height of the Stalingrad battle: “Stalingrad is doomed! Don't leave me behind!”

Even from this hasty survey it is obvious that we are confronted with something by no means without precedent in the murky history of documents originating (or professing to originate) in Russia since the Bolshevik regime. Dispute still sputters over the “Zinoviev letter,” the “Litvinov Memoirs” and a host of other concoctions.

Without entirely ruling out other possibilities, I think it fair to say that I do not regard

“Khrushchev Remembers” as a fake. But Khrushchev's last tapes have been tampered with almost beyond reconstruction. It would be helpful, of course, if the publishers would release for inspection their original Russian text, with its confusions, bumbling vagaries and all.

Nonetheless, “Khrushchev Remembers” is on its own special terms a formidable document, a valuable testament in the history of Russian Communism. Nothing demonstrates as does this work the shabby fate of the Russian Revolution. When the Bolsheviks defeated the Mensheviks, the S.R.'s (Social Revolutionaries) and the rest and drove them from the field, these dedicated oppositionists devoted their lives to exquisitely condemnations of the Bolshevik regime. When Leon Trotsky was exiled from Russia,

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